

Traveller Identification Programme

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Public Key Infrastructure – Basis of trust in eMRTDs

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International Organization for Standardization (ISO)

ICAO TRIP: Making the Air Travel more Secure and Efficient

TOWARDS A BETTER TRAVELLER IDENTIFICATION MANAGEMENT

FOR ENHANCED BORDER CONTROL INTEGRITY

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- Hashing
 - A Mathematical process applied to the process
 - Output is called a Message Digest
 - Input cannot be recreated from the output hence one way function
 - Same input always gives the same output
 - Any change in input changes the output
 - Ensures that message is not tampered



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- Digital Signature
 - A process of asymmetric encryption
 - Message cannot be decrypted using the key used for encryption
 - The two keys have a mathematical relationship with each other and form a unique pair
 - You keep one part of the key with you private key
 - You distribute the other key to others public key
 - You encrypt message with private key and send the message to others
 - If they can decrypt with your public key, then the message originated from you and has not been modified – Digital Signature



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- Message signing
 - First hash the message using a well known hashing algorithm to create a message digest
 - Encrypt the hash using your private key
 - Send the message and the encrypted hash to recipient
- Signature Verification
 - Decrypt the encrypted hash using the public key of the sender. This gives you the message digest.
 - Hash the received message to create a new message digest.
 - If the two match, then the message is from the sender and has not been modified
 - If the decryption of the encrypted hash fails or the message digests do not match, then the message has been modified in transit



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TRIP2017



- Public key
 - key pair used to sign messages (Document Signer) must be renewed regularly to avoid compromise
 - To avoid having to distribute these keys every time you renew them, you use a Master Key pair(Country Signer) to sign the Document Signer
 - Distribute Country Signer to recipients
 - Include the Document Signer with your message



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- Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
 - Any certificate that cannot be trusted must be published in CRL
 - Trust may be lost because of:
 - Suspected Compromise
 - Wrong issuance or issuance for different purpose
 - Weakness of keys



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


- E-Passport
 - Data groups defined to hold messages
 - DG1 is a copy of the MRZ
 - DG2 holds the image of the passport holder
 - 16 such data groups for different pieces of information
 - Store the Data Groups on chip "Logical Data Structure (LDS)"
 - Hash each datagroup
 - Encrypt all the hashes with your private key (Document Signer Certificate (DSC)) and store in the "Document Security Object (SOD)" – Store the SOD on the chip along with DSC



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- Issuance system
 - CSCA generation
 - DSC generation and distribution to Personalisation system





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Understanding E-Passport validation

- Trust is established by proper verification of the e-Passport
 - Verify SOD against DSC
 - Verify DSC against CSCA
 - Verify DSC not in CRL
 - Check that DG hash values matches the hash values stored in SOD
 - Compare DG1 with MRZ
 - Compare DG2 with printed photo
 - Compare photo to holder of passport

SOD is valid

LDS is valid

eMRTD is valid

Traveller is valid



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Security Considerations

- Five phases for security considerations
 - Security in Generation
 - Security in Transport to Personalisation systems
 - Proof of control over usage of Document Signer
 - Secure destruction of private key at end of lifetime
 - Monitoring of compromise and reporting



Proof of control

- CSCA generation and usage
- DSC generation and usage
- Passport issuance



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Border Control

- eMRTD not automatically trusted
- Trust depends on
 - Confidence in process of issuance of the document
 - Confidence in control over signing credentials
- Asserted by published Certificate Practise Statement (CPS) and Certificate Policy (CP) – backed by independent audit
- Data analysis acts as a surveillance and ensures continued trust





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