INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

REPORT OF THE MIDDLE EAST AIR NAVIGATION PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION REGIONAL GROUP (MIDANPIRG)

SECOND MEETING OF THE ATS INCIDENT ANALYSIS TASK FORCE

Cairo, 26 27 January 2003

The views expressed in this Report should be taken as those of the RNP/RNAV Task Force and not the Organization. This Report will, however, be submitted to the MIDANPIRG and any formal action taken will be published in due course as a Supplement to the Report

Approved by the Meeting
and published by authority of the Secretary General

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PART I - HISTORY OF THE MEETING

1. PLACE AND DURATION

1.1 The Second Meeting of the MIDANPIRG ATS Incident Analysis Task Force (AIA-TF/2) was held at the meeting room of the Middle East Regional Office, Cairo from 26 27 January 2003.

2. OPENING

2.1 Mr. M. R. Khonji, the ICAO Deputy Regional Director, MID Region welcomed the delegates to the meeting and wished them every success in their deliberations. He emphasized the importance of this second meeting and pointed out that the main objective of the Task Force is to identify deficiencies which may have a serious impact on the safety of air navigation in the region and to propose remedial actions. He stressed on the importance and quality of data received from various sources and the support of IATA in the collection and initial analysis of the reports received by airlines.

3. ATTENDANCE

3.1 The meeting was attended by a total of thirty participants from seven States (Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Oman, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) one Organization (IATA). The list of participants is at **Appendix A** to the report.

4. OFFICERS AND SECRETARIAT

4.1 The meeting was chaired by Mr. Salah Mahmoud Jrouh Al Adwan, Assistant Director-ATM from Jordan. Mr. D. Ramdoyal, Regional Officer for air traffic Management from the ICAO Middle East Office, was secretary of the meeting, supported by Mr. M.R. Khonji, the Deputy Regional Director.

5. LANGUAGE

5.1 The discussions were conducted in English. Documentation was issued in English.

6. AGENDA

6.1 The following Agenda was adopted:

Agenda Item 1: Election of the Chairman

Agenda Item 2: Review of the Terms of Reference of the Task Force

Agenda Item 3: Development of a methodology for regional ATS incident analysis

Agenda Item 4: Analysis of incident reports received by IATA

Agenda Item 5: Identification of deficiencies and corrective measures being proposed

Agenda Item 6: Any other business

7. CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS - DEFINITION

7.1 All MIDANPIRG Sub-Groups and Task Forces record their actions in the form of Conclusions and Decisions with the following significance:

a) **Conclusions**
reference, merit directly the attention of States on which further action will be initiated by ICAO in accordance with established procedures; and

b) **Decisions** deal with matters of concern only to the MIDANPIRG and its contributory bodies

8. LIST OF CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS

DECISION 2/1: TERMS OF REFERENCE AND WORK PROGRAMME OF THE ATS INCIDENT ANALYSIS TASK FORCE

That the revised Terms of Reference and Work Programme at **Appendix 2A** to the report on Agenda Item 2 be adopted for the ATS Incident Analysis Task Force.

CONCLUSION 2/2: METHODOLOGY FOR THE REPORTING AND ANALYSIS OF ATS INCIDENTS.

That,

a) The methodology indicated at **Appendix 3A** to the report on Agenda Item 3 be adopted for the reporting and analysis of ATS incidents in the region;

b) With a view to simplify and facilitate the reporting of ATS incidents to consolidate the IATA database, States/service providers use the simplified ATC Incident Reporting form at **Appendix 3B** to the report on Agenda Item 3 for the reporting of data;

c) States explore ways and means of establishing a non-punitive system for prompting ATCs to report any incident or situation which might have an impact on the safety of air navigation in the region; and

d) States accord high priority to any incident attributed to human factors, in particular, taking into account the new CNS/ATM manmachine automated environment.

CONCLUSION 2/3: ESTABLISHMENT OF A DATABASE AND THE REPORTING OF INFORMATION RELATING TO ATS INCIDENTS IN THE REGION

That:

a) With a view to assist the Task Force, IATA establishes a database for the collection of information on ATS incidents in the region;

b) States be urged to regularly send reports on ATS incidents, including remedial action(s) being taken to ICAO with copy to IATA; and

c) ATCs are invited to contribute to the IATA database by reporting through their authorities, any incident, situation or deficiency, which might have an impact on the safety of air navigation in the region.

CONCLUSION 2/4: ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AWARENESS PROGRAMME FOR PROMPTING REPORTS ON ATS INCIDENTS

That with a view to prompt reports on ATS incidents in the region, an awareness programme *e mistakes of others as you will not live long enough to make* be initiated, highlighting the objectives and nature of the process;

CONCLUSION 2/5: ATC PROFICIENCY

States are invited, through their safety management programmes, to evaluate and identify the requirement for ATC refresher courses, including English language training for ATCs with view to ensure that the level and quality of services are maintained.

CONCLUSION 2/6: COMMUNICATIONS/COORDINATION PROBLEMS

Taking into account the number of recurring incidents attributed to poor communications in the region, ICAO is invited to explore, through its regional planning mechanism, ways and means of addressing the problem.

CONCLUSION 2/7: ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

In view of the mandatory requirement for the establishment of safety management programmes by States *(27 November 2003)*, ICAO be invited to organize Seminars/workshops in the Region so as to assist in the process.

ATS Incident Analysis TF/2
Appendix A to the Report

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

NAME	TITLE & ADDRESS
BAHRAIN Mr. Mohamed Abdullah Zainal	 Head Standards Licensing & Developments Civil Aviation Affairs P.O. Box 586 Manama BAHRAIN FAX: (973) 321 029 TEL: (973) 321 028 Mobile: (973) 967 6707 E-mail: mzainal@bahrain.gov.bh
EGYPT Mr. Shawky Al Azab	 Under-Secretary for International & Internal Affairs Ministry of Civil Aviation Airport Road Cairo EGYPT FAX: (202) 267 9470 TEL: (202) 268 5420 Mobile: (2010) 604 3616 E.Mail: sh_elazab@hotmail.com
Eng. El Sayed Ahmed Mohamed Tahoon	Air Craft Engineer Ministry of Civil Aviation Airport Road P.O. Box 52 Heliopolis Cairo EGYPT TEL: (202) 268 5420 E.Mail: Sayed Tahoon@Hotmail.com
Mr. Ahmed Heshmat Abdel Kawi	Deputy, Head of Air Traffic Controlling Section National Air Navigation Services Company Ministry of Civil Aviation Cairo EGYPT FAX: (202) 268 0627 TEL: (202) 639 3950 Mobile: (2010) 601 3176
Mr. Mohamed Abdo Kasem	Director, Investigation Dept. National Air Navigation Services Company Ministry of Civil Aviation Cairo EGYPT TEL: (202) 267 0933 Mobile: (2010) 572 6411
Mr. Abdel Aziz Hamed El Naggar	Director, Investigation Dept. National Air Navigation Services Company Ministry of Civil Aviation Cairo EGYPT TEL: (202) 267 0933

NAME	TITLE & ADDRESS
Mr. Mohamed El Kady	Director of Cairo ACC National Air Navigation Services Company Ministry of Civil Aviation Cairo EGYPT FAX: (202) 268 0627 TEL: (202) 265 7849 Mobile: (2010) 650 4438
Mr. Alaa El Din El-Monairy	Air Traffic Controller App. Supervisor New Tower National Air Navigation Services Company Ministry of Civil Aviation International Cairo Airport Road Cairo EGYPT
Mr. Ibrahim Ibrahim Malouk	ACC Supervisor National Air Navigation Services Company Ministry of Civil Aviation Cairo EGYPT TEL: (202) 265 7951 Mobile: (2010) 153 8780
Mr. Ismail Aggag	A/C Avionix Inspector Ministry of Civil Aviation International Cairo Airport Road Cairo EGYPT FAX: (202) 268 2907 TEL: (202) 268 2907
Eng. Mohamed Ismail Mounir	Director, ACFT Accident Prevention Ministry of Civil Aviation P.O. Box 52 Heliopolis Cairo EGYPT FAX: (202) 634 9068 TEL: (202) 417 5499 Mobile: (2010) 540 0980
Eng. Aisha Ahmed Salah Eldin	Engineer ACFT Accident Investigation Ministry of Civil Aviation International Cairo Airport Road Cairo EGYPT FAX: (202) 634 9068 TEL: (202) 417 5499 Mobile: (2012) 266 5738
Eng. Hazem Hohamed El Saeed Awad	ACFT Accident Investigator Ministry of Civil Aviation International Cairo Airport Road P.O. BOX 52 - Heliopolis Cairo EGYPT FAX: (202) 634 9068 TEL: (202) 417 5499 Mobile: (2010) 533 4287

