



WORKING PAPER

AVSEC/FAL/RG/6 — WP/17

01/06/16

SIXTH MEETING OF THE AVIATION SECURITY AND FACILITATION REGIONAL GROUP (AVSEC/FAL/RG/6)

ICAO NACC Regional Office, Mexico City, Mexico, 6 to 10 June 2016

- Agenda Item 6: Programmes and Projects - Aviation Security (AVSEC) and Facilitation (FAL)**
6.2 Procedures for the implementation of One Stop Security System (OSS) – Coordinator State: Panama

PROCEDURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ONE STOP SECURITY PROGRAMME (OSS)

(Presented by Brazil, Panama and Trinidad and Tobago)

| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| This working paper presents the proposal of Panama to implement and establish a “One Stop Security System” throughout the Region. | |
| Action: | Suggested action is presented in Section 7. |
| <i>Strategic Objectives:</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Security & Facilitation |
| <i>References:</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Fifth meeting of the Regional Group on facilitation and aviation security NAM/CAR and SAM ICAO/CLAC, (AVSEC/FAL/RG/5) and a Regional Seminar on Aviation Security (AVSEC/SEM) |

1. Introduction

1.1 For the global commercial aviation activity, both time and resources are essential components for its development. The commercial aviation system will be benefited as a whole with the implementation of the OSS, in relation to improvements in the quality of service, time minimizing, improving infrastructures, and at the same time complying with aviation security regulations.

1.2 At the Fifth Meeting of the ICAO/LACAC NAM/CAR/SAM Aviation Security and Facilitation Regional Group (AVSEC/FAL/RG/5) and the Regional Seminar on Aviation Security (AVSEC/SEM/), held in Lima, Peru, from 3 to 5 June 2015, Panama introduced and exposed through its official delegation its interest in establishing a One Stop Security Programme throughout the Region.

1.3 Once the proposal from Panama was presented, support from representatives of Trinidad and Tobago was received, as well as Brazil, for the presentation of the current ICAO working paper.

1.4 The current working paper is presented at the AVSEC/FAL/RG/6 Meeting, taking place in Mexico D.F. from 8 to 10 June 2016, and refers to the document: *Safety measures of equivalence recognition*, published on August 2015, under the authorization of the General Secretary of the International Civil Aviation Organization, and for limited distribution.

1.5 It should be noted that in this working paper have been included recommendations provided by Guyana, Peru, and Bolivia, besides the ones provided by the States of this Working Group.

2. Objective

2.1 The objective is to establish a One Stop Security System (OSS) in the entire region, with the purpose of providing sustainability to the Aviation Security System, as well as increasing operational efficiency of our airports and airlines.


3. Development

3.1 In order to avoid duplication of security controls and increase the effectiveness and sustainability of the system of aviation security, States may consider recognizing other equivalent States' aviation security systems (Recommendation 2.4.9, Annex 17).

3.2 In the context of aviation security, recognition of equivalence is defined as the acceptance and formal approval by a State, that security measures implemented in another State are at least similar to its own security measures.

3.3 As described in Figure 1, the process leading to the recognition of similarity can be validated according to the result of equivalents.

Figure 1
Process of Recognition of Equivalence




3.4 Verification of Equivalence

3.4.1 The verification process is aimed to determine if the security measures adopted and implemented in the airports of a certain State, are of the interest of the requesting State, complying with the minimum security level.

3.4.2 Related with the previous paragraph, we can mention that the flow of transfer passengers coming from the airport "A", whose level of security has been validated by the State "Y", will not need to be inspected again when addressing the airport "C". See Figure 2.

Figure 2

Recognition of Equivalence Arrangement



3.4.3 The verification process is premised upon the compliance of the involved States, or that are in process to comply minimum requirements established in standards 2.4.2, 3.1.3, 4.4.2, 4.4.3 y 4.5.4 of Annex 17.

3.4.4 The process must be documented and must include a review of appropriate documentation and on-site assessment by the State “Y” of the applicable security procedures implemented by the State “X” (**Appendix A**, only available in Spanish).

