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ASSEMBLY — 37TH SESSION

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Agenda Item 13: Security policy

STRENGTHENING GLOBAL AVIATION SECURITY BY LEVERAGING INDUSTRY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE

(Presented by the International Air Transport Association (IATA)[1])

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following the 25 December 2009 security incident, the International Air Transport Association hosted an aviation security summit in January with the United States Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the ICAO Secretary General and airline chief executive officers (CEOs). A series of major regional conferences, coordinated with ICAO and DHS, were held in 2010, building consensus around the world on the need to strengthen global aviation security. This renewed commitment must be followed up by concrete actions that recognize the key contribution of industry and its necessary consultation in aviation security decision-making.

Action: The Assembly is invited to:

a) support ICAO's efforts to ensure global compliance with Annex 17 Standards and Recommended Practices, with specific attention to higher risk airports and regions;
b) recognize the importance of industry consultation by urging all Member States to establish Industry Consultative Bodies for aviation security;
c) recognize the need to develop a globally coordinated "checkpoint of the future" that integrates intelligence, behavioural analysis and passenger data;
d) urge Member States that require or will require airlines to transmit passenger data to various national departments to establish a single data portal (or "single window") through which all data should be electronically submitted; and
e) urge ICAO to produce guidance materials on Service Level Standards for Member States' internal procedures relating to international passenger processing and data transmission.

Strategic Objectives:	This working paper relates to Strategic Objective B – Security, *Enhance global civil aviation security*
Financial implications:	No financial implications
References:	No references

[1] Language versions prepared by IATA

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 IATA believes that the most effective security measures are based on appropriately trained personnel, procedures and equipment that work in concert with and are integrated into the complex operating environments of the industry. Stakeholders such as airlines and airports possess the unique operational experience and technical expertise needed to play a key role in making this integration successful.

1.2 The event of 25 December 2009, in which a terrorist tried and failed to ignite an explosive device on board a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, demonstrates a profound point. Threats to aviation are rapidly evolving and seek to exploit vulnerabilities at all points through our globally interconnected security systems. For this reason, all resources must be brought to bear on working together in a globally coordinated fashion.

1.3 On 22 January 2010 IATA hosted a Global Aviation Security Summit in Geneva with the ICAO Secretary General, the United States Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and airline CEOs.

1.4 In the last months, States have organized a series of high-level regional security conferences in Mexico City, Tokyo, Abuja and Abu Dhabi. IATA also set up and hosted regional security forums in Amman in June and in Singapore in September that were attended by airlines, civil aviation authorities, travel agents and freight forwarders.

1.5 IATA commends ICAO and governments around the world for their efforts to exchange information on terrorist threats and discussions on ways to improve aviation security. The efforts over the last several months reflect an unprecedented interest by the international aviation security community toward better cooperation and the development of more effective and efficient security measures. These efforts must be sustained and cannot be lost.

2. FIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AVIATION SECURITY

2.1 During the Global Summit in January, IATA and its member airlines made five key recommendations for aviation security:

- formal continuous consultation with all airlines: This would allow security policies to be written with the benefit of airline operational expertise;
- align emergency orders with industry's execution capabilities: Recognize that prescriptive, one-size-fits-all regulations with numerical targets will not secure a complex global industry. Governments must work with industry to define practical implementation measures for their security targets;
- eliminate inefficiencies in passenger data collection: IATA urged DHS to break down internal silos to create a single data collection and sharing programme that could serve as a model for implementation by other governments;
- governments must talk to each other to harmonize requirements: Governments must talk to each other to ensure that one State's requirements do not conflict with another State's laws; and
- develop a next generation checkpoint: Along with optimizing the capabilities of current screening technology, we must begin to look at future checkpoints that combine technology and intelligence.

3. ALIGNING INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT ROLES IN AVIATION SECURITY

3.1 The basic premise for the global aviation security system should be compliance by all Member States with the Standards and Recommended Practices contained in Annex 17 — *Security*. In this respect, IATA notes that "Promoting Global Compliance and Establishing Sustainable Aviation Security Oversight Capability of States" is recognized as a Strategic Focus Area under the ICAO Comprehensive Aviation Security Strategy. Annex 17 provisions should be strictly enforced and audited, with specific attention to higher risk airports and regions.