NAME	TITLE & ADDRESS
Ms. Gihan Abdel Alim Nassar	Flight Operation Officer ACFT Accident Investigator Ministry of Civil Aviation International Cairo Airport Road P.O. BOX 52 - Heliopolis Cairo EGYPT FAX: (202) 634 9068 TEL: (202) 417 5499 Mobile: (2012) 414 7546
Mr. Emad Daowd Nashed	ACFT Accident Investigation Ministry of Civil Aviation International Cairo Airport Road P.O. BOX 52 - Heliopolis Cairo EGYPT FAX: (202) 634 9068 TEL: (202) 417 5499
Mr. Wagdy Fouad Fahim	A/C Investigator International Cairo Airport Road P.O. BOX 52 - Heliopolis Cairo EGYPT TEL: (202) 417 5499 Mobile: (2012) 444 0229
IRAN Mr. Ali Rezvan	 Inspector of Accident & Incident Tehran Mehrabad International Airport P.O.Box 13445 1798 Tehran ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN FAX: (9821) 601 8659 TEL: (9821) 452 8013
Mr. Ahmad Ahmadzadeh	Accident & Incident Investigation Office Tehran Mehrabad International Airport P.O.Box 13445 1798 Tehran ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN FAX: (9821) 601 8659 TEL: (9821) 910 22137, 910 22118, 601 8659
JORDAN Mr. Salah Mahmoud Jrouh Al Adwan	 Assistant Director ATM Civil Aviation Authority P.O.Box 7547 Amman JORDAN FAX: (962-6) 445 2811 TEL: (962-6) 445 2312 E.Mail: ADWANATC@YAHOO.COM

NAME	TITLE & ADDRESS
Mrs. Wafa Mohammad Kayed Al-Hawamleh	ATC Investigator/Aircraft Accident Investigation Unit Civil Aviation Authority P.O.Box 7547 Amman JORDAN FAX: (962-6) 445 1141 TEL: (962-6) 445 1140 Mobile: 09962 777 86753
OMAN Mr. Saif Saleh Al Harthy	 Chief Air Traffic Control Centre Seeb International Airport P.O. Box 1 Code 111 Muscat, SULTANATE OF OMAN FAX: (968) 519 930 TEL: (968) 519 040 Mobile: (968) 942 1218 E-mail: Saif@dgcam.com.om
PAKISTAN Mr. Muhammad Arshad Malik	 Senior Air Traffic Controller F.T.O Civil Aviation Authority AIIAP Lahore PAKISTAN TEL: (0042) 922 0525
SAUDI ARABIA Mr. Mohammad Abdullah Kateb	 Air Traffic Services Dept. Presidency of Civil Aviation P.O. Box 929 Jeddah 21421 KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA FAX: (966-2) 640 1477 TEL: (966-2) 60 5000/5581 Mobile: 0566 10603
Mr. Fahad Al-Ghamdi	KAIA ATC OPS Manager King Abdul Aziz International Airport ATC Tower 6326 Presidency of Civil Aviation Jeddah 21442 KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA FAX: (966-2) 685 5768 TEL: (966-2)685 5045 Mobile: 96653 624810
ORGANIZATIONS **IATA** Capt. Amr Nabil	 Capt. A300-600 EGYPTAIR EGYPTAIR Flight Safety Flight Operations Sector TEL: (202) 276 4714 Mobile: (2012) 216 8664 E-mail: nabilamr@hotmail.com

NAME	TITLE & ADDRESS
Capt. Mohamed Manar Anaba	Captain EGYPTAIR Mobile: (2012) 210 2333
Co-pilot Tarek Farid	Flight Safety Officer + F/O A300-600 EGYPTAIR Flight Safety Dept. Flight Operations Sector TEL: (202) 267 4714 Mobile: (2012) 311 7331 E-mail: librapilot@yahoo.com
Mr. Mohamed El Said M. Abdel Maksoud	Flight Dispatcher EGYPTAIR EGYPTAIR Operations Dept. TEL: (202) 634 6480 Mobile: (2010) 122 9284 E-mail: BAKAR101@hotmail .com
Mr. Hazem Shams	Flight Dispatcher EGYPTAIR EGYPTAIR Flight Operations Center SITA: CAIOPMS Mobile: (2012) 354 8992 E-mail: Hazem_Shams@hotmail.com
Mrs. Hanada Said	Support Officer, Safety Operations & Infrastructure IATA MID Office P.O. Box 940587 Amman 11194, Jordan FAX: (962-6) 560 4548 TEL: (962-6) 569 8728 STA: AMMEBXB Mobile: 962 7746 3050 E-mail: Saidh@iata.org
ICAO Mr. Mohamed R. M. Khonji	 Deputy Regional Director ICAO Middle East Regional Office Cairo FAX: (202) 267 4843 TEL: (202) 267 4840/41/45/46 SITA: CAICAYA E-mail: mkhonji@cairo.icao.int
Mr. Dhiraj Ramdoyal	Regional Officer Air Traffic Management ICAO Middle East Regional Office Cairo FAX: (202) 267 4843 TEL: (202) 267 4840/41/45/46 Mob: (201) 01 820 339 SITA: CAICAYA E-mail: dramdoyal@cairo.icao.int

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PART II: REPORT ON AGENDA ITEMS

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 1: ELECTION OF THE CHAIRMAN

1.1 The meeting was informed that due to other commitments, Mr. Mohammed Thamer Al Khabi of Bahrain, will no longer be able to serve as Chairman of the Task Force. At the proposal of Bahrain and seconded by Saudi Arabia, Mr.Salah Mahmoud Jrouh Al Adwan, Assistant Director ATM from Jordan, was unanimously elected as Chairman of the Task Force.

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 2: REVIEW OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE TASK FORCE

2.1 Under this Agenda Item the meeting recalled that the First ATS Incident Analysis Task Force meeting (Cairo, 14 October 1999) highlighted the need for adding new items to the Terms of Reference of the Task Force. It was pointed out that most of the items of the existing Terms of Reference only referred to issues to be addressed by the first meeting.

2.2 The meeting accordingly reviewed the draft Terms of Reference of the Task Force as proposed by the Secretariat and amended it accordingly. Based on the foregoing, the meeting formulated the following decision:

DECISION 2/1: TERMS OF REFERENCE AND WORK PROGRAMME OF THE ATS INCIDENT ANALYSIS TASK FORCE

That the revised Terms of Reference and Work Programme at **Appendix 2A** to the report on Agenda Item 2 be adopted for the ATS Incident Analysis Task Force.

TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE ATS INCIDENT ANALYSIS TASK FORCE

1. Terms of Reference

To establish a mechanism for the analysis of ATS incident reports in the MID region with a view to:

i) have an indication on the frequency and nature of ATS incidents occurring in the MID Region and to propose corrective actions;

ii) assist States/service providers in the identification of deficiencies and to take appropriate remedial actions;

iii) Keep MIDANPIRG apprised of recurring incidents which may have a serious impact on the safety of air navigation in the region

2. Work Programme

i) Review the compliance of States of the Middle East Region with LIM MID RAN Recommendation 2/31, Reporting and analysis of ATS incidents by States

ii) Develop a statement of the objectives of the regional ATS incident analysis process.

iii) Carry out an analysis of ATS incident reports received through the IATA database, determine the probable cause(s), including contributory factors, and propose remedial action(s) as necessary.

iv) Make recommendations concerning the type of incidents which should be included in the regional analysis, and the form of reports which should be produced for MIDANPIRG and its Sub-Groups.

v) Identify elements which could be added in the IATA ATS incident data base.

vi) Explore ways and means of establishing a non-punitive voluntary reporting system for the MID Region with provisions for protecting the sources of the information.

3. Composition: All States on the MID Region, IATA, IFALPA and IFATCA.

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 3: DEVELOPMENT OF A METHODOLOGY FOR REGIONAL ATS INCIDENT ANALYSIS

3.1 Under this agenda item, the meeting recalled that at its first meeting the Task Force was apprised of the ICAO Accident/Incident Data Report (ADREP) data base, and work in progress in Europe to develop a classification system for ATS incidents. The first meeting of the Task Force was of the view that a decision on the exact nature of the data to be analysed should be deferred until more information on the systems being developed in Europe become available.

3.2 To date, information on type of data to be analysed and reports to be produced is still not available. In light of new requirements for the establishment of ATS safety management systems by States and the safety oriented culture being developed, the meeting was of the view that there is a need to adopt a pragmatic approach for the reporting and analysis of ATS incidents and it should be mainly geared towards the identification of deficiencies, which may have an impact on the safety of air navigation in the region and remedial action(s) to be taken. The Task Force was also apprised of the methodology being used in Saudi Arabia for the reporting/ processing and analysis of ATS incidents.

3.3 Furthermore, the meeting agreed that the Task Force should develop a simplified methodology for the reporting and analysis of ATS incident and ensure that both users and service providers contribute in the process. The meeting accordingly reviewed the draft methodology and reporting form developed by the Secretariat. Based on the foregoing, the meeting formulated the following conclusion:

CONCLUSION 2/2: METHODOLOGY FOR THE REPORTING AND ANALYSIS OF ATS INCIDENTS.

That:

a) The methodology indicated at **Appendix 3A** to the report on Agenda Item 3 be adopted for the reporting and analysis of ATS incidents in the region;

b) With a view to simplify and facilitate the reporting of ATS incidents to consolidate the IATA database, States/service providers use the simplified ATC Incident Reporting form at **Appendix 3B** to the report on Agenda Item 3 for the reporting of data;

c) States explore ways and means of establishing a non-punitive system for prompting ATCs to report any incident or situation which might have an impact on the safety of air navigation in the region; and

d) States accord high priority to any incident attributed to human factors, in particular, taking into account the new CNS/ATM manmachine automated environment.