3.4.5 The review should include an assessment by the State “Y”, of all relevant elements from documents provided by State “X”, such as:

- a. Regulatory legal framework for the viability of this process.
- b. ICAO USAP audit reports.
- c. National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP), Civil Aviation Security Regulations, Airport Security Programme (ASP) and other relevant operator programmes.
- d. The nature and extent of the oversight conducted by the appropriate authority.
- e. Exchange of information on threats and risks environment.
- f. Exchange of information on recognition arrangements with other States.
- g. Regulations, practices and procedures that support the airport security controls.
- h. Security equipment used at airports, operational use of security equipment and procedures for equipment calibration and maintenance, if applicable;
- i. Security staff recruitment, background checks, training and certification procedures;

- j. Performance monitoring measures of selected airport;
- k. Tools, measures and procedures for maintaining of security;
- l. Information on security controls, collected through national quality control activities (i.e. audits, surveys inspections and tests), where available. The collected information should include the frequency, findings and other pertinent details, of the quality control activities carried out by State “X”, as well as entities engaged in those activities.
- m. Establishment of a security site on transmission of information between participating states.

Note 1: When the State “X” has recognition arrangements with other States, the State “Y” could take these arrangements into consideration when determining whether to recognize the equivalence or similarity of the State “X’s” security systems. This could be achieved through a verification of the procedures used by the State “X”.

Note 2: In addition to documents reviewing, verification should also include on-site assessment of the security system. The on-site assessments should examine all relevant factors surrounding airport and airlines operations.

Note 3: Both the documents review and the on-site assessment may target specific areas that the State “Y” is willing to recognize. For example, State “Y” may wish to limit its recognition to specific airports or to individual components in State “X”, such as hold baggage screening.

3.5 **Decision: Validation**

3.5.1 Based on the verification process, State “Y” should formally determine whether security measures at State “X” provide or not minimum equivalent guarantees to its own security system. State “Y”, based on the obtained information through the verification process, will decide to validate or not the equivalence of security measures; this decision should be documented.

3.6 **Outcome: Recognition of Equivalence**

3.6.1 The decision to recognize the equivalence can be multilateral, bilateral or unilateral.


- a) **Multilateral Recognition of Equivalence.** More than two States may choose to achieve the recognition of equivalence arrangement on a multi-lateral basis, whereby recognition of the equivalence of security measures is mutual among all States. A formal arrangement (Memorandum of Understanding –MoU— or Recognition Agreement) should describe all the requirements and responsibilities that are inherent in the implementation.

- b) **Bilateral recognition of equivalence (State “X” recognizes State “Y” and State “Y” recognize State “X”).** Two States may choose to establish recognition of equivalence arrangement on a bilateral basis, whereby the recognition of equivalence of security measures is mutual between both States. A formal arrangement (Memorandum of Understanding –MoU– or Recognition Agreement) should describe all the requirements and responsibilities that are inherent in the implementation. (see Annex B).
- c) **Unilateral recognition of equivalence (State “Y” recognizes State “X”, but State “X” does not recognize State “Y”).** When the local operational environment or national legal restrictions are not conducive to the implementation of a bilateral or multilateral arrangement, one State may agree recognition of equivalence arrangement with another State on a unilateral basis. An example of this occurs when State “Y” unilaterally recognizes the equivalence of security measures of State “X”, which does not consider equivalent security measures in State “Y”. Although State “X” is not required to recognize equivalence of aviation security measures in State “Y”, under a formal unilateral arrangement, oversight responsibilities and agreements as well as information sharing provisions should be clearly defined and assigned to both States (Annex C).

Figure 3

Multilateral Recognition of Equivalence

Reconocimiento Bilateral y Multilateral de Equivalencia de las Medidas de Seguridad



3.7 **Continuous Process: Continuous Verification of Equivalence**

3.7.1 Once a recognition arrangement is in place, on-site assessments of the applicable and implemented security procedure of State “X” should be periodically carried out by State “Y” as a means to revalidate the arrangement.

