



BEA
Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses
pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile

Arnaud Desjardin
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Department


Managing a large scale accident/incident investigation

Gestión de una investigación de accidentes/ incidentes de gran escala

ICAO Accident/Incident Investigation Workshop
Oficina Regional NACC de la OACI – Mexico City
21 July 2015




Recurrent questions




- More than ever, abide by it:
 - ➔ Investigations must be conducted in a timely manner with the sole objective of drawing safety lessons;
 - ➔ The State conducting the investigation must associate with the investigation other States, in particular the States of Manufacture, Design, Registry and Operation of the aircraft;
 - ➔ Investigators must be independent and cannot receive instructions from any authority;
 - ➔ If a judicial investigation takes place in parallel with the safety investigation, it must not impede the due course of the safety investigation;
 - ➔ Only the authority conducting the investigation can provide information on the investigation. Its report must be made public.
- While respecting the sovereignty of each ICAO contracting state, **an accident and its lessons learned belong to the international aviation community.**

Steps of an investigation




Valid for any investigation !

Steps of an large scale investigation




Notification & Planning



■ The State of Occurrence shall forward a notification of an accident or serious incident, with a minimum of delay and by the most suitable and quickest means available, to:

- the State of Registry;
- the State of the Operator;
- the State of Design;
- the State of Manufacture; and
- ICAO, when the aircraft involved is of a maximum mass of over 2 250 kg or is a turbojet-powered aeroplane

Notification Workflow



■ If Accident → Investigate

Accident. An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which, in the case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, or in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place between the time the aircraft is ready to move with the purpose of flight until such time as it comes to rest at the end of the flight and the primary propulsion system is shut down, in which:

- a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:
- being in the aircraft, or
 - direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become detached from the aircraft, or
 - direct exposure to jet blast.

except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or

- b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which:
- adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and
 - would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component,

except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to a single engine (including its cowlings or accessories), to propellers, wing tips, antennas, probes, vanes, tires, brakes, wheels, fairings, panels, landing gear doors, windscreens, the aircraft skin (such as small dents or puncture holes), or for minor damages to main rotor blades, tail rotor blades, landing gear, and those resulting from hail or bird strike (including holes in the radome); or

- c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.

Note 1.— For statistical uniformity only, an injury resulting in death within thirty days of the date of the accident is classified, by ICAO, as a fatal injury.

Note 2.— An aircraft is considered to be missing when the official search has been terminated and the wreckage has not been located.

Investigating Incidents



- **Incident:** An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation.

→ Investigate, if **safety lessons** are expected to be drawn

- **Serious Incident:** An incident involving circumstances indicating that there was a high probability of an accident

→ Investigate

- The incidents listed are typical examples of incidents that are likely to be serious incidents

Near collisions requiring an avoidance manoeuvre to avoid a collision or an unsafe situation or when an avoidance action would have been appropriate.

Collisions not classified as accidents.

Controlled flight into terrain only marginally avoided.

Aborted take-offs on a closed or engaged runway, on a taxiway¹ or unassigned runway.

Take-offs from a closed or engaged runway, from a taxiway¹ or unassigned runway.

Landings or attempted landings on a closed or engaged runway, on a taxiway¹ or unassigned runway.

Gross failures to achieve predicted performance during take-off or initial climb.

Fires and/or smoke in the cockpit, in the passenger compartment, in cargo compartments or engine fires, even though such fires were extinguished by the use of extinguishing agents.

Events requiring the emergency use of oxygen by the flight crew.

Aircraft structural failures or engine disintegrations, including uncontained turbine engine failures, not classified as an accident.

Multiple malfunctions of one or more aircraft systems seriously affecting the operation of the aircraft.

Flight crew incapacitation in flight.

Fuel quantity level or distribution situations requiring the declaration of an emergency by the pilot, such as insufficient fuel, fuel exhaustion, fuel starvation, or inability to use all usable fuel on board.

Take-off or landing incidents. Incidents such as under-shooting, overrunning or running off the side of runways.

System failures, weather phenomena, operations outside the approved flight envelope or other occurrences which caused or could have caused difficulties controlling the aircraft.

Failures of more than one system in a redundancy system mandatory for flight guidance and navigation.

The unintentional or, as an emergency measure, the intentional release of a slung load or any other load carried external to the aircraft.

