ASSEMBLY — 38TH SESSION

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Agenda Item 14: Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP)

EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT OF THE
UNIVERSAL SECURITY AUDIT PROGRAMME (USAP)

(Presented by the Russian Federation)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document contains an analysis of the evolutionary development of the Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) and addresses the Programme's planned transition to the Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA).

Action: Action is in paragraph 4 of this document.

Strategic Objectives:	This working paper relates to Strategic Objective B — *Aviation Security*.
Financial implications:	No additional resources are required.
References:	A38-WP/15-EX/10 A38-WP/16-EX/11 Annex 17 — *Security* Annex 9 — *Facilitation* Doc 9734, *Oversight Manual*, Part C — *The Establishment and Management of a State's Aviation Security Oversight System*

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[1] Russian version provided by the Russian Federation.

1.   **INTRODUCTION**

1.1   The Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) entered into force in 2002 in order to help improve global aviation security by determining whether States are complying with Standards contained in Annex 17 — *Security*, identifying deficiencies in the aviation security system, and taking corrective actions to eliminate them. The first cycle of USAP was completed at the end of 2007.

1.2   Cycle two, which began in January 2008, focused on the potential of States in the realm of aviation security oversight, taking into account Standards in Annex 17 — *Security*, and the respective security-related provisions of Annex 9 — *Facilitation.* This cycle was completed at the end of June 2013.

1.3   However, the requirements of time are such that the system of conducting aviation security audits continuously must be improved and developed to achieve a more progressive and effective approach to aviation security at the global, regional, and state levels.

1.4   The necessity of receiving information on the status of aviation security in the States and on a continuous basis, particularly as new security threats and risks emerge, requires that a Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA) be established for global aviation security, taking into account an approach based on risk assessment in the context of constant change.

1.5   A fundamental component of the aviation security system is effective oversight (monitoring) over quality control. The effectiveness of aviation security quality control depends on States having the proper legislation, a governmental quality control programme, as well as qualified, competent, responsible personnel. Taking into account the direct connection between the level of aviation security and the quality control system, States should implement more broadly in their nations a quality control management certification by passing the proper legislation and arranging for personnel to receive highly professional training.

2.   **EVOLUTIONARY   DEVELOPMENT   OF   THE
        UNIVERSAL SECURITY AUDIT PROGRAMME (USAP)**

2.1   The twenty-fourth meeting of the Aviation Security (AVSEC) Panel discussed and unanimously supported the concept of transitioning from the Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) to a risk assessment-based continuous monitoring approach (CMA).

2.2   The main objective of the USAP-CMA is still to contribute to raising the level of aviation security on a global scale by identifying deficiencies in the aviation security and oversight systems in Member States and adopting corrective actions to eliminate deficiencies. Meanwhile, it is advisable to reassess the principles of States' informational interaction with ICAO so that they will reflect current and future requirements to the methodology for implementing this Programme after 2013.

2.3   The content of the new conceptual approach to conducting audits will not change, in principle under the framework of the next USAP implementation stage. The only thing that will change is the corresponding methodology that will include different versions of monitoring the status of aviation security in States so that the States' changing needs can be adapted to global aviation security requirements.

2.4   The planned work in the framework of the new methodology calls for: an audit of the respective documentation, an oversight audit, an audit of compliance with Standards in Annex 17 — *Security* and the respective provisions in Annex 9 — *Facilitation,* control audits and an assessment of aviation security on the basis of State-provided information, depending on specific indicators for each State and keeping in mind the results of previous audits. So, on the basis of information received from States, deficiencies will be identified in aviation security and recommendations issued to eliminate them. The principle of the universal programme remains unchanged.

2.5   As is well known, process of transitioning to the new method of audits under USAP-CMA will consist of three stages: cycle development stage, preparatory stage, and testing stage. The entire transition to CMA is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2014 and take effect at the beginning of 2015.

2.6   The principle of transparency must remain unchanged during USAP-CMA audits; i.e. confidentiality must not be undermined; it plays an important role from the perspective of national security and countering terrorism threats. In this case, it is advisable to observe the principle of "limited transparency", and also the provision contained in Recommended practice 2.4.5. of Annex 17 — *Security* which says that each State, as appropriate and taking into account their sovereignty, takes its own decision about responding to requests for information from other States about the results of the ICAO-performed audit and corresponding corrective actions.

3.   CONCLUSION

3.1   The primary goal of USAP-CMA remains to contribute to elevating the level of aviation security on a global scale by identifying deficiencies in the aviation security and oversight systems and also to take corrective actions as per ICAO recommendations to eliminate deficiencies.

3.2   The system of conducting aviation security audits must always be improved and developed to be a more progressive and effective approach to ensuring global, regional, and state aviation security.

3.3   Confidential information about aviation security must be protected in connection with the possible danger of classified information being used improperly.

4.   ACTION

4.1   The Assembly is invited to:

     a) support introducing a mechanism of continuous monitoring in the realm of aviation security, based on risk assessment;

     b) request the Council to prepare and publish instructions on implementing the continuous monitoring mechanism of the Universal Security Audit Programme, taking into account the continuous monitoring method;

     c) encourage States to actively implement, on the intra-state level under the quality control system, a new continuous monitoring method when doing audits, which is an effective approach to elevating the aviation security level;

d) propose that States more broadly implement a management certificate of a State quality control system (oversight) by passing the proper legislation and arranging highly professional personnel training in aviation security assurance; and

e) agree with the principle of "limited transparency," in connection with the possible danger of classified information about aviation security being used improperly.

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