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IoT Security and privacy challenges

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




Definition of IoT

[WIKIPEDIA] The Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of physical objects or "things" embedded with electronics, software, sensors and connectivity to enable it to achieve greater value and service by exchanging data with the manufacturer, operator and/or other connected devices.

[**OXFORD**] A proposed development of the Internet in which everyday objects have network connectivity, allowing them to send and receive data.



What challenges are there for mitigating these risks?

How might an organization address these challenges?


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The internet of Things moves in



Deloitte.

For additional insights from the 2014 Global Mobile Consumer Survey: U.S. edition, visit www.deloitte.com/us/mobileconsumer

"% of most valued technologies" refers to smartphone owner data. Respondents could select more than one option.



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IOT Attack news

THURSDAY, APRIL 4, 2019 . THE WASHINGTON POST

A19

ECONOMY & BUSINESS

O DOW 26,218.13 UP 39.0 (0.2%)

10-YEAR TREASURY
DOWN \$4,20 PER \$1,000; 2.5% YIELD

CURRENCIES \$1=111.51 YEN: EURO=\$1.124

Malware's faked malignancies in CT scans trick doctors

BY KIM ZETTER


When Hillary Clinton stumbled and coughed through public appearances during her 2016 presidential run, she faced critics who said that she might not be well enough to perform the top job in the country. To quell rumors about her medical condition, her doctor revealed that a CT scan of her lungs showed that

she just had pneumonia. But what if the scan had shown faked cancerous nodules, placed there by malware exploiting vul nerabilities in widely used CT and MRI scanning equipment? Researchers in Israel say they have developed such malware to draw attention to serious security weaknesses in critical medical imaging equipment used for diagnosing conditions and the networks that transmit those images - vulnerabilities that could have potentially life-altering consequences if unaddressed.

The malware they created would let attackers automatically add realistic, malignant-seeming growths to CT or MRI scans before radiologists and doctors examine them. Or it could remove real cancerous nodules and lesions without detection, leading to misdiagnosis and possibly a failure to treat patients who need critical and timely care.

Yisroel Mirsky, Yuval Elovici and two others at the Ben-Gurion University Cyber Security Research Center in Israel who created the malware say that attackers could target a presidential candidate or other politicians to trick them into believing they have a serious illness and cause them to withdraw from a race to seek treatment.

The research isn't theoretical. In a blind study, the researchers conducted involving real CT lung scans, 70 of which were altered by their malware, they were able to trick three skilled radiologists into misdiagnosing conditions nearly every time. In the case of scans with fabricated cancerous Researchers in Israel created program to highlight weaknesses in medical imaging equipment



Researchers in Israel created malware that can alter CT and MRI scans to show fake, malignant-seeming growths, as in the image at right,

real 60 percent of the time, leading them to misdiagnoses involving those patients. In the case of scans where the malware removed cancerous nodules, doctors did not detect this 87 percent of the time, concluding that very sick patients were healthy.

The researchers ran their test against a lung-cancer screening software tool that radiologists often use to confirm their diagnoes and were able to trick it into misdiagnosing the scans with

false tumors every time. "I was quite shocked," said Nancy Boniel, a radiologist in Canada who participated in the study. "I felt like the carpet was pulled out from under me, and I was left without the tools necessary to move forward

they could prevent patients who have a disease from receiving critical care or cause others who aren't ill to receive unwarranted biopsies, tests and treatment. The attackers could even alter followup scans after treatment begins to falsely show tumors spreading or shrinking. Or they could alter scans for patients in drug and medical research trials to sabotage the results

The vulnerabilities that would allow someone to alter scans reside in the equipment and networks hospitals use to transmit and store CT and MRI images. These images are sent to radiology workstations and back-end databases through what's known as a picture archiving and communication system (PACS). Mirords. But what happens within the [hospital] system itself, which no regular person should have access to in general, they tend to be pretty lenient [about]. It's not that they don't care. It's just that their priorities are set else-

Although one hospital network they examined in Israel did try to use encryption on its PACS network, the hospital configured the encryption incorrectly and as a result the images were still not

encrypted. Fotios Chantzis, a principal information-security engineer with the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota who did not participate in the study but confirmed that the attack is possible, said that PACS networks are generally not enthat don't have the ability to decrypt or re-encrypt images

