



International Civil Aviation Organization

WORKING PAPER

A36-WP/171

EX/60

12/09/07

English only

ASSEMBLY — 36TH SESSION

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Agenda Item 15: Aviation Security Programme

REQUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED GUIDANCE MATERIAL ON RESTRICTIONS ON LIQUIDS, AEROSOLS AND GELS FOR CARRIAGE ONBOARD AIRCRAFT

(Presented by Singapore)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper acknowledges the good work by ICAO in expeditiously developing guidelines for the implementation of restrictions on liquids, aerosols and gels onboard aircraft. It describes Singapore's experience and challenges faced in the implementation of the LAGs restrictions. Realising the need for better international harmonisation of these measures, the paper seeks to draw the attention of the Assembly to the urgent need for ICAO to develop detailed guidance material in order to further assist States in the implementation of security controls for screening liquids, aerosols and gels as soon as practicable.

Action: The Assembly is invited to:

- a) note the accomplishments of the ICAO Council, Secretariat, AVSEC Panel and the Secretariat Study Group for their expeditious efforts in responding to this new threat; and
- b) request ICAO to develop detailed guidance material in order to further assist States in the implementation of security controls pertaining to the carriage of liquids, aerosols and gels onboard aircraft as soon as practicable.

<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	This working paper will further Strategic Objective B by enhancing global aviation security.
<i>Financial implications:</i>	Not Applicable.
<i>References:</i>	AS 8/11-06/100 dated 1 December 2006 AS 8/11-07/26 dated 30 March 2007 AS 8/11-07/53 dated 6 July 2007 A36-WP55

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The alleged terrorist plot in the UK in August 2006 highlighted a new threat of liquid explosives on board aircraft. Since then, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) had issued three State Letters that provided useful guidance on the implementation of liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) restrictions. These included guidelines on the technical specifications of the Security Tamper-Evident Bag (STEBs), supply chain security for LAGs and STEBs, and the validation processes for mutual acceptance by Contracting States.

1.2 Nonetheless, the experience at airports has shown that while some airports have put in place various measures and procedures concerning the hand carriage of liquids, aerosols and gels by air travellers, other airports and regulators are still working out how they could institute practical measures to keep up security while at the same time minimise confusion, inconvenience, financial loss and improve airport facilitation for air travellers. In some airports, transfer passengers continue to abandon their LAGs items, especially those purchased at airport retail outlets, which is wasteful and environmentally unfriendly. Therefore, the development of detailed guidance materials on LAGs security controls is necessary to assist Contracting States to move towards harmonised implementation, thereby increasing the level of security while maintaining good facilitation for air travellers on a global basis.

2. SINGAPORE'S EXPERIENCE

2.1 Singapore implemented the security measures for LAGs on 8 May 2007. To ensure smooth implementation of LAGs control measures, a public communication campaign was launched one month prior to the implementation date. The media and travel trade were engaged for this purpose. The Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore also worked actively with airlines and ground handling agents to inform passengers of the new restrictions. Similarly, overseas airports were notified of Singapore's implementation to minimise inconvenience to passengers. Singapore also embarked on an extensive training programme for security, retail, and frontline customer service and check-in staff. At the airport, multi-lingual signs were placed at strategic locations to inform the travelling public of the new measures. Re-packing counters and disposal bins were also placed at various areas to facilitate passengers. During the initial implementation phase, additional customer service staff were deployed to help with queries and distribute re-sealable plastic bags to passengers.

2.2 Notwithstanding these initiatives, a number of travellers at Singapore Changi Airport, especially transfer passengers, have had to discard their LAGs purchases as these purchases were not packed in proper STEBs. Due to the differing treatment by States for certain LAGs items at other airports of origin, travellers also encountered problems during security screening at Singapore Changi Airport.

3. REQUEST FOR DETAILED GUIDANCE MATERIAL

3.1 The restrictions on the hand carriage of LAGs are likely to continue until new detection technology for liquid explosives that can be deployed effectively in an airport environment is available. This could take a considerable amount of time. Hence, it would be useful for many States if ICAO could quickly develop and promulgate detailed guidance material to guide States in the effective and comprehensive implementation of restrictions on LAGs. Taking into account that the amendment to the seventh edition of the Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference (Doc 8973) is in progress, it would be worthwhile to develop and include the detailed guidance material in this amendment to this document. Examples of detailed guidance that would be helpful to States would be instructions, documentation and guidance for the

training of screeners and travel retail staff on the identification and the handling and storage of LAGs and STEBs items. Detailed guidance for check-in and other frontline staff on the screening of passengers, handling of various scenarios and situations, implementation of supply chain security measures, and development of checklists for the validation of security regimes, could be of assistance to the implementing States on how the measures could be effectively and efficiently planned and applied.

3.2 States that are moving towards implementation or enhancement of the LAGs restrictions will benefit most from these detailed guidance materials as they will have a clearer step-by-step understanding of the measures needed to put in place for LAGs restrictions. With this, States can meet the expected security standards for LAGs implementation, thereby aiding the validation process for the mutual acceptance between States of each other's security regime. This will also help ICAO and its Contracting States to progress towards a harmonised approach for the security of LAGs carried by air travellers.

4. CONCLUSION

4.1 ICAO has been prompt and decisive in leading the drive to respond to this security threat. The AVSEC Panel was convened shortly after the alleged plot and was effective in galvanising support from States to respond to this threat. Efforts put in by the Study Group on the Carriage and Screening of Liquids Gels and Aerosols and the Council had enabled the rapid issuance by ICAO of the State Letters for States' implementation. Singapore would like to suggest that ICAO carry on with the momentum to reconvene the Secretariat Study Group on the Carriage and Screening of Liquids, Gels and Aerosols to develop this set of detailed guidance material for LAGs as soon as practicable.

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