




ACI membership & regional offices






Air passenger traffic has surpassed 2019 level for all regions



Civil Aviation still remains an attractive target for terrorists

Fatal terrorist attacks in 2023 (all types)



AUIs against civil aviation

- 57 AUIs in 2022
- **60** AUIs in 2023
 - o 8 on aircraft in flight
 - 13 on aviation facilities (e.g. airports)
 - o 1 unlawful seizure
 - o 1 attack using aircraft as weapon
 - o 37 attacks as others



Constant update of ICAO Risk Context Statement (RCS)



ACI Regional Aviation Security Committee

38 committee members, representing over 130 individual airports

















香港 HONG KONG INTERNATIONAL





































FIJI AIRPORTS
































ACI survey: top risks for airports



Perpetrators are constantly looking for the weakest link






Landside attacks becoming frequent in the past decade



Glasgow (2007)



Brussels (2016)




Moscow (2011)



Shanghai(2017)



Istanbul (2016)



Fort Lauderdale (2017)



ICAO strengthened landside security in July 2017

(New) 4.8.1 (standard)

.... shall ensure that landside areas are identified

(Upgrade) 4.8.2 Recommendation (Standard)

....shall ensure.... security measures in landside areas are **established**....

(Upgrade) 4.8.3 Recommendation (Standard)

....shall ensure **coordination** of landside security measures.....

ACI also reacted swiftly to the rising landside threats



54% meeting of the ACI World Governing Board Montreal, 25 September 2016

Agenda item 9.d.

ACTION REQUIRED

Agenda item 9 - Draft Resolutions

d. Urging a common sense approach to landside security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The terminist attacks in the landside area of Brusselb Airport on 22 March 2016 and in Istanbul on 20 June 2016 have drawn attention to public areas of airports, with governments and in the modia.

Unfortunately, some responses to these incidents have been ill thought through, with some Governments insisting on measures that are either:

- inappropriate to the threat environment (additional measures when a risk assessment indicates that the risk is low) or,
- Simply moving the vulnerability to another location (such an additional acreening

 Simply moving the vulnerability to another location (such as abbitonal screening at the airport entrance or at a remote location.)

This Resolution lays out a set of actions for airports and ACI, advocating the implementation of practical common sense measures to protect the landside of airports.

2. BACKGROUND

Following the Drussels attack, the ICAO Council has agreed two new standards with regard to landside security, almed at ensuring that States put appropriate measures in place. These replace existing (similar) recommended practices.

ACI and many of its member argorits have some concern that the inhoduction of the near standards may prompt some States to implement inappropriate measures such as screening at the entrance to terminal buildings. We maintain our position, along with many key States, that his simply moves the vulnerability, while creating considerable inconvenience, and is not recommended.

We also have a concern that the standard may be interpreted too broady to include areas that do not have mass gatherings of people such as hotels and carparis which are owned by an arport, and thus could be considered "landade". This may be expectated by the Istantiul affact, which include involved one active shooter in a terminal car park. We believe that it therefore sould be helpful for CIAO to have a defaintion of "landade" in guidance makens!

The Resolution puts forward a number of positive actions that airports can undertake to address the threat of landside attacks, most importantly working with local regulators to ensure that scope and responsibilities are clearly understood, and there is an agreed set of measure based on a proper risk assessment.

ACI World Resolution (adopted in 2016)



Resolution APAC/12.02

Call for Airports to Consider Strengthening Landside Security

Adopted by the 12th ACI Asia-Pacific Annual Assembly 11 April 2017, Doha

The Twelfth Assembly of the Asia-Pacific Region of Airports Council International, convened on this eleventh day of April 2017, in Doha, State of Qatar,

Recognizing that

- Current aviation security measures are mainly aimed at protecting the security-restricted area, the "airside", to safeguard aircraft operations;
- Many airports are important international gateways and therefore symbolic of the country's
 public infrastructure, institutions and authorities, and attacks on these facilities would present
 an affront to the State concerned and a challenge to its capability to protect its citizens, cause
 serious disruptions to the international air transport system, attract international media
 attention and inspire fear locally and worldwide;
- The threat of terrorist attacks against the landside of the airport, especially the check-in area and the arrivals hall, does exist:
- Terrorist attacks are aimed at congregations of passengers, visitors and airport employees and causing massive damages to airport equipment and facilities;
- The airport operator, as the landlord or manager of the passenger terminal and other landside facilities, has a duty of care to the passengers, visitors and employees using these facilities and is well positioned to play a coordinative role in raising security culture and alertness amongs: its tenants and other users of the airport;

Noting that

 The ICAO Recommendation for establishing landside security measures is expected to become a Standard applicable in 2017; and


Recalling that

The resolution adopted by the 26th Assembly of ACI World on 27 September 2016 in the city
of Montréal, Canada, calls for a "common sense approach" to enhancing landside security and
for airports to work with regulators to identify a range of flexible measures such as explosivedetection equipment, dog teams and behavior detection program;

Collectively resolve to

- Consider enhancing landside security by establishing programs for employees working at the airport to identify and report suspicious activities on the landside, building a good security culture and raising security alertness amonest them:
- Consider landside security in the design of future expansions of existing terminal buildings and the construction of new buildings; and
- Strive to facilitate passenger movements with information technology and automation to avoid mass congregations in the check-in area.