3.2 New security threats can be countered more effectively through a global collaborative effort that starts with formal, continuous consultation with the industry. Airlines and airports have an essential role to play in enhancing security through providing their unique perspective and technical expertise. Each Member State should establish an effective Industry Consultative Body that would act as a platform for government and aviation industry participants to exchange views on issues related to aviation security strategy, policy, proposed regulations and potential solutions.

3.3 Events over recent years indicate that today's security screening environment sometimes struggles to keep pace with the range of threats and continues to be a stressful experience for families, business travellers, tourists and employees. IATA strongly advocates a "checkpoint of the future", developed in concert by regulators and industry and implemented through globally coordinated guidelines. As a starting point, this "checkpoint of the future" would integrate screening technology with intelligence, behavioural analysis and passenger data. IATA is committed to working closely with ICAO, Airports Council International and with Member States to develop a conceptual framework by the end of 2011.

3.4 Member States should adhere to a "single window" concept when requesting electronic passenger data such as Advance Passenger Information (API) or Passenger Name Record (PNR) data. This would require sending passenger data to a single reception point, or portal, within the requesting State's information technology system, from which it could then be shared with those departments or agencies (immigration, customs, security) authorized by national law to receive it.

3.5 Service Level Standards measuring the performance of passenger processing (e.g. data transmission and response times, and biometric capture) should be developed internationally and introduced at the national level. These would establish a greater level of efficiency and predictability in international air transport operations. ICAO is encouraged to produce guidance materials to support Member States in the development and implementation of Service Level Standards covering their internal procedures related to international passenger processing and data transmission. The Appendix provides suggested areas to be examined.

4. CONCLUSION

4.1 The event of 25 December has created a sense of urgency. The high-level security conferences held in different regions have increased awareness that we need to enhance our collaborative efforts and share information.

4.2 This industry is committed to keeping the global skies safe and secure. IATA believes that the time is right to implement a number of concrete steps, under the leadership of ICAO.

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APPENDIX
PROPOSED SERVICE LEVEL STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONAL PASSENGER PROCESSING

Establishing transparent service level standards for both air carriers and Contracting States will provide a common understanding about services, priorities and responsibilities. Service Level Standards applied to services provided by States' personnel will allow airlines to be informed of what to expect, while providing metrics for States to use in measuring its internal performance levels. Among the processes and tasks for which Service Level Standards should be established are:

Automated System Response Times

- State's average response time to an automated query or electronic data submission; including iAPIS and other automated data exchange programs

Example: Standard State-generated response to air carriers following an electronic data submission should be provided within four (4) seconds for 98 per cent of all transactions.

- State's average response time for calls made to a resolution desk

Example: State should provide sufficient staffing to ensure 95 per cent of all calls to 24/7 resolution desks

System Availability and Outage Procedures

- Contracting State Outages

Example: States should provide notice to air carriers at least 72 hours in advance of a scheduled outage, including the anticipated duration of that outage.

- Carrier System Outages

Example: Air carriers identifying an internal system outage impacting on their ability to comply with a States' data provision requirement should notify the appropriate entity within five (5) minutes of the outage's discovery, including the anticipated duration of the outage (if known), what locations/flights are impacted and what alternative interim measures will be put into effect.

Passenger Data Exchange

Example: Passenger Name Records transmissions should be limited to an initial exchange at 72 hours prior to departure (or at PNR creation if less than 72 hours), at departure, and as warranted for reasonable cause on an ad hoc basis.

Inspection

Example: Contracting States should, as a goal, seek to process and clear 95 per cent of all persons not requiring more than normal inspection within 30 minutes of disembarkation.

Biometric data capture

Example: Capture of biometric data for passengers at the primary inspection booth should be completed within fifteen (15) seconds for 98 per cent of all individual transactions.

Oversight and Process Review

Example: States should establish an Industry Oversight Panel to meet twice yearly and comprised of an equal number of airline representatives (including airline trade associations) and State senior executive representatives. The Panel's mandate could include functions such as monitor progress, discuss upcoming initiatives, evaluate effectiveness of existing program requirements, receive intelligence briefings on matters affecting international air travel and discuss systems, technical and process issues.

Reporting / Notification of Discrepancies

Example: States should establish processes through which it can advise individual air carriers concerning their performance against program requirements on a regular basis.

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