To develop their malware, the Israeli researchers used machine learning to train their code to rapidly assess scans passing through a PACS network and to adjust and scale fabricated tu-mors to conform to a patient's unique anatomy and dimensions to make them more realistic. The entire attack can be fully automated so that once the malware is installed on a hospital's PACS network, it will operate independently to find and alter scans, even searching for a specific pa-

tient's name. To get the malware onto a PACS network, attackers would need either physical access to the network - to connect a malicious

was able to enter the radiology department after hours and connect his malicious device to the network in just 30 seconds, without anyone questioning his presence. Although the hospital had given permission for the test, staff members didn't know how or when Mirsky planned to carry it

To prevent someone from al-tering CT and MRI scans, Mirsky says, hospitals ideally would enable end-to-end encryption across their PACS network and digitally sign all images while also making sure that radiology and doctor workstations are set up to verify those signatures and flag any images that aren't properly signed.

Suzanne Schwartz, a medical doctor and the Food and Drug Administration's associate direc tor for Science and Strategic Partnerships, who has been leading some of the FDA's efforts to secure medical devices and equipment, expressed concern about the findings of the Israeli researchers. But she said many hospitals don't have the money to invest in more-secure equipment or they have 20-year-old infrastructure that doesn't support newer technologies.

Christian Dameff, an emergen cy room physician with the University of California at San Diego School of Medicine and a security researcher who has exposed vul nerabilities in the 911 emergency calling system, notes that in the case of a cancer diagnosis, some backstops would prevent a pa-tient from receiving unwarranted treatment based only on a maliciously modified CT scan. But that doesn't mean the attack would be harmless.

"There are a couple of steps before we just take someone to surgery" or prescribe radiation and chemotherapy, Dameff said. "But there is still harm to the patient regardless. There is the emotional distress [from learning you may have cancer], and there are all sorts of insurance



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IOT Attack news

Massive Botnet Attack Used More Than 400,000 IoT Devices

Researchers at Imperva Say Incident Mimicked Mirai-Style DDoS Attack

Akshaya Asokan (♥asokan_akshaya) • July 26, 2019 ●

IoT cyber attacks cost the UK economy £1 billion



New research from Irdeto revealed that Internet of Things (IoT) attacks cost UK businesses an average of £244,000 last year.

The Dutch Security vendor conducted research on IT security decision makers at UK organisations in sectors including health, transport and manufacturing. It was revealed IoT devices cost the UK economy over £1 billion each year.





https://gdpr.report/news/2019/05/24/iotcyber-attacks-cost-the-uk-economy-1-billion/



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IOT Attack news

IoT Attacks Escalating with a 217.5% Increase in Volume

By Sergiu Gatlan

March 29, 2019

7,000 AM

7,

Attacks against Internet of Things (IoT) devices and networks have been escalating throughout 2018 with 32.7 million IoT attacks having been detected during last year by SonicWall, while phishing saw a decrease in volume with most of the attacks being targeted.

While everyone wants to have their devices interconnected and connected to the Internet, many of the estimated 31 billion IoT devices that will be installed by 2020 according to Statista will also come with easy to abuse or no security controls.

This allows malicious actors to compromise and add them to large scale botnets they control by exploiting security flaws impacting them in great numbers or taking control of them using publicly available default credentials.



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IOT Attack news

What is the Mirai Botnet?

The Mirai malware exploits security holes in IoT devices, and has the potential to harness the collective power of millions of IoT devices into botnets, and launch attacks.









What is a DDoS Attack?

What is a Botnet?

Common DDoS Attacks

DDoS Attack Tools

DDoS Glossary of Terms Famous DDoS Attacks

Mirai Botnet Learning Objectives

After reading this article you will be able to:

- Learn about the Mirai botnet
- Learn how botnets are mutating
- Learn why botnets are dangerous
- · Learn how IoT devices and botnets are related

Related Content

What Is A Botnet?

What is Mirai?

Mirai is malware that infects smart devices that run on ARC processors, turning them into a network of remotely controlled bots or zombies. This network of bots, called a botnet, is often used to launch DDoS attacks.

Malware, short for malicious software, is an umbrella term that includes computer worms, viruses, Trojan horses, rootkits and spyware.