METHODOLOGY FOR THE MID REGIONAL ATS INCIDENT ANALYSIS TASK FORCE

Appendix 3-A

SECTION 1 **COLLECTION OF DATA ON ATS INCIDENTS**		REMARKS
INPUT	RECIPIENT (S)	
1.PILOT REPORTS *(Use ICAO Model on ATS Incident report form)* 2.ATC REPORTS *(Use simplified form for ATC reporting)* 3.IFALPA *(Using ICAO Model on ATS Incident report form)* 4.IFATCA *(using ATC simplified report forms)* 5.AIRLINE REPRESENTATIVES*(Use ICAO Model on ATS Incident report form)* 6.OTHER SOURCES	IATA, MID (Preferably through email) ICAO, MID (preferably through email)	1.Report should indicate whether it is an Airprox or procedure or Facility related 2. Reports should be of confidential nature thus protecting the source of the information, unless otherwise indicated.

SECTION 2 **RESPONSIBILITY**		
IATA	-Carry out an initial analysis of the report and update the data base accordingly; -Highlight the need for immediate action if required and initiate action through ICAO	Need to specify whether it is an Airprox facility related

	MID or directly to the State or Organization(s) concerned , with copy to ICAO; -Indicate impact on safety and efficiency	
TASK FORCE	-Review the reports with a view to identify the probable cause(s) -identify remedial action(s) to be taken and determine priority *(U) or **(A)	
ICAO	-Take follow-up action and identify rationale for non implementation Apprise MIDANPIRG of developments	Indicate whether related to human resources, funding
STATES/SERVICE PROVIDERS	Take appropriate action; -Indicate target date(s) on which remedial action (s) will be taken; -Identify rationale for non-implementation; and -Request assistance from ICAO for implementation *(if needed).*	

impact on safety and requiring immediate corrective actions.

***ATS INCIDENT REPORTING FORM**

STATE/FIR: **DATE: TIME (UTC)** ****PRIORITY: U A L**			**REMARKS**
REPORTING AGENCY/AUTHORITY	***** TYPE OF INCIDENT**	ATC	
		PROCEDURE	
NATURE OF REPORT		FACILITY:	
FORMAL:		PILOTS	
INFORMAL:		OTHERS	
CONFIDENTIAL:			

ADDITIONAL DETAILS

PROPOSED REMEDIAL ACTION(S)

ANY OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION:

****U**: Urgent/immediate action required
A: To be considered of high priority and may have an impact on safety.
L: Low priority/no immediate action required

*** *Examples for type of incidents could be as follows: Procedures-Lack of/or non- - failures, unauthorized climb/descent,. Coordination failures, TAs/RA*

**Note1:- This form does NOT replace the ICAO model air traffic incident reporting form indicated in the PANS ATM-4444-Appendix 4). The intent of this form is to prompt reports from different sources with a view to identify deficiencies in the region and to take remedial action as necessary, and is to be used only for the sake of sending information to consolidate the IATA data base.*

Note2:-.These forms should be sent through the appropriate authority in accordance with local procedures/instructions.

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 4: ANALYSIS OF ATS INCIDENT REPORTS RECEIVED FROM IATA

4.1 The Task Force noted with appreciation the data provided by IATA on incidents which had an impact on the safety of air navigation in the region (See **Appendix 4A** to the report on Agenda Item 4). It was noted that all reports were mainly filed by Pilots and there is a need to prompt ATC units to send reports on ATS incidents to the IATA database. It was emphasized that the main objective of Task Force is to identify deficiencies in the region and to propose remedial action and not to apportion blame to any State/service provider or unit concerned.

4.2 The data on ATS incident reports provided by IATA, which covered period 2000 2002, was accordingly reviewed by the Task Force. An initial analysis of the report is summarized as follows:

i) It is noted that since 2000, there has been a significant drop in the reports on ATS incidents in the region;

ii) Most of the incidents triggered TCAS TAs/RAs alerts and preventive action was taken by Pilots and in some instances by ATC;

iii) Although States indicated that false RAs were triggered, no information was forwarded to the IATA database over the issue;

iv) Most of the incident reports were during the cruising phase;

v) Information on ATS incidents and/or remedial action(s) being taken by States/service providers is not being provided regularly to IATA/ICAO;

vi) Indications are that there is a low level of participation by airlines in the reporting of ATS incidents;

vii) Some reports are incomplete/imprecise;

viii) The probable cause(s) of the incidents are mainly attributed to the following:

a) ATC related

- controller proficiency, in particular the use of standard phraseology and proficiency in the use of English language in non routine situations, is the main contributory cause for ATS incidents in the region and there is an urgent need for States/ service providers to take prompt action;

b) Communications

- VHF frequency congestion remains a major contributor to ATS incidents;

- lack of coordination between ATS units and Pilots due to poor VHF communications;

4.3 Based on the foregoing, the Task Force formulated the following conclusions:

CONCLUSION 2/3: ESTABLISHMENT OF A DATABASE AND THE REPORTING OF INFORMATION RELATING TO ATS INCIDENTS IN THE REGION

That:

a) With a view to assist the Task Force, IATA establishes a database for the collection of information on ATS incidents in the region;

b) States be urged to regularly send reports on ATS incidents, including remedial action(s) being taken to ICAO with copy to IATA; and

c) ATCs are invited to contribute to the IATA database by reporting through their authorities, any incident, situation or deficiency, which might have an impact on the safety of air navigation in the region.

CONCLUSION 2/4: ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AWARENESS PROGRAMME FOR PROMPTING REPORTS ON ATS INCIDENTS

That with a view to prompt reports on ATS incidents in the region, an awareness programme be initiated, highlighting the objectives and nature of the process;

CONCLUSION 2/5: ATC PROFICIENCY

States are invited, through their safety management programmes, to evaluate and identify the requirement for ATC refresher courses, including English language training for ATCs with view to ensure that the level and quality of services are maintained.

CONCLUSION 2/6: COMMUNICATIONS/COORDINATION PROBLEMS

Taking into account the number of recurring incidents attributed to poor communications in the region, ICAO is invited to explore, through its regional planning mechanism, ways and means of addressing the problem.

CONCLUSION 2/7: ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

In view of the mandatory requirement for the establishment of safety management programmes by States *(27 November 2003)*, ICAO be invited to organize Seminars/workshops in the Region so as to assist in the process.

4.4 The meeting was also apprised of ATS incidents which have been recorded within Cairo FIR since 1998 covering a period of 5 years. It was agreed that the data will not be used by the Task Force and future reports should be sent in the appropriate format/ methodology to IATA with copy to ICAO.

ATS Incident Analysis TF/2
Appendix 4A to the Report on Agenda Item 4

REPORTS OF ATS INCIDENTS IN THE MID REGION

REF./ DATE	ACFT TYPE	FIR	PHASE OF FLIGHT	INCIDENT REPORT	PROBABLE CAUSE(S)- CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS				
					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
2000									
001 02/04/00		Cairo	Descent	LH 652 lost communication with 130.9 and had to change to 125.3. Due to extreme workload on this freq. It took several minutes to establish contact with ATC. In this situation TCAS RA was triggered by crossing intruder with less than 1000ft separation.	✓		✓		Frequency Congestion
002 13/05/00	A320	Cairo	Cruise	On handover from Nicosia control to Cairo 130.9 the controller was virtually unreadable. The situation did not improve and as the controller was working several acft in his sector the situation was potentially hazardous as no acft could hear the controller. Due to being unable to receive adequately, despite requesting another freq. we arrived in ALY at FL110. Eventually re-established contact and QSY to ALX. A controller who is virtually unreadable and does nothing to rectify the situation poses potential danger to acft within his sector. The problem remained on the return sector the next day		✓	✓		Communications problems
003 20/06/00	A320	Cairo	Cruise	TCAS Warning ALY/JED: Flight got clearance from ALY ATC to FL 330, when passing FL 305, they got TCAS (resolution), confirmed with eye contact of opposite traffic at FL 310	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS RA
004 22/06/00	A321	Cairo	Cruise	TCAS Warning CMN/CAI: During cruise, TCAS resolution (Descent). Autopilot was disconnected warning (traffic, traffic) followed by TCAS and descent from FL 330 to FL 292 was initiated.	✓				TCAS TA/RA

REF./ DATE	ACFT TYPE	FIR	PHASE OF FLIGHT	INCIDENT REPORT	PROBABLE CAUSE(S)- CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS				
					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
005 03/07/00	A321	Cairo	Approach	TCAS Warning MXP/LXR: During approach at Luxor, TCAS (Traffic, Traffic), the flight following Egyptair left its altitude and Egyptair captain avoided and reported	✓				TCAS TA
006 14/07/00		Cairo	Cruise	**Event :** ATC FREQUENCY 129.400 MHZ UNREADABLE **Description:** Cairo ATC frequency 129.400 MHZ : every message coming from the controller is strongly garbled by a background noise which leads to a message unreadable.			✓		Background noise Garbled messages
007 02/08/00		Cairo	Cruise	Between "Gibal" point and "Ast" point, we were in contact with Cairo on VHF 126,6 MHZ. No problems between "Gibal" and "LXR" point. After Luxor, the frequency was garbled by a strong whistle only when Cairo is Speaking [the others aircraft were not garbled].This problem great difficulties to monitor ATC transmissions. This problem was already encountered one month ago, and it seems that nothing is done to solve it.			✓		Frequency garbled by a strong whistle
008 04/09/00		Cairo	Cruise	Very poor R/T reception from Cairo ATC. Frequencies 129.4 and 126.6 were identified where reception varied between 1 (unreadable) and strength 2 (readable intermittently). A climb was required but under these conditions the quality of ATC reception was unacceptably poor. Other aircraft (SWR) and BAW also complained. The time of the report was 2322UTC on 4th September.			✓		Poor communications