Accident / Incident Example



✓ A380 Le Bourget?


✓ Media visibility should not impact the classification of the event



Incidents vs. Serious Incidents

✓ Incidents (examples)

✓ List of examples of serious incidents ICAO Annex 13



When to investigation Incidents?

- Like for SMS
- Takes into account:
 - ↳ Consequence
 - ↳ Probability of occurrence
 - ↳ Robustness of protection mechanisms (soft and hard)
 - ↳ Procedures
 - ↳ Training
 - ↳ Best practices
 - ↳ Systems (TCAS, GPWS...)

- ERC matrix: Event Risk Classification

Question 2

What was the effectiveness of the remaining barriers between this event and the most credible accident scenario?			
Effective	Limited	Minimal	Not effective
50	102	502	2500
10	21	101	500
2	4	20	100
1			

Question 1

If this event had escalated into an accident outcome, what would have been the most credible outcome?	
Catastrophic Accident	Loss of aircraft or multiple fatalities (3 or more)
Major Accident	1 or 2 fatalities, multiple serious injuries, major damage to the aircraft
Minor Injuries or damage	Minor injuries, minor damage to aircraft
No accident outcome	No potential damage or injury could occur

Typical accident scenarios
Loss of control, mid air collision, uncontrollable fire on board, explosions, total structural failure of the aircraft, collision with terrain
High speed taxiway collision, major turbulence injuries
Pushback accident, minor weather damage
Any event which could not escalate into an accident, even if it may have operational consequences (e.g. diversion, delay, individual sickness)

Source: Methodology for Operational Risk Assessment - ARMS Working Group, 2007-2010

- SIA may have an added value:
 - ➔ Better access to systemic issues (Operator's SMS may be limited to internal information)
 - ➔ Make safety lessons public
- Benefits of accident investigations, without the main drawbacks:
 - ➔ The crew is still here to be interviewed
 - ➔ FDR and other avionics equipment available for download
 - ➔ Less pressure to explore systemic issues
 - ➔ **BUT:** CVR often overwritten!
 - Messages about CVR circuit breakers after an incident
 - Extension of CVR duration to 25 hours



Le Bourget, Thursday 21 June 2012

Ministère de l'Écologie, du Développement durable, des Transports et du Logement

BEA

Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile

NOTIFICATION OF NATIONAL AUTHORITIES				
Address:				
Telefax:				
a) for accidents the identifying abbreviation ACCID, for serious incidents INCID;	ACCID (Accident) <input type="checkbox"/>	INCID (Serious Incident) <input type="checkbox"/>	Incident (optional) <input type="checkbox"/>	
b) manufacturer, model, nationality and registration marks, and serial number of the aircraft;				
c) name of owner, operator and hirer, if any, of the aircraft;				
d) name of the pilot-in-command, and nationality of crew and passengers;				
e) date and time (local time or UTC) of the accident or serious incident;	(dd/mm/yyyy – hh:mm) local date: local time:	(dd/mm/yyyy – hh:mm) UTC date: UTC time:		
f) last point of departure and point of intended landing of the aircraft;				
Last point of departure: Point of intended landing:				
g) position of the aircraft with reference to some easily defined geographical point and latitude and longitude;				
h) number of crew and passengers; aboard, killed and seriously injured; others, killed and seriously injured;	Persons on board Fatal Serious Injury Minor	crew crew crew	pax pax pax	others others
i) description of the accident or serious incident and the extent of damage to the aircraft so far as is known;				
j) an indication to what extent the investigation will be conducted or is proposed to be delegated by the State of Occurrence;				
k) physical characteristics of the accident or serious incident area, as well as an indication of access difficulties or special requirements to reach the site;				
l) identification of the originating authority and means to contact the investigator-in-charge and the accident investigation authority of the State of Occurrence at any time;	BEA Investigator in charge:			
m) presence and description of dangerous goods on board the aircraft.	<input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes - If yes, UN#			
Operation Type (if information is available)	Commercial Aviation <input type="checkbox"/>	Scheduled <input type="checkbox"/>	Passenger <input type="checkbox"/>	
	General Aviation <input type="checkbox"/>	Non-Scheduled <input type="checkbox"/>	Cargo <input type="checkbox"/>	
Level of damage to aircraft (if information is available)	Destroyed <input type="checkbox"/>	Substantial <input type="checkbox"/>		Minor <input type="checkbox"/>
None <input type="checkbox"/>				
<i>The State of Occurrence shall forward a notification of an accident or serious incident with a minimum of delay and by the most suitable and quickest means available to: a) the State of Registry; b) the State of the Operator; c) the State of Design; d) the State of Manufacture; and e) the International Civil Aviation Organization, when the aircraft involved is of a maximum mass of over 2 250 kg.</i>				