3.7.2 The frequency, with which the on-site assessments should take place, should be documented in the arrangement; and take into account the robustness and reliability of the security oversight of State “X” it is recommended that on-site re-assessments should be conducted at regular intervals not exceeding two years.

3.7.3 Formally establish a team to conduct “continuous risk assessments” of the security systems at airports, which will be part of the One-Stop Security System. A team will be formally established to conduct these risk assessments, at minimum, based on new and emerging local, regional or global threats that can significantly affect civil aviation operations.

3.7.4 Annual audits and inspections will be carried out, at minimum, to the airports that are part of the One-Stop Security System, to ensure that States and their participating airports will comply with One-Stop Security System obligations and its established arrangements.

3.8 **Notification of changes affecting the recognition of equivalence:**

- a) Any relevant changes that may affect the validity of the recognition of equivalence arrangement should be communicated as soon as possible between the States; such as operational changes, threats and risk environment.
- b) Establish a mechanism for exchanging information between appropriate authorities, airports and airlines, should be in place to facilitate and simplify changes in operational environment.
- c) Any significant change in Security Airport Programme, regulations, procedures or national legislation, whether it emanates from changes in the environment, threat or local considerations, should be communicated immediately to the States.
- d) When there is lack of compliance of the recognition of equivalence agreement (in whole or in part) that affects security outcomes and this is observed during oversight activities conducted by State “X”, or when there is reasonable doubt of non-compliance by State “X”, this should be communicated to State “Y” as soon as possible.

3.8.1 Based on the received information, States should re-assess whether recognition is still valid or not. State “Y” should reserve the right to suspend or terminate recognition of equivalence arrangement, if circumstances lead to State “Y” to conclude that applicable security procedures applied by the State “X” (or airport “A”) no longer achieve equivalent security outcomes. This decision or action must be documented and presented to stakeholders.

3.8.2 When States have accepted recognition of equivalence arrangement, on a multilateral, bilateral or unilateral basis, any new or prior recognition of equivalence arrangement must be disclosed within all involved States. Similarly, States should reserve the right to suspend or terminate their arrangement if they consider that the new recognition of equivalence arrangement agreed by a State, with which they also have an arrangement, may or will be compromised. This decision or action must be documented and presented to the stakeholders.

3.9 **Liability**

3.9.1 States should consider their legal liabilities with respect to their international obligations, taking into account their national law.

3.10 **Applications of Recognition of Security Equivalence arrangements**

3.10.1 Recognition of security measures between States can be carried out through a process to comprehensively improve safety procedures. This process, known as One-Stop Security System (OSS), whereby transfer passengers, their cabin baggage, hold baggage and cargo, are exempted from screening at a connection airport (airport “B”) if they have been screened to an equivalent level at their airport of origin (airport “A”).

3.10.2 As a result of the arrangement, airport operators and aircrafts, based on their risk assessment, may choose to not to provide exemptions from security controls.

3.11 **One-Stop Security System (OSS)**

3.11.1 One stop security allows transfer passengers, cabin baggage, hold baggage and cargo, to be exempted from screening if they have been properly screened at the airport of origin.

3.11.2 One stop security can be holistic when passengers, cabin baggage, baggage and freight exempt re-screening; or, specifically, when at least one of these elements is re-screening. A one stop security arrangement may cover the entire transfer operation between two States, or its scope may be limited to a specific airport or terminal, a number of airports and all airports within a State.

4 Benefits of One stop security system (OSS)

4.1 One stop security can be implemented by all States and its airports. However, it is advisable to perform a risk/cost/benefit assessment for each airport, and stakeholders involved, assessing the importance of implementing an OSS.

4.1.1 Benefits:

- a) Increases cooperation between States;
- b) Greater sustainability of aviation security, which can result in reallocation of resources;
- c) The transfer process is made simpler and more expeditious for travellers, resulting in shorter connections, reducing the risk of losing the connection and/or luggage at the place of destination;
- d) Increased operational efficiency of airports and airlines, including fewer delays;
- e) Increased passenger satisfaction for the service and offering a smoother travel experience;
- f) Optimization of the available resources.