REF./ DATE	ACFT TYPE	FIR	PHASE OF FLIGHT	INCIDENT REPORT	PROBABLE CAUSE(S)- CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS				
					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
009 11/09/00		Cairo	Cruise	**Event :** Cairo VHF is garbled by a strong whistle **Description:** Between GIBAL and LXR on 129,4 MHZ. Cairo control is unreadable due to a strong whistle which appears only when Cairo is transmitting. Other aircraft are read loud and clear. This trouble was already encountered several times since June 2000 and two reports have been already made.			✓		Frequency garbled by a strong whistle
010 15/11/00		Cairo	Airport	of 50M and 75M for Rwy 05R/23R. Ground confirmed this was the current RVR. The RVR around the parked aircraft was 300M+ so I was taken to the edge of RWY 05R by the ground engineer and I assessed the RVR to be in excess of 300M. After boarding the passengers ATC advised RVR 05R 50M/23R 375M so we departed from 23R and the RVR was at least 600M, an Air France 777 reported an RVR of 600M as given by ATC/ATIS.		✓			ATC Clearance RVR Need to check RVR
011 17/12/00		Cairo	Approach	1/ Frequency "Cairo" 127.7" almost inaudible : strong background noise making it necessary to ask ATC for repetitions several times. No			✓		VHF frequency unreadable with background noise
012 27/12/00		Cairo	Cruise	**Description:** Position on A451 60 nm from AST, VHF Cairo 126.6 MHZ, there is a strong whistle during ground to air communication Cairo is almost unreadable. (1/5). Other air station are perfectly (5/5). The problem remains until LXR (Luxor). This problem was already notified during summer. other frequency available.			✓		VHF frequency unreadable with background noise

REF./ DATE	ACFT TYPE	FIR	PHASE OF FLIGHT	INCIDENT REPORT	PROBABLE CAUSE(S)- CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS				
					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
013 20/01/00	B777	Damascus	Climb	**Summary:** TCAS RA alert during climb out of Damascus **Event and Cause:** During climb Damascus ATC (12010) cleared us to maintain FL170 initially. Shortly afterwards further clearance was given to climb to FL190. Egypt Air "opposite traffic bound to Damascus" was given descent to FL200. TA alert occurred while climbing through FL170 'traffic traffic' to be followed shortly by an RA alert 'descent descent'. RA was followed while opposite traffic was descending 1800ft above us. Damascus ATC was immediately informed and aircraft maintained FL180 followed by monitor vertical speed alert. Normal climb was resumed once opposite traffic was passed and acquired visually.	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS TA/RA
014 03/03/00	A310	Damascus	Descent	**Event and Cause:** Inbound Damascus (Abbas - Sofia). Cleared to FL 200; outbound a/c (B727) cleared to FL 190 - visual contact. 1nm offset right. Traffic advisory first - then R/A "Reduce vertical speed". Autopilot disconnected + R/A flown. Probably from high ROC (outbound) + high ROD (inbound a/c).	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS RT/RA
015 30/03/00	A300	Damascus	Climb	**Summary:** T.C.A.S RA **Event and Cause:** In Damascus FIR cleared FL250, advised by ATC of traffic A320 descending FL260 in 12:00 clock position. Traffic confirmed visually at approx. 6nm received RA to descend at 3000' per mint, at 4 NM " monitor vertical speed "descend 500' per mint. Traffic depicted read from 1100' to 900ft. No action taken as traffic confirmed visually and indicated altitude 1000' above. Other A/C, Syrian A320 white/blue tail.	✓				RA

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016 17/08/00	A300	Damascus	Descent	**Summary**: ATC Procedural control **Event and cause:** EK 003 at FL 280 and LH at FL 260 were immediately below us to ABBAS. EK 911 held at FL 310, asked to report 40 Dme Dam (on 083R inbound to DAM) reported 40 DME-ATC Cleared EK 003 to FL 310 and then LH to FL 280. At 36 DME DAM ATC cleared EK 911 to descend. Track miles to over DAL NDB (procedure lose was 26000 feet. No traffic outbound from DAM yet ATC gave priority to EK 003 and LH ahead descent EK 911. We were requested to do 3000 fpm or more by ATC. Needed to extend outbound leg over DAL NB to achieve satisfactory approach.		✓			ATC Clearance
017 24/10/00	B767	Damascus	Cruise	**Event description:** Yemenia 642 intended to climb through our level which produced a TCAS RA. Both were visual. Y642 leveled off at fl300 after their TCAS TA and climbed to fl330 after passing us visually. Damascus thought that we were at fl350 instead of fl310.	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS RA
018 18/03/00	A310	Emirates	Initial climb	**Summary:** T.C.A.S warning.**Event and Cause:** After T/OFF RWY 30L DXB passing approx. 800' T.A warning "TRAFFIC TRAFFIC" target on V.S.I passed 300' below & left of A/C centre line. Target not seen visually.	✓	✓			TCAS TA

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019 30/03/00	A300	Emirates	Climb	**Summary:** TCAS RA **Event and Cause:** Passing F270, UAE control (129.5) advised opposite direction traffic descending to F290. Traffic was sighted. TCAS RA requiring lower vertical ROC (F277) TAS commands followed. Aircraft levelled at cleared level of F280. UAE control advised of TCAS RA. For info, callsign of conflict aircraft Aeroflot 539.	✓				TCAS RA
020 11/05/00	A330	Emirates	Climb	**Summary:** TCAS TA **Event and Cause:** During climb out at ~9000' TCAS TA. ND indicated traffic at 2.5nm at 3 o'clock +600ft queried ATC who replied they (UAE centre). Dubai only had a helicopter at 3500'.Traffic appeared on ND to rapidly descend and circle behind us	✓				TCAS TA
021 08/07/00	B767	Emirates	Approach	During final app Rwy 12L (VOR/DME) at DXB. An Aircraft showed up on TCAS 9 after. Visual contact was not made but TCAS showed him to clear behind. I We were impossible to overlook for him and judging his speed/distance a sudden maneuver might do more harm than good. ATC later confirmed a Hawk-Trainer 500 ft, 300 KTS passing had us visual and was instructed to pass behind (other controller). TFC-INFO never got to us (telephone problems).	✓	✓			ATC Clearance Resulting in TCAS RA

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022 29/03/00	A310	Emirates	Cruise	**Summary:** TCAS-RA **Event and Cause:** AT TRF -10 nm, TCAS -RA, A/C above +2400' descending RA regard descent at 1500'+ per mint. RA ceased at FL 307, A/C above levelled off at FL330. ATC informed, they advised traffic MTN 2000' separation	✓	✓			TCAS RA
023 17/05/00		Jeddah	Approach	On AWY UR219, coming from TRF, we are under Jeddah control on 133.3. Quite Often, the quality of broadcast is such on the said frequency that instructions From ATC are not understandable. Remark is made by the crew. When approaching TOTAD, contact is lost. We transfer ourselves, without Instruction, on 134.4.			✓		Com
024 17/01/00	B777	Tehran	Cruise	**Summary:** Traffic Advisory F280**Event and cause:** While in crz DXB-LHR, FL 280, R659 (over Iran) opposite direction (@ F290) traffic identified on TCAS. At approx. 20nm range acft descended, TA sounded. Altitude difference 60+ to + 400ft, then traffic rapidly climbed back to F290. Traffic passed us @ F290 & identified visually as TU 154 with blue tail. For info - F310 & F350 both unavailable due traffic.	✓	✓			TCAS TA
025 02/03/00	A330	Tehran	Cruise	**Summary:** 25 NM prior to IFN, on AWY R659 under radar control, RA + 'climb' orders. Intruder observed coming from below (red target alt minus 1000')	✓	✓			TCAS RA

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026 03/03/00	A310	Tehran	Climb	**Summary:** TCAS Descent **Event and Cause:** Initial clearance from Mehrabad approach was: After departure 29 L left turn TWDS RUS (275) and maintain 6000 ft. Approaching 6000ft we were recleared to fl 100 and maintain track to RUS were told to maintain fl 100 due traffic CMD 1 was selected on AP 1 with Captain flying and fl 100 selected in ALT window the autopilot mode was PSPD, PCLB and failed to capture the altitude. The autopilot was disengaged and had overshot the fl 100 by B-400 ft. By this time we also received TCAS RA "Descend". The nose was pushed fwd to achieve +/-2000 ft descend rate within a few seconds "clear of traffic". On TCAS auto, excellent support and monitoring by F/O.	✓				On board equipment failure triggering TCAS RA
026 08/03/00	A 340-300	Tehran	Cruise	Cruising FL290. TCAS TA then RA descend, descend ! TCAS procedure (V/S -1100ft/mn). Descent carried out down to FL282. Visual contact established with an opposite traffic, on lefthand side, head-on, climbing. Aircraft type was an Ilyushin 76, flight IRP 4621. Minimum lateral separation estimated at 0.5NM, vertical one was NIL ! Flight IRP 4621 was climbing to FL310 whilst it had been cleared by ATC to FL280 and the crew understood FL310.	✓	✓	✓	✓ Crew understood Fl310 instead of FL280	TCAS TA/RA

