

Updates on Face Morphing: Risks, Evaluation, and Potential Mitigation

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


November 14th, 2024







Face Morphing: Single Image of Two People



Subject A




Subject B



Morph (A + B)

Face morphing generates an image that visually resembles both contributing subjects

The problem: face recognition matches *both* persons




Multiple people can authenticate against a morph

All modern face recognition algorithms tested by NIST and operational matchers tested by parts of the U.S. Government are vulnerable to morphs

Threat: one document, multiple users

PASSPORT APPLICATION



Current U.S. passport application susceptible to manipulation of user-submitted photos.

Many other countries also accept user-submitted photos for identity credential applications.

Risk #1: Organizations that accept user-submitted photos for enrollment are at risk of morphing attack.

Risk #2: Organizations that may have to process ID documents from other countries that are vulnerable to morphs may also be at risk.

NIST FATE MORPH Evaluation [Ongoing]



Automated Face Morph Detection Evaluation

- Independent, **sequestered** evaluation of morph detection capabilities across diverse datasets
- “Black-box” testing
- Ongoing testing + public reporting (report + interactive webpage)



Use Cases

- Single-image morph detection
- Two-image differential morph detection
- 1:1 morph acceptance (FR resistance against morphing)
- Demorphing

Recent participants

- **Academic:** Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NO), Fraunhofer Institute for Telecommunications Heinrich Hertz Institute (DE), Universidade de Coimbra (PT), West Virginia University (US), University of Bologna (IT), Hochschule Darmstadt
- **Commercial:** Idemia (FR), Neurotechnology (LT), Vision-box (PT), Secunet (DE), Kempelen Institute of Intelligent Technologies (SK)

FATE MORPH Report published as NIST Interagency Report 8292
Ongoing morph detection submissions accepted! Google: FATE MORPH



FATE MORPH Track: Morph Detection

Single-
image
(S-MAD)

Morph detection with single
image in isolation
(e.g., document issuance)




DOCUMENT ISSUANCE:
Suspect image in isolation

Differential
(D-MAD)

Morph detection with
additional live capture image
(e.g., border crossing)


$C = A+B$. Morphed image
is contained in a passport



A. Images of this image
not available during
authentication



B2: This image represents a live
capture during an eGate border
crossing, say.




BORDER CROSSING: Suspect image + live image


New FATE MORPH Track: Demorphing


Demorphing is the process of recovering the original faces/identities used to generate a morph

- Single-image demorphing



- Differential demorphing





Differential morph
detection capability is
close to valuable:
Run silent pilots

False Accusation Rate, BPCER = 0.01

Proportion of morphs **not** detected,
MACER = 0.36

Potential Detection Strategy: Secondary Immigration


Operational Use of Differential Morph Detection in Border Control (D-MAD)

This operates in the following setting

- Suspected morph from passport
- AND
- Live border crossing photo → not a morph

Document scope

- Algorithm selection
- Algorithm configuration – low BPCER
- Human-led investigative process after a candidate morph detected



Possible application of differential morph detection




- In primary immigration eGate, run differential morph detector configured at a **low** false detection rate
- When a potential morph is detected, send traveler to secondary
- In secondary review
 - Inspect document, question traveler
 - Retrieve and visually compare
 - Photo(s) of document owner from other sources if available (e.g., ID card, driver's license)
 - Previous passport photos of document owner if available
 - Collect a pristine ICAO compliant portrait of traveler, then
 - Run differential morph detection of portrait against DG2 (to rule out quality-related issues)
 - Run a 1:1 matcher with portrait and 1) previous passport photos and/or 2) photos from other sources
 - Confirm traveler identity with different biometric modality (e.g., DG3, DG4) if available

Potential Detection Strategy: 1:N Duplicate Detection

When a face is submitted for, say, passport application, execute a search of the databases of prior applicants.

Expected result: Strong hit, if previously encountered, OR
No hit if not.

But for morphed image: Possible weaker hit.



<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2022/NIST.IR.8430.pdf>

Use of 1:N Face Recognition for Morph Detection

Example Scenario: Passport Renewal



Bona fide search image
(mated – subject in database)



	Score	Rank
	4.087	1
	4.001	2
	3.991	3
	0.707	4
	0.330	5
	0.198	6
	0.074	7
	0.016	8

VERY HIGH
SCORES @ RANK 1 + 2

...



Morphed search image
(ONE subject in database)



	Score	Rank
	3.142	1
	3.011	2
	3.000	3
	0.707	4
	0.330	5
	0.198	6
	0.074	7
	0.016	8

HIGH SCORES @
RANK 1 + 2

...



Morphed search image
(BOTH subjects in database)



	Score	Rank
	3.142	1
	3.110	2
	3.028	3
	3.011	4
	3.000	5
	0.198	6
	0.074	7
	0.016	8

HIGH SCORES
@ RANK 1 + 2

...

Morphing: possible mitigation

Do live enrollment

- Norway (now), Sweden (now), Germany 2025¹
- Should be adopted by all countries to be effective
- But some morphs in circulation now

Continue to develop morph detection

- Continue development of automated morph detection (particularly D-MAD, which may be ready for operational piloting)
- Perform 1:N duplicate check; look for suspicious activity [NISTIR 8430]

Eliminate print + scanned photos

- Avoid printing and scanning
- Require high resolution, digital photos

Do trusted external capture

- Signed photobooths
- Certified photographers (e.g., Finland, France)
- Liveness detection in dedicated, secure mobile application

Build awareness

- Train relevant personnel about morphs
- Can training improve personnel skills on morphed image over time?
- What cues are people good at detecting morphs using and are any of them tangible to document?

Establish strong secondary verification processes

- Verify with additional data source (e.g., Slovenia)
- Use another biometric modality

[1] <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-tech-morphing/germany-bans-digital-doppelganger-passport-photos-idUSKBN23A1YM>

Thank you!

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