In September 2016, the authors of the Mirai malware launched a DDoS attack on the website of a wellknown security expert. A week later they released the source code into the world, possibly in an attempt to hide the origins of that attack. This code was quickly replicated by other cybercriminals, and is believed to be behind the massive attack that brought down the domain registration services provider, Dvn. in October 2016.



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IOT Attack news

kaspersky daily

Products • Renew Downloads Support Resource Center Blog •

Mirai goes Enterprise

March 19, 2019

Yesterday we found a story about a new version of Mirai (a self-propagating botnet that targets IoT devices and was responsible for a massive DDoS attack on Dyn's servers back in 2016). According to the analysts, this botnet is equipped with a much wider range of exploits, which makes it even more dangerous and allows it to spread faster. More troubling is the fact that the new strain is targeting not only its usual victims — routers, IP cameras, and other "smart" things — but also enterprise IoT devices.



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IOT Attack news






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Smart Home & Wearable devices





Smart WiFi Light Bulb, LED RGB Color Changing, Compatible with Amazon Alexa and Google Home Assistant, No Hub Required, A19 F26 Multicolor LUMIMAN 2 Pack

by LUMIMAN

★★★★☆ × 358 customer reviews | 105 answered questions

Price: \$24.99 (\$12.50 / Count) \rightarrow prime

Get \$70 off instantly: Pay \$0.00 upon approval for the Amazon Prime Rewards Visa Card.

Style: 2 Pack RGBW Smart Bulb

2 Pack RGBW Smart Bulb


\$24.99 (\$12.50 / Count)

24FT LED Outdoor String Lights from 1 seller









Ships from and sold by Amazon.com.

Configuration: Microwave

Works with Alexa

Price: \$59.99 /prime

Microwave \$59.99


with Dot (Charcoal) \$99.98

with Dot (Heather Grav) √prime





IoT in Health



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IoTin Agriculture



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IoTin Education




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IoTin Traffic



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IoT in Retail





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
IoT in Smart City



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IoT Based Waste Collection



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


IoT Based Pollution Control

Installation of environment sensors: air, light, humidity, noise, etc.

Benefits include:

- Leverages parking sensor infrastructure
- Provides valuable data for improving analytics applications and forecasting



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Smart Dust Bin in London



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Smart Dust Bin in London (Cont.)



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Smart Dust Bin in London (Cont.)



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IoT Application Areas and Devices

Service Sectors	Application Groups	Locations	Devices	
Buildings	Commercial/Institutional	Office, Education, Retail, Hospitality, Healthcare, Airports, Stadiums	HVAC, Transport, Fire & Safety, Lighting, Security,	
	Industrial	Process, Clean Room, Campus	Access, etc.	
_	Supply/Demand	Power Gen, Trans & Dist, Low Voltage, Power Quality, Energy management	Turbines, Windmills, UPS, Batteries, Generators,	
Energy	• Alternative • Solar	Solar Wind, Co-generation, Electrochemical	Meters, Drills, Fuel Cells, etc.	
	Oil/Gas	Rigs, Derricks, Heads, Pumps, Pipelines		
	Infrastructure	Wiring, Network Access, Energy management	Digital company Dayson Systems MID a Danders	
Consumer and Home	Awareness & Safety	 Security/Alerts, Fire Safety, Elderly, Children, Power Protection 	Digital cameras, Power Systems, MID, e-Readers, Dishwashers, Desktop Computers, Washer/ Dryers, Meters, Lights, TVs, MP3, Games Console,	
	Convenience & Entertainment	HVAC/Climate, Lighting, Appliance, Entertainment	Alarms, etc.	
	• Care	Hospital, ER, Mobile, POC, Clinic, Labs, Doctor Office		
Healthcare and Life Science	In Vivo/Home	Implants, Home, Monitoring Systems	MRI, PDAs, Implants, Surgical Equipment, Pumps, Monitors, Telemedicine, etc.	
and the selence	Research	Drug Discovery, Diagnostics, Labs	,	
	Non-Vehicular Air, Rail, Marine			
Transportation	• Vehicles	Consumer, Commercial, Construction, Off-Highway Vehicles, Lights, Ships, Planes,	Vehicles, Lights, Ships, Planes, Signage, Tolls, etc.	
	Trans Systems	Tolls, Traffic mgmt., Navigation		

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IoT Application Areas and Devices