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027 11/03/00	A300	Tehran	Cruise	**Summary:** TCAS Traffic Advisory **Event and Cause:** When outbound OISS, SHIRAZ VOR 68 DME, encountered reciprocal traffic, Boeing 737 maintaining FL 273, i.e. 700' below US - reduced vertical separation - TCAS traffic advisory sounded.	✓	✓			TCAS TA
028 13/04/00	MD 11	Tehran	Cruise	Descending from FL 310 → FL 280 due to traffic lvl 310 upon order from Tehran. Received TCAS TA. Same level 290, Opposite < 20 miles. Increased rate of descend to 2500 fpm to avoid. Passed traffic FL 282, crossing. Lateral separation zero.	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS TA
029 14/04/00		Tehran	Cruise:	Very bad reception of following ATC frequencies:119.3, 125.7, 126.3			✓		Comm
030 29/07/00	A340	Tehran	Cruise	Airprox with RA TCAS. The other traffic was at the same level. It was IRM 5004 Yerevan boundry at 22h21 UTC on airway R660 from20 NM after Tabriz (Vor-dme TBZ). After the RA TCAS we saw IRM 5004 just behind us. It seems that IRM 5004 was not in contact with Tehran Control on 119.3.	✓	✓			ATC resulting in triggering TCAS RA

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031 27/8/00	A340 -300	Tehran	Cruise	About 10 NM before ISN on R659, northbound, TCAS traffic detected 25 NM ahead at same FL and opposite direction. We call ATC for information, no reply! We have and keep visual contact with traffic. Shortly after, we receive a (TA) as opposite traffic seems turning to the right, then RA (descend) that with follow together with a message (TCAS descent) sent to ATC. New apply. At FL 302, in descent, TCAS to FL310. An Airprox initial message is sent to ATC. Conflicting traffic was IRANAIR 1563.	✓	✓			Contacted ATC no reply. Resulted in triggering TCAS TA/RA
032 22/10/00		Tehran	Cruise	Separation was 900'vertical and 0 lateral. A 100% TCAS SAVE!! KL9166 northbound on R654 between SAV and ZAJ maintaining FL310 and in contact with Tehran ACC 119.30. Southbound flight Condor 349 on same airway and also on 119.30 was cleared from FL290 to FL330. Climbing through FL300 Condor spotted us on TCAS and stopped his climb. KL9166 then received a traffic advisory and made visual contact.	✓	✓			ATC Clearance triggering TCAS TA

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033 04/11/00		Tehran	Cruise	A TCAS TA warning annunciated during cruise at FL310 (position 346 degree R system DME 12, under Tehran control in VMC). The EA50 checklist was actioned. No traffic was sighted however a solid amber circle was displayed on the TCAS display showing -06. This was accompanied by one TRAFFIC TRAFFIC aural warning. The amber circle disappeared after approximately 30 seconds. Tehran ATC was informed but had no information on any traffic operating 600 feet below our flight level. BANDA ABBAS military radar were also contacted but had no knowledge of traffic in our vicinity.	✓				TCAS TA (False)
034 19/03/00		Tel Aviv	Cruise	TLV ATC cleared us: from GITLA hdg. 300,clb FL260. In addition we were advised about military activity 40nm ahead. When passing FL210 we received traffic alert on TCAS, and visual contact with the conflicting traffic (on our right side). We turned to the left for separation.	✓			✓ Intruder acft. military	TCAS due to intruder TA

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2001									
035 17/03/01		Amman	Climb	ATC clearance was from tower freq. 119.8 to destination AQB via QTR DEP. Before T/O RWY 08R the flight re cleared by tower to climb to 8000 ft, clearance for T/O obtained. After T/O the flight requested to change to AMM radar freq. 128.8 who confirmed to climb to 8000 Ft with turn right DCT QTR. Passing 7000 Ft climbing to 8000 Ft TCAS TA activated followed by RA with DESCEND NOW message. Corrective action was taken according to TCAS warning Procedure, A/C descended to 7000 Ft and visual contact was established. The intruder was a small twin prop engines aircraft	✓	✓			ATC Clearance triggering TCAS RA
036 15/04/01	B737-800	Beirut	Approach	During our approach at Beirut airport when passing 12000ft we noticed some militairy activity over the mountains east of the airport. We asked the tower what was going on. He said two unidentified aircraft (altitude unknown) were being shot at. We could clearly see the anti a/c gnner shooting in the air and explosions in the air. We asked for the position of the two a/c. Asnwer: 15 miles east of the localiser. While considering our options we agin a/c are moving south, position 8 miles was safe to land. Answer: Yes, all operations normal. We then decided to	✓			✓	Military Intruder Other Crew kept requesting info instead of being informed by them

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				continue our approach. When capturing the localizer we asked again for their position. Now they said they are flying north again, overhead KAD beacon, which is the airport!! They were coming straight at us. We had no options left than to continue since a go-around would only aggrevate the situation. The next position report was at time I realised that our aircraft was at danger since we were in between 2 undentified a/c and the anti a/c gunners in the mountains. Our position was about 1500ft altitude on the ILS runway 18. after landing the shooting was still going on for approx 15 minutes. KLM Beirut was NOT informed by the Tower. What concerns us, is that we <u>had to ask</u> for all the info instead of <u>being</u> informed. After landing we heard that 2 other aircraft (one being Egyptair) had diverted.					
037 27/08/01	A320	Beirut	Descent	TCAS resolution to reduce rate of descent. Other aircraft 800ft just below. We were clear FL290 descending from FL370.	✓	✓			TCAS RA

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038 03/05/01		Cairo	Cruise	On frequency 121,5 (Guard) Cairo Volmet received loud and clear (at time 0550 UTC). No transmission received on 126,2 (normal Volmet frequency). At position Metru (time 0634 UTC) same transmission received till 0646 UTC (distance to Cairo more than 450 NM) Same transmission received at position PLH (time 0651 UTC) distance to Cairo environ 500 NM. This had been experienced on VHF 3 and 2 sets.			✓		Comm
039 03/05/01		Cairo		Cairo VOLMET broadcasting on 121.5 instead of 126.2. ATC Cairo informed. Broadcast continued until out of range. Also reported by other aircraft.			✓		Comm Volmet broadcast
040 10/03/01		Cairo	Descent	Within Cairo FIR ATC instructed to descend to FL 180 expedite through climb 2000-2500 fpm. A/C was indicated on TCAS at 180 climbing to 190. The A/C was Egypt C-130 with call sign 1294. An argument between ATC and the A/C was carried out where the ATC claimed that the clearance was given to FL170 only, whereas the A/C claimed it was FL 190. The auto pilot was disengaged and the TCAS instructions were carried out with no further incident.	✓	✓		Descend	ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS TA/ RA

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041 10/04/01		Cairo	Climb	After T/O from RWY 23L, crossing 3500ft, heading 250, then crossing FL050, heading 350 on request from ATC ! Since our crew are used to strictly follow ATC clearances and instructions, this matter deserves clarification and recalls the need for establishment of SIDs and STARS which appears to be a necessity in an airport having a traffic density and complexity such as CAIRO INTL.		✓			ATC Clearance Requirment for SIDs and STARs
042 18/02/01		Cairo	Cruise	Between AST and LXR, VHF Cairo (129.4) is garbled only when Cairo is transmitting (strong whistle) - The other planes are received without whistle. No whistle when nobody is transmitting.			✓		Frequency garbled by a strong whistle
043 18/04/01		Cairo	Cruise	Between AST and Katab, all emission of VHF Cairo Mhz are garbled by a strong whistle. Sometimes, Cairo is totally unreadable. We had to ask a relay from another A/C to understand ATC request.			✓		Frequency garbled by a strong whistle
044 22/03/01		Cairo	Cruise	When CAIRO is transmitting on VHF on 129.40, we only receive the carrier and the transmission is unreadable. We had the same problem last day on the other way in AF 3864 from CDG to MRU on frequencies 126.6 and 132.17.			✓		Comm Garbled transmissions

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045 11/06/01	A 310	Damascus	Descent	Kept high at FL 160 until +16 miles then would need to descend in the hold to loose height. This was approved and we were given clearance for VOR DME 05R. below to the left. We were about to turn left for parallel entry when we got RA (+7500) to maintain rate of descent. Traffic visual to the left same level less than 1nm turning towards us and climbing. We followed TCAS and once clear of conflict we turned to DAM VOR commenced the approach. Uneventful landing. Other aircraft was Syrian 411.	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS TA/ RA
046 15/03/01	A310	Damascus	Descent	EK 911 changed to Tower frequency passing ABBAS at F280. From then on DAM TWR continually used non standard phraseology and much RT from Tower was in Arabic. Before SOFIA we were given NDB 12ILS 2 for RW 23R APPR. Two mins later changed to "proceed to VOR for the VOR ILS 23R App, expect delay of about 5 mins". Flight held up at altitude and then asked to expedite through certain levels. About 6nm tower said "got you visual, turn left 10deg descend 5000"' Many times asking a/c "where are you" and Arabic RT. 911 was turned to go to VOR and outbound 038R. At 5000 feet, 038degR, tower calls saying he has us visual again and to do the approach, calling intercept LLZ. An aircraft was cleared to land 23R, while 911 was still decelerating on the runway.		✓			Non standard phraseology