Notification Letter



✓ ACCID = Accident

✓ INCID = Serious Incident

Zone Sud – Bâtiment 153
200 rue de Paris
Aéroport du Bourget
93352 Le Bourget Cedex
France
Tel : +33 1 49 92 72 00
Fax : +33 1 49 92 72 03
www.bea.aero



Le Bourget, Date

Mr. or Mrs..... (when known)
Name of the local authority
Country

e-mail address or Fax Number

O/Ref: BEA Stamp / BEA / INV

Subject: Appointment of an accredited representative and technical advisors
To participate in the investigation into
Type of event / type of aircraft / Registration number / Date / Place /
Country

Thank you for the notification that you sent to the BEA concerning the
aforementioned (type event). In accordance with the provisions of Annex 13, we
have appointed as accredited representative:

- Name and Forename, BEA investigator (or else),

He / She will be accompanied by the following investigators:

- Name and Forename, BEA investigator (or else) ;
- Name and Forename, BEA investigator (or else) ;

He / She will be assisted by the following technical advisors:

- Name and Forename, position, company (when needed);
- Name and Forename, position, company (when needed);

Mr (Mrs) Name and Forename of the ACCREP and his / her team are scheduled
to arrive at LOCAL AIRPORT airport on DATE at TIME on FLIGHT NUMBER
XXX from Paris. I would be grateful to you if you could welcome them.

You may contact ACCREP4S Name and Forename at:

prenom.nom@bea-fr.org

Cell phone: +33 6 XX...

Fax: + 33 1 49 92 72 90 (si envoi par fax)

The BEA remains at your disposal for both CVR and FDR read-out and any
aircraft parts examination that might be required.

I look forward to hearing from you soon.


Best regards,


Answer to a Notification

- ✓ Appoint a Accredited Representative
- ✓ Name the Technical Advisers


➔ Provide a precise response
regarding your participation

- The right team size
- The right skills







International Organisation



International Organisation



Site & Recorder readout



■ Go-Team

- ➔ Bio-Hazards + protection equipment
- ➔ Travel & Hotel

■ Site documentation

- ➔ Wreckage analysis
- ➔ Flight Recorder search

■ Briefing within your team morning and evening

- ➔ Safety on site
- ➔ Objectives of the day

■ Do plan to talk to the media

- Site access



Planning for site activities

- Get a meeting room near the crash site
- Will be the site investigation headquarters
 - ➔ Will be the destination point for everybody travelling to the site




© Can Stock Photo - csp4831420


Provide help cards for people on site

Dangerous goods


- 1 Batteries, Aircraft Quantity 2
- 2 Engine Oil
- 3 Escape Slides/Life Rafts
- 4 Fire Bottles (APU, engines, lower cargo compartment, lavatory waste containers)
- 5 Fire extinguishers (attendant stations, closets, galleys, etc.)
- 6 Fuel
- 7 Hydraulic Fluid, Reservoirs (waste only)
- 8 Uranium, (depleted, Depleted Uranium Control Balance Aircraft Batteries counter-balance weights)
- 9 Ordnance Devices (off-wing escape)
- 10 Oxygen Bottles, Portable, Gaseous
- 11 Oxygen Bottles, Crew System Gaseous
- 12 Oxygen Bottles, Passenger System Gaseous
- 13 Oxygen Generators (optional: each PSU standard: each attendant station and lavatory)
- 14 Rain Repellent
- 15 Refrigerant (located in each galley)
- 16 Smoke Hoods
- 17 Tritium Signs (aisles emergency exit doors)



Flight Recorder Location



Exterior Painting Drawing



- Location and identification of major components and pieces

- Ground fire areas

- Ground scars



- Establish the direction of flight at impact



- Determine impact angle, aircraft attitude, aircraft track

- Check for clues of fire before impact



- Establish engine power at impact

- Determine aircraft configuration (gear, flaps, spoilers)
- Determine the need for specialist examinations of components, systems, instruments, fractures
- Document cockpit configuration (handles, levers, switches), instruments, warning panels and lights



- Estimate aircraft speed and rate of descent
- Establish general failure mode of airframe
- Take samples of all fluids



- Plan 2 meetings per day
 - ↳ Morning briefing: what is planned for the day, and who
 - ↳ Evening briefing: results of the day
- Organize by themes:
 - ↳ “Administrative” items: site access, who is who?
 - ↳ Aircraft aspects
 - ↳ OPS aspects
 - ↳ Systems aspects
- With all the Acc. Reps, Tech. Advisers, and others
- 1 hour max!

