



*International Civil Aviation Organization*

**Aviation Security and Facilitation Plan Development Group**

**Third Meeting (SECFAL PDG/3)**  
*(Kuwait, 8 – 10 May 2018)*

---

**Agenda Item 3: Draft ACAC/MID SECFAL Plan**

**AVIATION SECURITY RESILIENCE**

*(Presented by the Secretariat)*

**SUMMARY**

This paper highlights the importance of establishing a resilient Aviation Security system to withstand and adapt to the challenges of unlawful interference in Civil Aviation.

Action by the meeting is at paragraph 3.

**REFERENCES**

- Annex 17 – *Security*
- Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP)
- Security Manual Doc. 8973, 10<sup>th</sup> Edition

**1. INTRODUCTION**

1.1 The Middle East common policy of aviation security owes its existence and evolution to a series of high-profile terrorist attacks and plots that have targeted the civil aviation since 11 September 2001. The sense of urgency generated in the aftermath of the incidents has resulted in renewed political pressure for Middle East States to close potential security loopholes through national and regional legislation. When it comes to Aviation Security, the ultimate goal is to reduce the impact of security threats and vulnerabilities. Therefore, security needs to be managed with a view to establishing a resilient system.

**2. DISCUSSION**

2.1 The first key priority in the GASeP is: *Enhance Risk awareness and response*, where the related priority actions identified are: Understanding risk is essential for policies and measures that are effective, proportionate and sustainable. Undertaking risk assessments will help to identify gaps and vulnerabilities, which can then be urgently addressed in the most practical way possible, and with optimal use of resources.

2.2 Recent terrorist incidents at airport facilities in Istanbul and Brussels have introduced new and important landside security concerns. Furthermore, emerging technologies, the changing character of risk and threat, and growing reliance on cyber are changing the nature of the threats – creating pressure on the industry to make sure it maintains its security level, with the number of air travelers projected to nearly double in the next 20 years.

2.3 The security of commercial aviation is a critical element to any State's national security, infrastructure and policy. In the prevailing environment of evolving and adaptable security threats, security risks are best mitigated by the current layered framework encompassing a range of complementary measures that are applied by Governments and the aviation industry. ICAO acknowledges that the security environment is not static, recognizing the need to be vigilant and together with the aviation industry periodically reviewing the efficacy of existing arrangements to ensure that security measures (and their outcomes) continue to meet the evolving security risks to civil aviation. This framework will effectively sustain the safe operation of aircraft, airports and associated infrastructure across the globe.

2.4 Aviation security needs to be managed with a view of not only preventing unlawful interference but as an increasingly complex discipline requiring proper identification of physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences and establishing a resilient adaptive system to counter it. While there is no “one-size-fits-all” answer, building a framework guidance to embedding resilience practices in aviation security would establish a strong and robust security culture.

2.5 Security as a preventive discipline relies on stopping threats before they happen and hence, failure is often total if the threat is not stopped. Resilience, on the other hand, focuses on the ability to withstand and adapt to unexpected events/threats and comes in a form of a multi-layered approach to identifying, managing, and responding to risk and ensuring any new security measures are sufficiently flexible to be unpredictable and capable of being scaled up or down according to changes in the threat landscape

2.6 Resilience strategies follows risk and business continuity management principles and can be a cost-effective option, as the provisioning of security, robustness and redundancies in the aviation sector would be tremendously expensive, and would still not guarantee that significant disruptions and threats do not take place.

2.7 The underlying logic of resilience is avoiding total failure. A resilient State would thus not only be able to recover when faced with the unexpected, but also have the ability to maintain a level of stability through securing at least a minimum level of basic services at all times and under all circumstances and/or recover such services within a reasonable time to minimize the adverse impact of disasters and disruptions to its airport operations.

2.8 Building a vision for resiliency begins with a recognition that security is not a steady-state business. A resiliency plan should be tailored to the AVSEC elements and processes, existing infrastructure, current and desired framework and models, budget constraints and various other factors and should balance the associated costs, budget and optimal level of availability with affordability. A resilient infrastructure can proactively mitigate and manage key security risks to enable member States to focus on capturing various aviation opportunities and reaching its overall objectives.

2.9 Unlawful interferences can be catastrophic and can lead to multiple deaths, damage to infrastructure, financial losses and lose stakeholder and public confidence. The future aviation security system should be based on all elements of the resilience cycle and should be well-balanced. It should embrace processes and technologies to support each phase of the resilience cycle.

2.10 Achieving and maintaining operational resilience should be a strategic priority. Resilience cannot be an afterthought within the State's aviation security policy. It should be key part of the management's agenda requiring major security and resilience initiatives prioritized as part of a consolidated agenda of strategic programs.

2.11 The overall focus of the SECFAL Plan is to raise the level of resilience in aviation security in line with the Africa and Middle East Aviation Security Roadmap and the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) relating to Aviation Security and Facilitation. The following objectives are set strategically in order to establish a resilient system:

- MID States to maintain an effective security risk assessment methodology;
- MID States to establish a strong and robust security culture and develop human capitals, skills and competency;
- MID States to establish a Crisis Management/Contingency Plan in order to enhance state response to accidents/incidents; and
- Strengthening cooperation and sharing information between and amongst MID states & Stakeholders.

### **3. ACTION BY THE MEETING**

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

- a) review the principal components of resilience to enable MID States to enhance their AVSEC resilience and to implement and measure improvements;
- b) encourage MID States to coordinate and integrate management disciplines to improve coherence and performance; and
- c) encourage MID States for cooperation on security concerns, in the physical and cyber domain.

- END -