Service Sectors	Application Groups	Locations	Devices	
Industrial	Resource Automation	Mining, Irrigation, Agricultural, Woodland	Pumps, Valves, Vats, Conveyors, Fabrication, Assembly/Packaging, Vessels/Tanks, etc.	
	• Fluid/Processes	Petro-Chem, Hydro, Carbons, Food, Beverage		
	Converting/Discrete	 Metals, Papers, Rubber/Plastic, Metalworking electronics, Assembly/Test 		
	• Distribution	Pipelines, Conveyance		
Retail	Specialty	Fuel Stations, Gaming, Bowling, Cinemas, Discos, Special Events	POS Terminals, Tags, Cash Registers, Vending Machines, Signs, etc.	
	Hospitality	Hotels Restaurants, Bars, Cafes, Clubs		
	• Stores	Supermarkets, Shopping Centers, Single Site, Distribution, Centers		
Security / Public Safety	Surveillance	Radar/Satellite, Environ., Military Security, Unmanned, Fixed	Tanks, Fighter Jets, Battlefields, jeeps, Cars, Ambulance, Homeland Security, Environment, Monitor, etc.	
	Equipment	Weapons, Vehicles, Ships, Aircraft, Gear		
	Tracking	Human, Animal, Postal, Food, Health, Baggage		
	Public Infrastructure	Water, Treatment, Building, Environ. Equip. & Personnel, Police, Fire, Regulatory		
	Emergency Service	Ambulance, Police, fire, Homeland Security		
IT and Networks	• Public	Services, E-Commerce, Data Centers, Mobile Carriers, ISPs	Servers, Storage, PCs. Routers, Switches, PBXs, etc.	
	Enterprise	• IT/Data Center Office, Privacy Nets		



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Weak, Guessable, or Hardcoded Passwords

Use of easily bruteforced, publicly available, or unchangeable credentials, including backdoors in firmware or client software that grants unauthorized access to deployed systems.



Insecure Network Services
Unneeded or insecure network services

Unneeded or insecure network services running on the device itself, especially those exposed to the internet, that compromise the confidentiality, integrity/authenticity, or availability of information or allow unauthorized remote control...



Insecure Ecosystem Interfaces
Insecure web, backend API, cloud, or mobile interfaces in the ecosystem outside of the device that allows compromise of the device or its related components. Common issues include a lack of authentication/authorization, lacking or weak encryption, and a lack of input and output filtering.



Lack of Secure Update Mechanism

Lack of ability to securely update the device. This includes lack of firmware validation on device, lack of secure delivery (un-encrypted in transit), lack of anti-rollback mechanisms, and lack of notifications of security changes due to updates.



Use of Insecure or Outdated Components

Use of deprecated or insecure software components/libraries that could allow the device to be compromised. This includes insecure customization of operating system platforms, and the use of third-party software or hardware components from a compromised supply chain.

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Insufficient Privacy Protection

User's personal information stored on the device or in the ecosystem that is used insecurely improperly, or without permission.



Insecure Data Transfer and Storage

Lack of encryption or access control of sensitive data anywhere within the ecosystem, including at rest, in transit, or during processing.



Lack of Device Management

Lack of security support on devices deployed in production, including asset management, update management, secure decommissioning, systems monitoring, and response capabilities.



Insecure Default Settings

Devices or systems shipped with insecure default settings or lack the ability to make the system more secure by restricting operators from modifying configurations.



Lack of Physical Hardening

Lack of physical hardening measures, allowing potential attackers to gain sensitive information that can help in a future remote attack or take local control of the device.



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IoT Attack Surface Areas

Device Memory

- Cleartext credentials
- Third-party credentials
- Encryption keys

Ecosystem (general)

- Implicit trust between components
- Enrollment security
- Decommissioning system
- Lost access procedures

Device Physical Interfaces

- Firmware extraction
- User CLI
- Admin CLI
- Privilege escalation
- Reset to insecure state
- Removal of storage media
- Tamper resistance

Device Web Interface

- SQL injection
- Cross-site scripting
- Cross-siteRequest Forgery
- Username enumeration
- Weak passwords
- Account lockout
- Known default credentials

Device Firmware

- Hardcoded credentials
- Encryption keys
- Encryption (Symmetric, Asymmetric)
- Sensitive information
- Sensitive URL disclosure
- Firmware version display and/or last update date