- Interview the witnesses (check their location) including crew and passengers, where available

- Interview Plan:
 - Opening
 - 2 - Main Body
 - Free recall
 - Specific questions
 - 3 - Closing

Interview Opening



- Introduce yourself, your agency and the purpose of the investigation (no blame)
- Explain how you will conduct the interview
- Ask for the permission to write down notes
- Be polite and relax
- Keep in mind that:
 - You should only intervene to steer the conversation in the desired direction
 - You must display a sincere interest
 - You are not a policeman

■ Free Recall

- ➔ Let the witness talk about what he/she knows of the accident
- ➔ Just wait and be quiet; don't fill in the gaps
- ➔ You may have to say: "Please continue, what happened then?"
- ➔ Never interrupt the witness; write down the questions that may come to your mind

Interview – Main Body



- Questions
 - ↳ Specific questions may prompt the witness to remember further details
 - ↳ Open-ended questions evoke a description of the events and lead to witness participation ≠ Closed questions may produce only “yes” or “no” answers
 - ↳ Questions containing the expected answers may influence the witness and be judgmental:
 - ↳ *“Which direction was the aircraft flying to?” ≠ “Was the aircraft flying to the west?”*
- Do not mention subjects before the witness mentions them
- Do not use technical terms the witness is not familiar with
- If necessary, take a break

- **Summarize** the key points
- **Read back** your written notes
- Give the witness an opportunity:
 - ➔ To precise any point
 - ➔ To add further points he/she feels significant
- Reassure and thank the witness
- Ask for possible follow-up interview if need be
- Can end by *“Do you have any questions for me”*

Flight Recorders

- On site recovery



Various shape of recorders



- Even if damaged, can be easily recognized...



- but the memory module may be separated from its case



- and sometimes not so easy to recognize

FDR from the Germanwings Accident – France, 24 March 2015



- Should be placed and transported in a container of water if recovered at sea / lake

⇒ **Recorder specialist may be needed on site**

Damaged Solid State Recorder Readout



Electronic part of a safe recorder





Memory module from accident recorder

The electronic part of a safe (and modified) recorder is used as an interface






...or if really damaged



- The memory is extracted from the module...



Readout of the memory board




- After readout, plan for a press conference
 - Talk about the data that was extracted
 - Give a preliminary plots / history of flight



— Trajectoire partielle du D-AIPX issue des données du radar secondaire de Marseille depuis 09 h 29 min jusqu'au dernier point enregistré

Les heures sont indiquées en temps UTC

Organization & Conduct of the Investigation



Part I
Organization
and
Planning


Part II
Procedures
and
Checklists

Part III
Investigation

Part IV
Reporting



■ Working Groups:




- IIC should establish objectives for each group
- Group leaders responsible for their Group report

Case Study

Accident
Airbus A320 registered
D-AIPX operated by
Germanwings on 24 March 2015

Germanwings Accident Investigation




Circumstances



- Flight Barcelona => Düsseldorf
- 144 pax, 6 crew
- Copilot alone in the cockpit during cruise (point # 3)
- Autopilot commanded to descent until terrain (point #4)
- Cockpit door locked despite requests for access via keypad, cabin interphone and knocks on the door (point #7, #9, #11)

- *Note: Several altitude selections towards 100 ft were recorded during descent on the flight that preceded the accident flight, while the co-pilot was alone in the cockpit*

■ General view





Wreckage site – general view

Human means and equipments



- More than 300 gendarmes and policemen on site (including high mountain specialists)
- 380 firemen
- French army
- Emergency physicians and psychologists
- 7 BEA investigators (including 2 wreckage and 2 recorders specialists)
- 3 BFU, 2 CIAIAC, 1 EASA, 10 GWI + LH, 6 Airbus, 2 SNECMA