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047 15/05/01	A310	Damascus	Descent	**Summary:** Descent clearance discrepancy **Event and Cause:** Entering Damascus FIR at F350 we requested descent, ATC asked if we could descent to F330 in 30 seconds.		✓		Pilot Misunderstood clearance	ATC Clearance
048 22/12/01	A310	Damascus	Descent	**Summary:** Navaid failure during approach **Event and Cause:** Just after completing procedure turn on VOR/DME OJR. The DAM VOR went u/s for approximately one minute. When questioned ATC told us to fly the NDB approach. Instead, however the NDB did not work at all. The DME worked all the time, and the flight was basically visual with the runway, so approach was continued to the DIP approximately 2NM before the DIP the VOR worked again.				Navaids	Ground Failure

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049 09/01/01		Emirates	Initial climb	**Event:** Crew error in interpretation and executed of SID OSTIN RWY 12 towards ENADA detected but not corrected by ATC. **Description:** Following a crew error about level displayed on altitude selector at 6000 ft as first level constraint after take off, we climbed 6000 ft instead off 3000 ft as requested by SID OSTIN towards ENADA.As we were not given any further frequency crossing 500 ft, I had to recall TWR to obtain that frequency. So we contacted DUBAI APP 124,9 when crossing 2500 ft with vertical speed of 1200 ft/mn. DUBAI APP level clearance. He asked us what was our level passing and level climbing. I said "climbing 6000 ft". He insisted on knowing why we were climbing to 6000 ft. He said : "who gave you this level 6000 ft ?" going on "what is your given SID ?". I said :"OSTIN 6000 ft in our ATC clearance". He insisted "read on your document OSTIN SID". I had to read again this SID and I saw my error. I apologised. He said " I will write that on paper"! Meanwhile we climbed 6000ft without any clearance.				Crew error	Others Crew error

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050 03/10/01	B747-400	Emirates	Cruise	TCAS descend RA with southbound A/C callsign AYZ 9183 on AWY A418 approx 60nm south of PAPAR, AYZ9183 was descending; BA16 CRZ F/L310 . We were crz F/L 310. A/C ahead seen on TCAS by both crew in a descent passing + 23 (reducing). Crew commented 'hope A/C would stop descent at F/L 330', continued monitoring A/C at +19 (reducing) seat belts on, landing LTS on preparation for TCAS RA. UAE radar informed of descending A/C. We were given immediate right turn hdg 090. Turn initiated followed by TCAS amber TA becoming a red RA descend. A/P disconnected to action RA descend. Min vert separation plus 500 ft lateral separation < 1/4 nm. A/C passed down left side: very close. Clear of conflict msg A/C returned to F/L 310. Both UAE radar CTL (129.5) and Teh 133.4 advised report would be filed and any relevant info should be saved. A/C event pressed.	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS TA/RA
051 03/03/01	B747-400	Emirates	Approach	Two [2] aircraft on simultaneous approaches (parallel) to runways 12L and 12R DXB. Although visual with other aircraft, TCAS RA climb followed through. Reported to ATC on R/T. ATC DXB and both aircraft were aware of their positions relative to each other.	✓	✓			TCAS RA Need to follow-up as to whether it was a true alert
052 17/05/01	B777	Emirates	Final approach	ATC trainee vectored beech 1900. Straight across final approach runway 30R. TCAS RA followed. G/S regained normal landing.	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS RA

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053 25/03/01	A330	Emirates	Initial climb	Traffic airborne from Sharjah crossed our altitude at 1500 feet going west, 5NM ahead of us departing DXB to OSTIN seen on TCAS. Time 0442	✓	✓			TCAS
054 18/05/01	B777	Jeddah	Climb	**Summary:** AIRMISS / TCAS TA **Event and Cause:** Climbing to cleared level FL250,Received a 'query' call from Riyadh ATC (126.0) [both F/O and myself are convinced that we had not missed an ATC call]. On reply ATC casually instructed 20 degrees right turn ("right" part of instruction was snot clearly transmitted). On commencing right turn we received a TCAS traffic Advisory from traffic that had just appeared descending towards us. The other aircraft was also instructed to turn but with insufficient warning.	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS TA
055 10/09/01		Muscat	Cruise	In cruise at FL310 approaching MAROB (from East on AWY R219W) we received a traffic advisory immediately followed by a resolution advisory from opposite direction Indian airlines airbus (FLT 952) at FL290 indicating on TCAS-1700 climbing approx 8NM range. Autopilot disengaged plus TCAS RA memory checklist actioned. Muscat ATC informed and we communicated with 952. Seatbelt sign switched on for TA plus TCAS RA memory checks actioned. We reached FL317 before climb- RA adjusted to - monitor vertical speed- RA. ATC (Muscat VHF) was informed and we recovered to FL310. Completed checklist plus communicated with cabin crew once -clear of conflict we communicated with the Indian airlines a/c. In 952 although not admitting, they apologised for the TCAS. Incident reported to Muscat on 123.95.	✓	✓			TCAS TA/RA

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056 16/11/01	B777	Muscat	Climb	On climb out from DXB after hand-over to Muscat control were cleared to FL 330 (our final cruise level). Through FL 290 traffic appeared on TCAS at FL 310 at approximately 25 NM same airway (T120) which we established was in opposite direction as per normal quadrilateral levels. When we queried Muscat control about the traffic we were immediately given a turn to initiate an avoiding maneuver. At about this time and approaching FL 300 we got a traffic advisory (had already got visual contact) which remained at that alert level. Traffic passed 500' below approximately half a mile to the left. (It appeared they had been cruising slightly to the right of the airway). Conflicting traffic was 'SYRIAN 512'. After avoidance continued as normal. It appeared after talking to ATC that both aircraft were adhering to cleared levels.	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS TA
057 15/11/01	B777	Muscat	Descent	Descent given by MCT to FL250 (non standard probably and he knew about traffic, but we were not informed. (Military traffic) FL 240. Due high rate of descent at the time with speed brakes caused RA, but 'ALT capture was active by then. Action taken. Traffic was visually identified. Once cleared, continued decent. Informed MCT control about it. Traffic was FL 240.	✓	✓			TCAS RA

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058 02/06/01	A310		Cruise	**Summary:** Aircraft cleared to same flight level **Event and Cause:** Cruising at fl370, we noticed an aircraft well below us, climbing out of SYN, the traffic was about 15 miles ahead of us. We heard ATC giving a clearance to an aircraft to climb to FL370. We did not know what the callsign of the traffic was but suspected that the clearance was given to him and this would bring him very close to us. I called Sanaa ATC, who seemed to have realised his mistake when we called, and without answering our call, re-cleared the traffic to fl330.	✓	✓			Wrong ATC Clearance
059 07/07/01	B747-400F	Tehran	Cruise	Opposite traffic was initially 800 ft above us at FL288 while we were cruising at FL280 Westbound on A418 between ROTAL and KASOL. It then started to descend to FL287 which activated our TCAS RA for us to descend. Subsequently it stopped descend immediately at FL287 and climbed back to FL288 as we crossed each other on our port side. We were visual at all times during the event.	✓	✓			TCAS RA
060 08/03/01	A310	Tehran	Cruise	**Summary:** TA IN CRIUSE **Event and Cause:** TA triggered by B747 MH650. They were slightly ahead of us at FL260. When TA triggered, they were showing to be 1600' below and climbing. ATC was of no help. MH6150 contacted us directly on 133.4 and explained that they had an autopilot problem and un-commanded climb.	✓			Auto pilot problem	Equipment Failure TA

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061 09/06/01	B777	Tehran	Cruise	In cruise AWY R659 F350 offset R1 approx. 50nm north of KAVOT in good VMC. Air India B747 flight no. 101 destination EGLL 2 n.m ahead was cleared by Tehran control 126.9 to leave F310 and climb F350. Unable to advise ATC due to frequency congestion transmitted blind on 121.50 to advise of conflict AI101 stopped climb at F330 after advising Tehran control, was descended to F310.			✓	Need more information on offset on R659	Comm Congestion
062 09/10/01	B747-400	Tehran	Cruise	Approaching SYZ position on Awy R654 eastbound at FL330, we noticed opposite traffic on TCAS 20 NM ahead at FL333 on awy R659 westbound. As no climb or descent was noticed, we initiated a descent while turning right off airway. Overhead SYZ the traffic mentioned had started a slow climb. Traffic advisory had been given by TCAS and visual contact had been established while PNF contacted Tehran ATC on 126.9 to advise them of the conflict. Traffic passed overhead at 33.600 Ft while we were reaching 32.600. File airprox with Tehran ATC and obtained callsign of traffic as KIL 3036 Type TU.154	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS TA
063 20/03/01	B777	Tehran	Cruise	**Summary**: TRAFFIC ADVISORY **Event and Cause:** 6NM prior to ISN, TCAS traffic noted on R659 reciprocal direction just before ISN, ATC advised but responded that traffic at F270. Aircraft visually sighted and passed almost overhead (1NM offset right flown) 700' below. Aircraft believed to be an IL76.	✓	✓			TCAS TA