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IoT Attack Surface Areas

Device Network Services

- Information disclosure
- User CLI
- Administrative CLI
- Injection and Denial of Service
- Unencrypted Services
- Poorly implemented encryption
- UPnP
- Vulnerable UDP Services

Administrative Interface

- SQL injection
- Cross-site scripting
- Security/encryption options
- Logging options
- Two-factor authentication
- Inability to wipe device

Local Data Storage

- Unencrypted data
- Data encrypted with discovered keys
- Lack of data integrity checks

Cloud Web Interface

- SQL injection
- Cross-site scripting
- Transport encryption
- Insecure password recovery mechanism
- Two-factor authentication

Third-party Backend APIs

- Unencrypted PII sent
- Encrypted PII sent
- Device information leaked
- Location leaked



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IoT Attack Surface Areas

Update Mechanism

- Update is not encrypted
- Updates not signed
- Update location writable
- Update verification & authentication
- Missing update mechanism
- No manual update mechanism

Mobile Application

- Implicitly trusted by device or cloud
- Username enumeration
- Account lockout
- Known default credentials
- Weak pass
- Transport encryption
- Insecure recovery mechanism

Vendor Backend APIs

- Inherent trust of cloud or mobile application
- Weak authentication
- Weak access controls
- Injection attacks
- Hidden services

Ecosystem Communication

- Health checks
- Heartbeats
- Ecosystem commands
- Deprovisioning
- Pushing updates

Network Traffic

- LAN
- LAN to Internet
- Short range
- Non-standard

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IoT Security is the Worst-of-All-Worlds

Network

Application

Mobile

Cloud

IoT

- services, encryption, firewall, input...
- authN, authZ, input validation, etc.
- insecure APIs, lack of encryption, etc.
- AuthSessionAccess
- net + app + mobile + cloud = IoT



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IoT Technologies and Protocols

Short-range Wireless Communication

- Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
- Light-Fidelity (Li-Fi)
- Near Field Communication (NFC)
- QR Codes and Barcodes
- Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
- Thread
- Wi-fi
- Wi-Fi Direct
- Z-wave
- ZigBee

Medium-range Wireless Communication

- Ha-Low
- LTE-Advanced



Long-range Wireless Communication

- Low-power Widearea Networking (LPWAN)
 - LoRaWAN
 - Sigfox
 - Neul
- Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT)
- Cellular

Wired Communication

- Ethernet
- Multimedia over Coax Alliance (MoCA)
- Power-line Communication (PLC)



IoT Operating Systems


- RIOT OS
- ARM mbed OS
- RealSense OS X
- Nucleus RTOS
- Brillo
- Contiki
- Zephyr
- Ubuntu Core
- Integrity RTOS
- Apache Mynewt


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





IoT Communication Models










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Mobile App






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
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




Data Leakage & Users Privacy Issues









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
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Data Leakage & Users Privacy Issues





DONE



Siri

Siri helps you get things done just by asking. Siri can even make suggestions before you ask in apps, search, and keyboards.

To use Siri, press and hold the side button or say "Hey Siri" anytime.

Siri sends information like your voice input, contacts, and location to Apple to process your requests. About Siri...

Continue

Set Up Later in Settings





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Data Leakage & Users Privacy Issues





Trip-related location

Uber may collect location data from when you open the app until a trip ends, even when the app is not on your screen. This improves pick-ups, support and more.

Learn more

οк

CALENDAR	
0 items (unlimited space available)	
Last synced: 23/11/2018, 21:37	
Sync on	
Sync using	
Wi-Fi and mobile data	
CONTACTS	
0 items (unlimited space available)	
Last synced: 23/11/2018, 21:56	
Sync on	
Sync using	
Wi-Fi and mobile data	
KEYBOARD DATA	
Predictive text data	
Last synced: 23/11/2018, 21:40	
Sync on	
Sync using	
Wi-Fi and mobile data	





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
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Google Services









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Google Services (Cont.)

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The new way to talk to Google

Navigate, communicate and get things done



Turn on these settings for the full Assistant experience. You can still get a limited Assistant experience without them.

adelnet2k@gmail.com



Stores info about contacts, calendars, apps, music and other data from your devices

NO, THANKS



The new way to talk to Google

Navigate, communicate and get things



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Google partners are businesses that have a commercial relationship with Google.