Human means and equipments

- 5 helicopters from gendarmerie (on site operations)
- 1 plane for radiocommunications
- 13 helicopters from French Army (no-fly zone, SAR, VIP and specialits transport)
- 3 helicopters and 1 reco plane from firemen services



Human means and equipments

- Hotel 30 min from base camp (Seyne les Alpes A/D)
- Meeting room nearby village (wifi, photocopier, video projector)



Offroad trucks



Mobile Headquarters

Ministère de l'Intérieur/DICOM/P. Chabaud

- Fatigue management
 - ↳ 2 Wreckage Specialists day 1 to 7
 - ↳ 2 WS + 2 Relief team day 8
 - ↳ Only relief team the following days
- 8 am to 5 pm non stop (no restroom)
 - ↳ Lunch on site (quick snack)
 - ↳ Dinner at base camp offered by voluntary association

- Transportation
 - ➔ Helicopter winching
 - ➔ Offroad truck and walking
 - ➔ By road from




Human means and equipments

■ Safety on site

- ➔ FFP3 disposable mask
- ➔ Protective footwear (crushing)
- ➔ Gloves (Kevlar + nitril + leather)
(cut + fluid + perforation)



During



After

- ➔ Helmet and harness

(provided by high mountain specialists)

- ➔ Team = 1 BEA + 1 specialist
(with rope + crampon + ice axe)



Managing a large scale accident/incident investigation

■ Dangers on site

- ➔ Poisoning by fuel (smell remaining during 8 days)
- ➔ Composite material (low risk – no massive fire)
- ➔ Psychological risk (body parts)
- ➔ Slippery surface more difficult going up (increasing slope and unsteady ground)




- End of site phase: 2 April 2015 (FDR recovery)
 - ➔ No injury or damages except one investigator shoe

- European regulation (EU) 996/2010 – Article 12.2


Where, in the course of the safety investigation, it becomes known or it is suspected that an act of unlawful interference as provided for under national law, such as national law on accident investigations, was involved in the accident or serious incident, the investigator-in-charge shall immediately inform the competent authorities thereof. Subject to Article 14, the relevant information collected in the safety investigation shall be shared with those authorities immediately and upon request, relevant material may also be transferred to those authorities. The sharing of that information and that material shall be without prejudice to the right of the safety investigation authority to continue the safety investigation, in coordination with the authorities to which the control of the site may have been transferred.

➔ **The BEA decided to continue the safety investigation**

- Date published: 6 May 2015, in 4 languages
- <http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.gwi18g/vol.gwi18g.php>




Initial Findings



- The flight crew possessed the licenses and ratings required to perform the flight.
- The co-pilot obtained his class 1 medical certificate without restrictions in April 2008, valid for one year.
- An episode of depression and the taking of medication to treat it delayed the renewal of the copilot's class 1 medical certificate between April and July 2009.
- From July 2009, the co-pilot's medical certificate was endorsed with the note *"Note the special conditions/restrictions of the waiver FRA 091/09 - REV-"*. His pilot's license had been endorsed with the note *"***SIC**incl. PPL ***"*.

Ongoing Investigation




- Medical aspects: current balance between medical confidentiality and flight safety. How and why pilots can be in a cockpit with the intention of causing the loss of the aircraft and its occupants, despite the existence of:
 - ➔ regulations setting mandatory medical criteria for flight crews, especially in the areas of psychiatry, psychology and behavioral problems;
 - ➔ recruitment policies, as well as the initial and recurrent training processes within airlines.
- Cockpit security: compromises between the requirements of security, specifically those that followed the attacks on 11 September 2001, and the requirements of flight safety. In this context, the investigation will include a focus on cockpit door locking systems and cockpit access and exit procedures.