REF./ DATE	ACFT TYPE	FIR	PHASE OF FLIGHT	INCIDENT REPORT	PROBABLE CAUSE(S)- CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS				
					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
064 20/09/01	B747-400	Tehran	Cruise	Flying at FL 280 ATC instructed us to climb FL310 3NM behind; TCAS was showing other aircraft. After consulting with ATC about other aircraft ATC apologized and we stayed at FL 280	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS
065 29/03/01	B777	Tehran	Cruise	**Summary :** TCAS Resolution Advisory **Event and Cause:** Enroute between SYZ to ISN on R659 1NM right of track TCAS indicated an aircraft between 500 ft and 600 ft below. ATC advised and conflicting traffic (Iran Air B727) advised of altitude error. Iran Air stated flying at FL270. Lufthansa aircraft at FL 280 10 miles ahead experienced same TCAS advisory with conflicting traffic. TCAS followed and ATC advised.	✓	✓			TCAS RA

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					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
066 09/11/01	A340 -300	Tehran	Cruise	Flight levels restrictions over Pakistan. We crossed Tehran FIR at the reporting point EGSAL at FL 240 onto airway R654 (Westbound direction). Very poor radio communications (none HF communication).Numerous blind areas between EGSAL and KERMAN. Nevertheless, after EGSAL we finally got a read back clearance for a climb towards FL 310. Around 00h20 UTC at FL 260 we have seen on the TCAS (and also in sight) an aircraft climbing to FL 280, crossing our flight level (Turkish Airlines 61). Its TAS (True Air Speed) was slower than our TAS : around 30 kt. Conversely, its rate of climb was greater. He was in front of us at 12 NM. This aircraft got the climb clearance after us but the Controller did not take into account the TAS and rate of climb differences between the two aircraft.	✓		✓		Comm
067 26/02/01		Tel Aviv	Climb	RJ263 cleared by BGN ATC to climb to FL200 with direct routing to ALPON, passing FL175, TCAC TRAFFIC WARNING initially followed by command to descend now. An immediate manual descent was carried out and reported to ATC. 3 fighters aircraft (brown to dark brown colors) sighted crossing from left to right at same level, ATC instructed us to turn left heading 200, we were heading 295, ATC later apologized and said that he had seen the whole incident and the fighters should haver been maintaining FL220	✓			Military aircraft	TCAC due to military intruder

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					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
2002									
068 -	-	Bahrain	Approach	ILS on this runway is 3 , and Papis are set at 3. The advisory heights for the VOR/DME app give a 2.5 and approach, and if followed to decision altitude put the aircraft in a lower than normal approach to be no real reason why the VOR/DME heights should not be calculated for a 3 slope, and this would make the whole picture a lot more comfortable.				Navaids	App GND NAV AIDs Other
069 15/05/02	737	Beirut	Approach	When descending out of 13000 feet ATC informed us about unknown traffic 12 clock pos, 30 NM out moving in our direction (alt unknown). Traffic past us at 9 clock pos and at the same tine ATC notified us about other unknown traffic over the airport (2 or more aircraft). In the meantime the traffic which past turned around and followed us with 10 NM spacing (all info was given by app as there was no visual contact and no indication on TCAS. The traffic near the airport was flying through Loc 17 and moving west/southwest away from the field. We continued for approach 17 as turning west would bring us in the vicinity of all unkown traffic. When on Loc 17 all the traffic was west of the airport and an uneventful landing was made.				Military	App Intruder Other

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					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
070 15/05/02	738	Beirut	Climb	Take off RWY 21, 2000 ft right turn to Balma, climb to FL 180. Shortly after take off info from Beirut radar 119.30 about unidentified aircraft heading south second unidentified aircraft also heading south head on. No mode "C" / TCAS info. Both aircraft changing heading all the time. Two fighters?? No visual \ wx radar contact.				Military	Intruder Other
071 1/09/02	767	Cairo	Cruise	Report Heading Sub-standard R/T quality in Cairo airspace. Report In sectors 1 and 4 of Cairo airspace (freqs 127.7 and 129.4 respectively) the quality of the R/T was at best 3/3 and at times totally unreadable. The same applied on the homeward flight - BA132 on the 03Sep02. Action by crew			✓		Comm
072 3/09/02		Cairo	Cruise	Report Heading Sub-standard R/T quality in Cairo airspace Report In sectors 1 and 4 of Cairo airspace (freqs 127.7 and 129.4Respectively) the quality of the R/T was at best 3/3 and at times totally unreadable. The same applied on the homeward flight - BA132 on the 03Sep 02 Action by crew			✓		Comm

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					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
073 20/09/02		Cairo	Ground	Received a report from one of our captains complaining about the behaviour of air traffic controllers in CAI. Our flight was taxiing on "A" for runway 05L. On the ground frequency, the crew was instructed to hold abeam taxi way "E" stating no reason. It was found out a little later that the reason was to push back 2 Egypt Air planes. Our flight had to unduly hold for 10 minutes at that point and another 6 minute delay for take off since it had to wait for the 2 flights to be airborne. This definitely is bad behaviour on the Egyptian side. Furthermore, while on the take off run, the tower controller started giving un-intelligible instructions to an unknown entity. This could have resulted in a rejected take off, being un-understandable.		✓			Airport ATC Clearance Need for closer coordination between Pilots and ATCs
074 05/09/02	767	Cairo	Descent	ILS Glideslope erratic from 5.0 to 4.0 CVO DME and from 3.0 to 0.0 CVO DME. (2) Outer marker inop. (3) No locator (NDB) 284Khz "OR". CVO 4.5 DME substituted for G/S height check. (4) 284Khz, when tuned, has a constant north-westerly bearing i.e. QDM 310 to 340, QDR 130 to 160. Please be informed that items (2) (3) and (4) have already been reported to ATC as same Captain submitted report of 10AUG listed below.			✓	Navaids Glide path	Ground Equip Failure

REF./ DATE	ACFT TYPE	FIR	PHASE OF FLIGHT	INCIDENT REPORT	PROBABLE CAUSE(S)- CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS				
					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
075 29/07/02	B767	Cairo	Descent	A few seconds after G/S capture at 2500ft QNH and established on the localiser, 3 autopilots engaged in CMD, the nose of the aircraft dipped sharply enough for the pilot handling to disconnect instinctively the autopilot system and fly manually. The autopilot was re-engaged immediately and no further excursions from G/S were observed. Time approx 1210Z.				Navaids Localiser	Ground Equip Failure
076 10/08/02	B767	Cairo	Descent	(1) Outer marker inop. (2) Locator "OR" NDB 284Khz continuously shows a QDM of 305 degrees from 15DME CVO Localiser 05R Finals until touchdown. No ident. (3) The only G/S check height is CVO DME 4.5. ATC were also notified.				Navaids Outermarker Localiser	Ground Equip Failure
077 09/07/02l		Cairo	Descent	"on glideslope capture aircraft dived 1600' per min and autopilot disconnected on own accord".				Navaids Glidepath	Ground Equip Failure

REF./ DATE	ACFT TYPE	FIR	PHASE OF FLIGHT	INCIDENT REPORT	PROBABLE CAUSE(S)- CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS				
					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
078 11/08/02	A320	Cairo	Cruise	**Summary:** TCAS RA Climb **Event and Cause:** Flight from BER/SSM, in contact with Cairo. Position 100NM inbound to SHM VOR cleared by ATC FL320 TO FL270. Approaching FL315, Saudia came head on FL310 climbing. A few seconds before TCAS RA, Cairo instructed us to continue descent FL250 at that time, we were visual with the Saudia, made level off, and followed each other at 200 FT. (Saudia followed (2x) immediately to ATC: NO REPLY we called 3rd time Cairo, stating the incident and report will be filed answer: SSH approached.	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS RA
079 21/06/02	A320	Jeddah	Climb	Initial climb clearance was 4000FT. Then cleared us to 5000 FT maintaining control passed information for incoming traffic. Descending to 6000FT about 6 miles 9 o'clock position. We had TA on TCAS followed by corrective resolution advisory (RA). (RA) action carried out	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS TA/RA
080 10/11/02		Jeddah	Airport	**SUMMARY:** Thales plates g20/g19 appear to lack SID designator's. **EVENT+CAUSE:** Taxying out clearance received to fly 'alpha one' departure unable to find in thales book issue 17. Clearance is ahead to 5000', which is same as radar vectored SID on plate g20. but said plate SIDS have no designators.			✓		Need for SID charts/designators

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					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
081 30/11/02		Kuwait	Airport	When cleared to line for departure, the crew noticed that the red stop bar was still illuminated informed ATC accordingly. ATC confirmed the clearance but did not switch off the stop bar		✓			Airport ATC Clearance
082 09/01/02		Muscat	Cruise	**Summary:** Brief loss of contact with muscat radar 124.7.**Event + Cause:** On calling Muscat radar, advised that radar had been trying to contact A/c all 3 flt crew had been monitoring ATC at all times.			✓		Comm
083 20/01/ 02	B 777	Muscat	Cruise	**Event and Cause:** In Muscat FIR cruising at cleared level 330 with a clearance direct to MAROB way-point traffic appeared on TCAS same level 11 o'clock and closing left to right. It occurred during radio hand-over. Traffic was queried with new controller who said it was unidentified. About this time we received a TCAS 'Traffic' advisory with the conflicting traffic visually sighted crossing our track followed shortly after by a TCAS Resolution Advisory fly down which was followed. By this time ATC had established the traffic to be military which hadn't called 10mins prior to their 'tactical point' **Other Information:** Conflicting traffic call-sign was not clear but controller spelt it back as "TREWAR 50" after querying it several times.	✓	✓			TCAS Triggered by Intruder TA/RA