Services and your privacy

Google sends services that you talk to a unique code.

Google Terms of service and Privacy policy apply













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





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



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
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CONTINUE









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Your m	usic services	
	YouTube Free service available when using a screen	С
**	No default provider Use other accounts' preferences on shared devices	•
More n	nusic services	
J	Other music services You can ask your Assistant to use any music app on your phone or tablet	
Availal	bility	
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	ole on Google Home, Android 6.0+ phones and , TVs, Chromebooks, and Smart Displays	i



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Google Services (Cont.)

3:06



What's New in Calendar

Found Events



Siri suggests events found in Mail, Messages, and Safari, so you can add them easily, such as flight reservations and hotel bookings.

Time to Leave




Calendar uses Apple Maps to look up locations, traffic conditions, and transit options to tell you when it's time to leave.

1

Location Suggestions

Calendar suggests locations based on your past events and significant locations.



Continue




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Google Services (Cont.)




Voice Match lets you access your Assistant directly by using your voice, even when your screen is off.



A unique model of your voice will be created on this device, which will help your Assistant identify you and tell you apart from others.

Keep in mind: A similar voice or recording might also be able to access your Assistant. You can remove Voice Match permission later by turning it off in Assistant settings.

















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Google Services (Cont.)





Discover new places Get info on points of interest

Search what you see with Lens

When you open Google Lens or tap the Lens button, Lens will continually analyse what you see to show you results.

Your Google Lens Activity

If your Web & app activity setting is turned on, your Google Lens activity - including images that you use with Lens - will be saved to your Google Account.

This is true whether you use Lens in any camera app, Google product or Google service. You can see your data, delete it and change your account settings at account.google.com.

Terms of Service and Privacy Policy



Google Lens



Scan text

Look up a word, save contact info

Search what you see with Lens

When you open Google Lens or tap the Lens button, Lens will continually analyse what you see to show you results.

Your Google Lens Activity

If your Web & app activity setting is turned on, your Google Lens activity - including images that you use with Lens - will be saved to your Google Account.

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Google Lens



Shop smarter

Find products & compare prices

Search what you see with Lens

When you open Google Lens or tap the Lens button, Lens will continually analyse what you see to show you results.

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Turn on camera to use Lens

Turn on camera to use Lens




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
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Google Services (Cont.)

Google admits it tracked user location data even when the setting was turned off

It did so via cell tower data

by Shannon Liao | @Shannon_Liao | Nov 21, 2017, 11:53am EST





Ad closed by Google

Report this ad

Ads by Google ①

Android phones gather your location data and send it to Google, even if you've turned off location services and don't have a SIM card, Quartz reported today.




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
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




Samsung Health App









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
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Samsung Health App





Next



Auto sync will turn on when you tap Start. You can turn it off in Settings.

Skip Start




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Samsung Health App (Cont.)



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
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
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Samsung Health App (Cont.)










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


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
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


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NIST Cyber Security Framework

Identify

Protect

Detect

Respond

Recover

Asset Management

Access Control

Anomalies and Events

Response Planning

Recovery Planning

Business Environment Awareness and Training

Security Continuous Monitoring

Improvements

Governance

Info Protection Processes and

Procedures

Data Security

Detection Processes

Analysis

Communications

Risk Assessment

Risk Management Strategy

Maintenance

Protective Technology Mitigation



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Withdrawn Draft

Warning Notice

The attached draft document has been withdrawn, and is provided solely for historical purposes. It has been superseded by the document identified below.

Withdrawal Date June 25, 2019

Original Release Date September 24, 2019

Draft NISTIR 8259

Core Cybersecurity Feature Baseline for Securable IoT Devices:

A Starting Point for IoT Device Manufacturers

Michael Fagan Katerina N. Megas Karen Scarfone Matthew Smith

Superseding Document

Status Final

Series/Number NIST Interagency or Internal Report (NISTIR) 8228

Title Considerations for Managing Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity

and Privacy Risks

Publication Date June 2019


DOI https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8228

CSRC URL https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/nistir/8228/

Additional Information NIST Cybersecurity for IoT Program

https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/nist-cybers

program




publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8259-draft

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Questions?

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