Similar events

 In progress

Date	Aircraft	Operator	State of Occurrence	Deaths	Circumstances
29/11/2013	ERJ 190	LAM	Namibia	33	The aeroplane was in cruise at flight level FL380 when the co-pilot left the cockpit to go to the toilet, leaving the Captain alone. On three occasions, different altitudes were selected to order a descent to the ground with autopilot. The CVR showed variable levels of aural warnings, as well as noises of repeated knocking and calls, corresponding to attempts to get into in the cockpit.
27/03/2012 NEW	A320?	JetBlue	USA	0	The Captain's erratic behaviour during flight between New York and Las Vegas prompted an unscheduled landing in Amarillo, TX after crew and passengers intervened to subdue the pilot.
28/01/2008 NEW	B767	Air Canada	North Atlantic Ocean	0	The aircraft was operating a scheduled passenger service from Toronto (Pearson) to London (Heathrow). On first contact with Shannon ATC the Commander made a PAN call and requested a diversion to Shannon Airport due to a medical emergency. The First Officers behaviour became belligerent and uncooperative which convinced the Commander he was now dealing with a crewmember who was effectively incapacitated. The aircraft landed safely at Shannon where medical assistance was waiting to meet the aircraft.
31/10/1999	B767	EgyptAir	North Atlantic Ocean	217	The aeroplane was in cruise at flight level FL330 with a flight crew consisting of a Captain, a duty co-pilot and a relief co-pilot. The duty co-pilot left the cockpit, and the relief co-pilot took his place in the right seat. Eight minutes later, the Captain left the cockpit in turn, leaving the relief co-pilot alone. The autopilot was then disengaged and nose-down inputs were recorded on the FDR. The aeroplane descended. The engines were shut down. The Captain returned to the cockpit and tried to take back control of the aeroplane. The Captain repeatedly asked the co-pilot to help him to pitch up the aeroplane ("pull with me") but the latter continued to command the elevator to pitch nose down. The aeroplane regained altitude before descending again. It collided with the surface of the ocean. The reasons that led the co-pilot to take these actions could not be determined.
11/10/1999	ATR-42	Air Botswana	Botswana	1	The pilot, the only person on board, deliberately flew the aeroplane into the ground by crashing at Gaborone airport. The validity of his licence had been revoked for medical reasons.
19/12/1997	B737	Silk Air	Indonesia	104	While the aircraft was in cruise at 35,000 ft, the flight recorders stopped recording one after the other. The aeroplane suddenly started to descend. No Mayday message was transmitted before or during the descent. The aircraft crashed into a river. The safety investigation was not able to identify any technical problem that would make it possible to explain the accident.
21/08/1994	ATR42	Royal Air Maroc	Morocco	44	The Captain disengaged the autopilot and deliberately directed the aircraft towards the ground. The co-pilot was in the cockpit but was not able to counter the Captain's actions.
09/02/1982	DC-8	Japan Airlines	Japan	24	After having disengaged the autopilot on final approach at a height of 164 ft, the pilot pushed the control column forward and set the thrust levers on idle. He then moved the thrust levers of engines 2 and 3 to the reverse idle position. While the aircraft's attitude decreased, the co-pilot tried to pull on the control column. The co-pilot was unable to raise the nose of the aeroplane because the Captain was pushing forward on the control column with both hands. The aircraft crashed into the sea 510 m short of the runway. The investigation showed that the pilot's actions resulted from a mental problem. He was suffering from schizophrenia.



Accident to the Airbus A320-211 registered D-AIPX, flight 4U9525, on 24 March 2015 - Windows Internet E

BEA http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.gwi18g/flight.t... Intranet BEA

Fichier Edition Affichage Favoris Outils ?

Accident to the Airbus A320-211 registered D-AIPX, flight 4U9525, on 24 March 2015

Reporting an occurrence
Contact the BEA
Links
Glossary
Annual Report
Archives

Reports

- Preliminary Report, 6 May 2015

Press releases and information

- Information, 24 March 2015
- Information, 31 March 2015
- Information, 3 April 2015


Media library

- Photos of the CVR brought to the BEA on the morning of the 25 March
- Photo of the site of the accident
- Photos of the CVR brought to the BEA on the morning of the 25 March

+ Press Conference – 25 March 2015




Report Drafting & Consultation




- A well-structured report
 - ➔ Means a well-structured methodology
- Consultation
 - ➔ Break the isolation
 - ➔ But remain independent

- Extent of the investigation linked to the lessons expected to be drawn for the improvement of aviation safety
 - ➔ Full-ICAO Annex 13 reports
 - ➔ Simplified reports (“accident brief”, “bulletin”...)