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084 08/02/02		Muscat	Descent	In contact with Muscat Control, descended to FL 390 due to headwind. At 34500 GPWS was activated. A/P & A/T disconnected stopped descent, and climbed back to FL 347. No traffic on TCAS. No known TFC at that position known to Muscat.Lot of military TFC in area. May be that generated this GPWS warning. After few minutes desc. Slowly to FL 310 in concert with MCT CTRL. NOTE: all lighting was on, including wing-and logo lights.				Military	Intruder Trigger of GPWS/other
085 23/11/02	B744	Muscat	Cruise	**Summary:** Airprox with OMA 811**Event + Cruise:** TCAS TA received. Other a/c alerted. ATC and we were instructed to make an immediate left turn. OMA 811 was climbing through ovr FL to FL 330.	✓	✓			ATC Clearance trigger TCAS
086 1/12/02		Muscat	Cruise	**Caution: Airway B457 East of AUH** Intersection LAKRO and LAKLU have been read back wrong due to likeness in sound. MCT control advises several misrouting plus wrong clearances because of very close sound of names		✓		✓	Need for easily pronounced five-letter name-codes Secretariat to follow-up with State
087 21/08/02	A310		Descent	During final appr, for RWY 18 at SAH (OYSN), a heavy fire shooting observed from the ground to the air, at the final appr CRS, which forced us to delay our appr until it is safe for the appr again. This aircraft effecting the safety of the flight. SAH				Militaty	Other Firing

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088 3/05/ 02	B777	Jeddah	Descent	A/C had been cleared to descend 7000 feet on QNH 1001 at 25080 feet. ATC said to stop descent at FL 250. Altimeters reset to 1013. Autopilot disconnected and aircraft gently leveled towards FL 250. then ATC said descend FL 150.		✓			ATC Clearance
089 16/01/02		Tehran	Cruise	At 0210Z, we noticed a traffic on our ND ahead of us, at + 07 (+ 700 feet). Few seconds after, we had a traffic Advisory. As we saw traffic, we made a right deviation, on heading 330. When we crossed traffic, he was 1000' above us, and 0,5 Nm left. We asked information to Tehran control (119.3) who told us it was Scandinavia 973, which was under radar control and informed of our traffic. We reported to Tehran that we had not received information on his traffic, and we had had a T-CAS alert.	✓	✓			ATC Clearance resulting in triggering TCAS TA
090 29/01/02	B777	Tehran	Climb	**SUMMARY:** Airprox with LUFT779 during climb which would have been a TCAS event if both aircraft had not modified their parameters **EVENT+CAUSE:** BA 106 was restricted to fl 220 on entering Tehran FIR due excessive higher level traffic. Tehran under radar turned the BA 106 to heading 360 top enable climb to fl 350. Luft 779 (probably a B747) was cleared on course to fl 390. ATC then cleared BA 106 to return to course - GESIP nearest point. BA 106 was climbing at greater rate than LUFT 779, passing approx fl 330 separation reduced to approx 1500 ft		✓			ATC Clearance Traffic density

REF./ DATE	ACFT TYPE	FIR	PHASE OF FLIGHT	INCIDENT REPORT	PROBABLE CAUSE(S)- CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS				
					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
091 31/01/02	B 777	Tehran	Cruise	Approximately 60 NM from ISN TCAS advisory "TRAFFIC" received. At 49 NM from ISN TCAS corrective resolution advisory "descend". Opposite traffic was Kish Air IRK 1153 IL76 climbing to FL 330. Minimum vertical separation was 300 feet, crossing separation 600 feet and horizontal 1 NM due our 1NM right of track. Conflicting IL76 was white with green tail markings.	✓				TCAS TA/RA
092 21/01/02	B 777	Tehran	Climb	**Event and Cause:** Approaching PAPAR, 40 NM while passing FL260 climbing to cleared FL280, observed TCAS display traffic approaching FL270. UAE ATC assigned radar vector to avoid traffic not on frequency. Traffic advisory from TCAS passing FL273. Visually sighted traffic left of aircraft. UAE controller took timely action. Other aircraft cleared to FL 270 by Teheran ATC.	✓		✓		Comm congestion
093 18/01/02	A 330	Tehran	Cruise	**Event and Cause:** Cleared by OIII (133.40) (very poor quality ATC radio turn left heading 300 establish 5NM left track then climb FL350. This we did, however on TCAS observed LH8570 opposite direction at FL330, he was tracking right of airway 2NM (LH OPS). Climb and lateral separation was such that at our crossing point would have been same level with 2NM lateral separation!	✓	✓	✓		Comm RA

REF./ DATE	ACFT TYPE	FIR	PHASE OF FLIGHT	INCIDENT REPORT	PROBABLE CAUSE(S)- CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS				
					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
094 30/03/02		Tehran	Climb	BA 72 cleared to climb by Tehran ATC from FL280 to FL390 and report FL310 and FL350. Very busy frequency and overloaded controller. Reported passing FL 320 and FL 370, ATC acknowledged. At FL375 TCAS traffic advisory, very quickly followed by TCAS RA climb. RA manoeuvre completed. Aircraft observed passing 1 NM to left and 500 FT below BA 72.	✓	✓			ATC failure to de conflict traffic resulting in triggering TCAS
095 16/05/02	763	Tehran	Cruise	When making position report to Tehran (120.90 MHZ), position SYZ-W3-MESVI, they instructed us to use "normal" route via R659-ISN due restrictions. We asked confirmation of our field routing initially Tehran stated R659-ISN, however when we declared an "air traffic incident" (at 22.35 UTC) they verified our routing again and confirmed our field via W3-MESVI was corrected.		✓			ATC Clearance
096 29/04/02	763	Tehran	Cruise	KLM 428 maintained FL 280 inbound ISN R659 DME ISN 50 NM. Tehran Control cleared AHY 016 from FL 260 to FL 390 which was 5 min ahead (seen on TCAS). KL 428 turned left 30. AHY016 crossed FL 280 only 4 NM ahead. Tehran informed us the traffic was 10 NM ahead which was not true. No radar control. No risk of collision.	✓	✓			TCAS
097 28/08/02		Tel Aviv	Approach	Aircraft was 4000ft altitude, 10 miled BCN 300R on approach aircraft registration was GBNWN. This relates to the music interference on MWN on approach to Tel Aviv			✓		COMM interference

REF./ DATE	ACFT TYPE	FIR	PHASE OF FLIGHT	INCIDENT REPORT	PROBABLE CAUSE(S)- CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS				
					TCAS TAs/RAs	ATC	COM	OTHER	REMARKS
098 14 /09/02	B777	Emirates	Airport	MH 91 was cleared lineup RWY 12R by DXB Tower. Five seconds later MH 91 cleared takeoff RWY 12R, climb to 3000 feet and call DXB departure 124.45. Clearance was readback. During takeoff roll Approaching Vr I noticed something moving at far end of runway 12R but could not make out exactly what it is. On lift off and initial climb confirmed sighting a vehicle on the runway fast trying to exit the active runway. Tower apologized for runway incursion during climb. Crew advised DXB ATC that an incident report will be raised.		✓			RWY Incursion Other

Note: *These reports do not apportion blame to any State/Organization or FIR involved. The rationale is only to identify deficiencies in the region, follow-up on recurring incidents, and propose remedial action(s) to be taken and does not in any manner replaces procedures already in force in States for the reporting and analysis of ATS incidents..*

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 5: IDENTIFICATION OF DEFICIENCIES AND CORRECTIVE MEASURES BEING PROPOSED

5.1 Under this agenda item the Task Force was apprised of the different elements to be taken into account in the identification of deficiencies. Although significant improvements have been noted with the acquiring of new upgraded ATC equipment and facilities, it was pointed out that requirements regarding enhancements to airspace capacity and ATC limitations need to be evaluated.

5.2 Indications are that it some very busy environments, at peak periods, ATCs are overworked and handle traffic nearing the maximum capacity of the system. However, on the other hand, reports indicate that incidents normally occur during periods of lull in the traffic density because ATCs tend to undermine the traffic situation. There is a need to follow-up on constraints associated with ATC workload, system capacity, including other situations regarding communications/coordination problems, surveillance systems being used, airspace complexity

5.3 It was agreed that the appropriate PIRG mechanism addresses the above issue and limitations in system capacity and ATC workload be closely monitored. It was pointed out that guidance on factors to be taken into account in determining the type(s) quality of services is indicated in the Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology (Doc 8689) and the Air Traffic Services Planning Manual (Doc 9426).

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 6: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

6.1 Under this Agenda Item the interval between meetings of the Task Force was discussed. It was agreed that the next meeting should be held between 12 to 18 Months of this meeting and would be dictated by quality and amount of traffic incident data received by IATA.
