# International Civil Aviation Organization North American, Central American and Caribbean Office

# **WORKING PAPER**

C/CAR/DCA/14 — WP/25 10/05/15

# Fourteenth Directors of Civil Aviation of the Central Caribbean Meeting (C/CAR/DCA/14) Kingston, Jamaica, 11 to 13 May 2015

**Agenda Item 3:** Aviation Safety Management

3.2 ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA)

#### STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME

(Presented by Cuba)

# **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This working paper shows the Cuban experience on the performed activities framed in the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) development with a Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA), in order to incorporate the safety risk analysis and particularly to evaluate and develop the safety system oversight competencies of the State.

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Action:	<ol> <li>Take note on the experience of the corrective action plan update resulting from the USOAP audit.</li> <li>Analyse the appropriateness of applying the SSP</li> </ol>
	<ul><li>implementation methodologies together with the ones proposed in the USOAP framework.</li><li>3. Analyse the need to have a framework aligned with Annex 19 available.</li></ul>
Strategic Objectives:	• Safety
References:	<ul> <li>Cuban Aviation Regulation RAC 19 Safety Management</li> <li>Doc 9734 – Safety Oversight Manual</li> <li>Doc 9735 – Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Manual</li> </ul>

#### 1. Introduction

- 1.1 Cuban safety oversight audit held from 19 to 28 February 2008, under the Comprehensive Systems Approach (CSA), included the State examination of compliance with ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) related to safety and their linked guideline texts, as well as with the related Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS). Such audit showed a lack of implementation result of 13.4%.
- 1.2 Cuba presented to ICAO a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) aimed at solving the 30 findings formed by the 107 protocol questions which resulted non satisfactory. ICAO Safety Oversight Audit (SOA) section reviewed the presented corrective measure plan and assessed that it addressed every existant verifications and recommendations.

## 2. Preliminary actions taken by the Cuban Civil Aviation Institute (IACC)

- 2.1 With a view to preparing for the ICAO CMA step and the State Safety Programme (SSP) implementation, since 2011 IACC proceeded with the Safety Management System (SMS) service providers assessment in their reacting phase. As a result of such assessment, it became evident that SMS presented the following insufficiencies:
  - hazard identification processes were not defined through out the organisation
  - although safety is a task for all, all level management responsibilities regarding SMS operations were not determined
- 2.2 During this SMS assessment, IACC own gaps to perform such function were made evident, being the more relevant:
  - safety information was not sufficiently data-based
  - risk management related to IACC safety oversight funtions was not being applied
- 2.3 Starting from the Annex 19 adoption initial proposal in 2012 and its following adoption by ICAO Council, Cuba enacted RAC 19, which establishes as a requirement the SSP implementation. This RAC, besides integrating in a unique norm the requirements concerning service providers SMS, stimulates and ensures:
  - the current safety oversight system description and its improvements and changes, as established by the SSP for every level of service providers SMS development
  - the development of hazard identification and management risks processes related to the State safety oversight funtions
  - the compliance with the requirements related to safety information, the corresponding needed database and the information flow for an effective risk management
- 2.4 Since 2014, in order to implement the State safety programme, the gap analysis was made through the system provided by ICAO in its webpage, which allowed the identification of the aspects to be priorized in the service providers SMS, as well as in IACC safety oversight system.

## 3. Corrective Action Plan (CAP) Update

- 3.1 The Corrective Action Plan (CAP) update to solve the deficiencies detected as a result of the 2008 USOAP audit was resumed after the RAC 19 adoption and was simultaneously performed with the system application to asses the SSP implementation gaps. This allowed to focus holistically the current restrictions in risk management systems of air operators, airport operators and aeronautical services operators, as well as in the IACC safety oversight system.
- 3.2 PAC update process made during 2014 made evident the need of reformulating most of the initially proposed corrective actions and of taking additional actions related to 20% of the findings embracing 30% of the concerned audit protocols.

## 4. Conclusions

- 4.1 ICAO provided to the States the guidance material for the safety programme implementation and for the development and reinforcement of safety oversight systems. Automated tools are also available in the ICAO website, to assist in the State safety oversight system assessment.
- 4.2 In the Cuban experience, in order to improve the safety oversight system, it is useful to use the guidelines and tools simultaneously for the SSP implementation, especially the gap analysis and those provided by USOAP to solve audit related deficiencies.
- 4.3 The availability of RAC 19 aligned with Annex 19 adopted by ICAO Council allows to establish the State safety oversight system requirements which addresses the main causes of the deficiencies resulting from the USOAP audit and to establish the guidelines for such system to correspond with service provider SMS performance requirements.

## 5. Proposed actions

- a) Take note on the corrective action plan experience resulting from the USOAP audit CAP udpate:
- b) Analyse the convenience of applying the SSP implementation methodologies, in particular the gap analysis, together with those proposed in the USOAP framework to solve the deficiencies detected in the audits; and
- c) Analyse the need to make available a regulatory framework aligned with Annex 19.