Report Structure




BEA What is a « cause » or « contributing factor »

- Actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which led to the accident or incident
 - ➔ Act or condition against which one should fight against in order to prevent similar accidents/incidents
- Answer to the question “**WHY?**”
 - ➔ NOT the question “WHAT?”
 - ➔ CFIT, LOC-I, System failure... describe **what** happened, not why
- Should be formulated with preventive action in mind, and linked to appropriate safety recommendations
 - ➔ The reader should be able to “guess” the SRs once the causes have been read

BEA How to determine cause & contributing factors

- Build a scenario, by identifying turning points (decision point by various actors, like pilots, technician, controller, designer...)




- The immediate cause is the last turning point before the accident
- Contributing factors are the preceding ones: even if going towards the accident, there was still a way out

Examples to avoid

- The accident was due to bad weather conditions
- The accident was due a failure of the electrical system
- The accident was due to the collision with the mountain

- The State conducting the investigation sends a copy of the “draft final report” to any State that participated in the investigation
 - ➔ Acc. Reps consult Technical Adviser
 - ➔ Acc. Reps compile comments
- 60 days
- For large scale investigation:
 - ➔ Plan meeting to merge comments
 - ➔ Give feedback on what you take into account or not
- **Amend** report or **append** comments (for Acc. Reps comments)

Publication & Safety Recommendations



- Interim Report ~30 days
 - ➔ May include Safety Rec.
- Final Report within 12 months
 - ➔ If not possible, issue an interim statement publicly available on each anniversary

Language Issue



- The report shall be submitted to appropriate States and to ICAO in one of its working languages
- As often as possible, provide an English version of the report
 - ➔ Reports in their English version are more accessible and, as such, more downloaded
- Make the report publicly available
 - ➔ Internet site
 - ➔ ICAO's e-Library of Final Reports


- Especially, for large scale investigation
 - ➔ Plan a victims' families meeting to present the report before it is released
 - ➔ Prepare a media release
 - ➔ Expect reactions from the families, the airline, the manufacturer


**It may be appropriate to make a presentation of the report
to the executives of the airline if the latter is involved
in the conclusions of the investigation**

- Annex 13 definition : “A proposal of an accident investigation authority based on information derived from an investigation, **made with the intention of preventing accidents** or incidents and which in no case has the purpose of creating a presumption of blame or liability for an accident or incident. In addition to safety recommendations arising from accident and incident investigations, safety recommendations may result from diverse sources, including safety studies.”
- Golden rules:
 - ➔ Be backed by strong evidence and clear **cause-and-effect** relationships
 - ➔ Focus the attention **on the problem** rather than the suggested solution
 - ➔ Include a **specific addressee**
 - ➔ Leave enough scope for the addressee to determine how the problem could be resolved

Basis of a Safety Recommendation

- Holes in the “safety barriers” have been identified by the investigation or the safety study
- SRs should point out the areas where to apply a “patch” in order to cover the holes






- § 6.10 *A State that receives safety recommendations shall inform the proposing State, within ninety days of the date of the transmittal correspondence, of the preventive action taken or under consideration, or the reasons why no action will be taken.*

- EU 996/2010
 - ➔ Same as Annex 13 +

2. Within 60 days of the receipt of the reply, the safety investigation authority shall inform the addressee whether or not it considers the reply adequate and give justification when it disagrees with the decision to take no action.




- § 6.11 *A State conducting an investigation or any other State issuing a safety recommendation should implement procedures **to record the responses** to the safety recommendation issued*
- § 6.12 *A State that receives a safety recommendation should implement procedures **to monitor the progress** of the action taken in response to that safety recommendation*

■ SRIS in EU States

- ➔ Sharing recommendations and experience on their effectiveness is helpful when considering issuing new recommendations
- ➔ Enable queries on common safety concerns or themes
- ➔ Track the timeliness of responses, as well as the assessments on these responses
- ➔ Make the final reports or safety studies containing the recommendations easily accessible (via hyperlinks)



- <http://eccairs-dds.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pubsris/default.asp>



The screenshot shows the ECCAIRS 5 WebDAS interface in Internet Explorer. The browser title is "ECCAIRS 5 WebDAS: User PUB.SRIS on repository PUBLIC SRIS - Windows Internet Explorer fourni par Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyse". The address bar shows the URL: <http://eccairs-dds.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pubsris/default.asp>. The page header includes "About | Disclaimer | English (en)".

The main content area features the logo of the European Commission and the text "JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE ECCAIRS - European Coordination Centre for Accident and Incident Reporting Systems". Below this is a breadcrumb trail: "European Commission > JRC > IPSC > Eccairs > pubSRIS".