ACI Asia-Pacific Resolution (adopted in 2017)



ACI Landside Security Handbook (published in 2018)



Comprehensive approach developed for landside risk mitigation

People	Physical design	Dynamic Measures
Threat and intelligence sharing Risk analysis Public awareness Staff training Clear allocation of responsibilities	Building design Roadway design Blast proofing Terminal and flow design	Physical presence of patrols Communication
Behavior detection, security culture, public awareness and reporting	Well lit areas, good terminal design	Monitoring, CCTV, patrols, overt and covert screening, canines
Crisis management processes, training, communication	Evacuation routes, design to limit impacts	Communication processes, evacuation procedures, business continuity and contingency plans
	Threat and intelligence sharing Risk analysis Public awareness Staff training Clear allocation of responsibilities Behavior detection, security culture, public awareness and reporting Crisis management processes, training,	Threat and intelligence sharing Risk analysis Public awareness Staff training Clear allocation of responsibilities Behavior detection, security culture, public awareness and reporting Crisis management processes, training, Evacuation routes, design to limit impacts

More advanced solutions are deployed for landside security



Explosives K9 team



Security robot



Crowd monitoring tools



ANPR & road blocker system



Advanced CCTV with behaviour analysis



Autonomous patrol car



Body camera



PIDS



Besides, airports are doing more to train up its people



Security exercises for landside attack




Dedicated trainings for crowd management



Security awareness campaign

Landside remains one of the least-complied areas in Annex 17



Many airports are still struggling with basic protection

- 1) Design & space constraint
 - o e.g. limited stand-off distance, gathering of crowds
- 2) Risk assessment
 - o e.g. ineffective risk assessment for landside
- 3) Stakeholder coordination
 - o e.g. ineffective communication between stakeholders for emergency response
 - e.g. balance of SEC & FAL
- 4) Vulnerability to vehicle attacks
 - o e.g. limited hostile vehicle mitigation, ineffective unattended vehicle procedures
- 5) Perimeter protection
 - o e.g. unclear landside boundary, poor maintenance of fence
- 6) Landside surveillance
 - o e.g. insufficient CCTV coverage and landside patrolling
- 7) Facilitation
 - o e.g. balance of SEC & FAL



Rising activism activities add complexity to landside protection



Suvarnabhumi Airport



Hong Kong Airport



Frankfurt Airport



Barcelona Airport




London City Airport


Specific guidance newly available on landside activism



New ACI advisory bulletin - Airport disruption caused by activism




New webinar on activism at airports



New section on "disruption caused by activists" in Doc 8973



Apart from "people" and "measures", design is also crucial



Lots of new airport infrastructure needed to meet future demand

2021-2040 total needed capex by region



- 18% of total
- US\$77bn CAPEX in greenfield
- 4.4bn passengers by 2040



- Insignificant CAPEX in greenfield
- 3.1bn passengers by 2040





MIDDLE EAST

- 4% of total
- . US\$41bn CAPEX in greenfield
- 1.6bn passengers by 2040
- 1% of total
 - US\$13bn CAPEX in greenfield
 - 457mn passengers by 2040
 - 6% of total
 - . US\$54bn CAPEX in greenfield
 - 1.2bn passengers by 2040
- **ASIA-PACIFIC**
- . US\$579bn CAPEX in greenfield
- 8.9bn passengers by 2040



Examples of airport mega project in **MID** region



Musandam International Airport (Oman)



Al Maktoum International Airport (UAE)



King Salman International Airport (Saudi)





Security-by-design becoming more important to save cost, improve security and enhance efficiency



Good design incorporating landside security elements



Courtesy of Montevideo Airport



Courtesy of Atlanta Airport



Courtesy of Changi Airport



Courtesy of Adelaide Airport



In summary....

To note:

- Landside security remains a top challenge for airports among other emerging threats
- Major challenges for airports
 - Design & space
 - Risk assessment
 - Stakeholder coordination
 - Surveillance & patrolling

To be encouraged:

- Make use of ACI's resources available on landside security (e.g. handbook)
- Work closer with airports & stakeholders for addressing landside security challenges