



DIRECTORS GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION-MIDDLE EAST REGION

Seventh Meeting (DGCA-MID/7)
(Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 19 – 20 May 2024)

Agenda Item 5: Aviation Security and Facilitation

ONE STOP SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS – THIRD-PARTY IMPLICATIONS AND THE CRITICALITY OF INFORMATION SHARING

(Presented by the United States of America)

SUMMARY

As One-Stop Security (OSS) arrangements become more prevalent, the potential for increased security vulnerabilities and consequent shifting of risk within the civil aviation ecosystem also grows. For OSS to truly enhance global and regional aviation security, States involved in such arrangements must ensure the highest levels of security are implemented and maintained over time, to account for changes in threat, innovations in aviation security practices, and developments in advanced screening technologies. Likewise, an essential part of achieving this objective is the consistent sharing of relevant OSS arrangement information with all impacted States and stakeholders.

REFERENCES

- ICAO document: [Recognizing the Equivalence of Security Measures – One Stop Security \(2023\)](#)

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) promotes the benefits of OSS as enabling “the avoidance of unnecessary duplication of security controls and increasing the global sustainability of the aviation security system, and providing for a more straightforward transfer process for passengers and their belongings resulting in shorter connections, fewer missed connections and fewer missing bags at destination.”¹ While advocating the efficacy of such arrangements, ICAO also recognizes that States must inform receiving States of any OSS arrangements.² However, as OSS arrangements become more prevalent both globally and regionally, the potential for increased security vulnerabilities and consequent shifting of risk within the civil aviation ecosystem also grows. In particular, recent experience has shown that some States engaged in OSS arrangements have not communicated consistently and proactively with other States and stakeholders who are not party to the arrangement, yet who are impacted by it directly or indirectly, despite ICAO guidance and encouragement to States to do so.

¹ ICAO document: [Recognizing the Equivalence of Security Measures – One Stop Security \(2023\)](https://www.icao.int/Security/SFP/Pages/OSS.aspx), <https://www.icao.int/Security/SFP/Pages/OSS.aspx>.

² *Ibid.*, “Process: Verification of Equivalence” at page 9.

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 While OSS arrangements (whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral) are intended to increase the sustainability of the aviation security system, enhance passenger experiences, and increase efficiencies in aviation travel, they also have the potential to subject the aviation system to unintended vulnerabilities or additional risk if they are implemented without sufficient coordination and consideration.³ Such coordination and consideration must include not only the States that are party to an OSS arrangement, but also the receiving States, as well as the stakeholders (i.e. airport operators and air carriers) that are expected to facilitate the transfer/transit of those passengers and their baggage under the OSS arrangement. This is essential as security measures that would otherwise be carried out at the transfer airport, to include measures required by receiving States, would be eliminated under the OSS framework.

2.2 States that are party to an OSS arrangement will know the details of each other's systems on which equivalency is established, including the basis on which security measures are identified as duplicative and are subsequently eliminated. It may be equally imperative for impacted States that are not parties to that OSS arrangement to understand the specific requirements and validation processes that have been established to support such arrangements, and the bases on which equivalency was determined. This includes security equipment, and their detection capabilities, that are in use at all locations covered by the arrangement, as well as the States' continuous validation, and monitoring and quality control plans for the sustainment of the OSS arrangement.

2.3 Similarly, understanding what the States' plans are for continuing enhancements and evolution of their security systems (to include their security equipment and capital investment plans, as well as contingency plans, for the affected OSS locations) will be essential to ensuring that the OSS arrangement truly enhances global and regional aviation security, rather than unintentionally diminishing it, creating a static security posture, or unknowingly shifting the risk to receiving States. This will also allow States that are not parties to the OSS arrangement but that are on the receiving end of it to conduct their own risk assessment for operations bound for their territory given the changed security posture at the last point of departure and to manage that risk as they deem appropriate. The increasing frequency of OSS arrangements highlight the need for greater transparency and information sharing on current and planned or proposed OSS arrangements, in a manner that could benefit all Member States and reach all global and regional aviation security communities. To assist States in the process of notification and sharing information and best practices, it is recommended that ICAO, especially by leveraging all of its Regional Offices, establish a mechanism to facilitate that sharing in both a transparent and timely fashion.

2.4 When OSS arrangement information is not shared with all affected parties, ideally well in advance of implementation, it can lead to missed opportunities to resolve roadblocks that might otherwise complicate the implementation of the arrangement and/or result in unexpected costs and demands for additional resources. For example, if/when reduced security measures achieved through an OSS arrangement conflict with requirements placed on airports and/or air carriers serving the same passengers, or set forth in bilateral air service agreements, additional measures may need to be placed on the operators to compensate for the newly-created security gap. This undermines the potential facilitation benefits that OSS arrangements can provide.

3. CONCLUSION

3.1 For OSS to truly enhance global and regional aviation security, States involved in such arrangements must ensure the highest levels of security are implemented and maintained over time to account for changes in threat, innovations in aviation security practices, and developments in advanced screening technologies. Likewise, an essential part of achieving this objective is the consistent sharing of relevant OSS arrangement information with all impacted States and stakeholders.

³ *Ibid.*, "Benefits and Challenges of One-Stop Security" at page 12.

4. ACTION BY THE MEETING

- 4.1 The meeting is invited to note the information and recommendations in this Paper.

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