A search query is displayed: "Query: Query" and "Find all Recommendation where { File number {Recommendation} has value }".

The results are presented in a table with the following columns: View, File number, Originator, Date issued, Hyperlink, and Headline.

View	File number	Originator	Date issued	Hyperlink	Headline
	FR.SIA-2015-0011	France - BEA	25/06/2015	Study	Certification des moteurs et leurs accessoires initialement non conçus pour une utilisation aéronautique / Certification of engines and accessories not originally d
	FR.SIA-2015-0012	France - BEA	25/06/2015	Study	Certification des moteurs et leurs accessoires initialement non conçus pour une utilisation aéronautique / Certification of engines and accessories not originally d
	NO.SIA-2015-0004	Norway - AAIB	16/06/2015	Final Report	Prepare areas along the roads to become suitable predefined helicopter landing sites
	NO.SIA-2015-0005	Norway - AAIB	16/06/2015	Final Report	Need to modernise obstacle database and make it compatible with GPS
	NO.SIA-2015-0006	Norway - AAIB	16/06/2015	Final Report	Revitalize SMS-activities on helicopter landings out in the fields - hazard id, standardised procedures, use of obstacle data bases and moving maps, CRM
	PT.SIA-2015-0001	Portugal - GPIAA	09/06/2015	36/ACCID/2014	Collision with the ground; Herdade da Amieira, Ponte de Sor; 04/dec/2014,10:50 UTC; Heli Schweizer 269C-1
	PT.SIA-2015-0002	Portugal - GPIAA	09/06/2015	36/ACCID/2014	Collision with the ground; Herdade da Amieira, Ponte de Sor; 04/dec/2014,10:50 UTC; Heli Schweizer 269C-1
	PT.SIA-2015-0003	Portugal - GPIAA	09/06/2015	36/ACCID/2014	Collision with the ground; Herdade da Amieira, Ponte de Sor; 04/dec/2014,10:50 UTC; Heli Schweizer 269C-1
	FR.SIA-2015-0009	France - BEA	04/06/2015	Final report	Efficacité du principe "Voir et éviter" lors de vols en montagne /Principle of effectiveness "See and avoid" when mountain flights
	FR.SIA-2015-0010	France - BEA	04/06/2015	Final report	Efficacité du principe "Voir et éviter" lors de vols en montagne / Principle of effectiveness "See and avoid" when mountain flights
	GB.SIA-2015-0006	United Kingdom - AAIB	14/05/2015	G-EWZZ Final Report	Location of aircraft fitted with a Ballistic Parachute Recovery System - CZAW SportCruiser (G-EWZZ) Controlled flight into terrain, Isle of Bute, 9 August 2014
	GB.SIA-2015-0007	United Kingdom - AAIB	14/05/2015	G-EWZZ Final Report	Location of rocket launcher in aircraft fitted with a Ballistic Parachute Recovery System - CZAW SportCruiser (G-EWZZ) Controlled flight into terrain, Isle of Bute,
	GB.SIA-2015-0008	United Kingdom - AAIB	14/05/2015	G-EWZZ Final Report	Dissemination of information for the Identification of aircraft with a Ballistic Parachute Recovery System - CZAW SportCruiser (G-EWZZ) Controlled flight into ter
	GB.SIA-2015-0009	United Kingdom - AAIB	14/05/2015	G-EWZZ Final Report	Placarding of aircraft fitted with a Ballistic Parachute Recovery System - CZAW SportCruiser (G-EWZZ) Controlled flight into terrain, Isle of Bute, 9 August 2014
	GB.SIA-2015-0010	United Kingdom - AAIB	14/05/2015	G-EWZZ Final Report	Location of rocket launcher in aircraft fitted with a Ballistic Parachute Recovery System - CZAW SportCruiser (G-EWZZ) Controlled flight into terrain, Isle of Bute,


At the bottom of the table, there is a pagination control: "Page: 1/15" and a "Refresh" button. The total number of recommendations is shown as "Total Recommendation: 1404".

- Always try to consult the addressee of your safety recommendations before issuing them
- A series of serious incidents may really support your recommendations
- Sharing safety recommendations adds weight to our impact on safety



BEA

Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses
pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile



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Thank you for your attention