5 Challenges to State “Y” that must be taken into consideration:

- a) Airport infrastructure modifications to protect passengers in the transfer area from unauthorized interference and/or to handle the separation flow of hold baggage and cargo more safely.
- b) Provide necessary resources to the appropriate authority, to establish and continuity of the arrangements, including the need for on-site assessments;
- c) Monitoring changes in the global threats and risk environment, and being prepared to take appropriate action in response to these changes, such as for example re-establishing transfers screening temporarily or permanently;
- d) Identify any liability issues that may prevent the conclusion of an arrangement.

6 Infrastructure considerations with OSS

6.1 One stop security arrangement should address matters related to infrastructure and the subsequent protection of transfer passengers and their cabin baggage, from unauthorized interference. The principal premise of OSS arrangement is that passengers, and their personal belongings concerned by the arrangement should not mixed with passengers who have not been subjected to the equivalences screening.

6.2 All transfer airports, when OSS arrangement is in place, connecting passengers not covered by the arrangement should be subject to screening before being allowed to mix with passengers covered by the arrangement. Passengers arriving from the Airport “A” should be separated from passengers arriving from the Airport “D” until those passengers have been screened.


6.3 This scenario is described in Figure 4, where the Airport “A” in State “X” has an One Stop Security arrangement with Airport “B” in State “Y”, but no arrangement is in place with Airport “D” in State “W”; in such situation the passengers arriving from airport D should not be mix with transferring passengers arriving from Airport A, until they have been subjected to screening at the airport B.

6.4 Placing physical barriers to segregate passengers with one stop security arrangement and passengers without one stop security arrangement; under this scenario, a security screening should be performed in the arrival area, before allowing people under one stop security arrangement using the same area as passengers without security arrangements.

6.5 A Contingency Plan should be put in place to address any change to the risk and threat environment, or any other significant change affecting the validity of one stop security. Mechanisms should be in place at all time at State “Y” (Airport “B”) to allow for re-screening of all passengers, cabin/hold baggage and cargo arriving from State “X” (or Airport “A”).

Figure 4

Separation of passengers for one-stop security (OSS)



6.6 One stop security arrangement can take into account other OSS arrangement, for cases in which transfer passengers, cabin baggage, hold baggage and cargo arriving at Airport “B” from Airport “A” may have already been transferred at Airport “A”, from a variety of destinations. Airport “A” should be able to demonstrate, as part of the validation and the continuous verification processes, what effective security controls have been applied to such passengers, cabin baggage and cargo.

7. Suggested actions

7.1 The Meeting is invited to:

- a) Submit to consideration and evaluation of the Meeting the proposal of implementing a One Stop Security System, based on compliance of the standards 4.4.2; 4.4.3 y 4.5.4 of Annex 17.

APPENDIX A
Lista de verificación

Inspector: _____

Fecha: _____

Área: PUNTO DE INSPECCIÓN DE SEGURIDAD **Hora:** _____

| Actividad | Norma PNSAC / PSA / Libro XXXVI | C | NC | NA | Observaciones |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------|
| Condición del equipo de rayos X (registro prueba inicial diaria) | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Condición del arco detector de metales (registro de prueba inicial) | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Condición del detector de metales manual | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Cuenta el punto de inspección de seguridad medios de comunicación | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Cuenta el punto de inspección de seguridad con un supervisor | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Cuenta el punto de inspección de seguridad con Policía Nacional | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Número adecuado de personal de inspección de seguridad | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Área privada para inspecciones físicas | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| El personal de inspección de seguridad esta certificado | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Rotación del personal de rayos X (20 min ops / 40 min. descanso) | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Todas los pasajeros / personas son inspeccionadas adecuadamente | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Todo el equipaje de mano es inspeccionado adecuadamente | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Emplean todas las funciones del arco detector de metales | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Se realiza las inspecciones aleatorias personas / equipaje (10%) | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Se emplea adecuadamente el detector de metales manual | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Se conducen inspecciones físicas de las personas adecuadamente | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Se conducen inspecciones adecuadas a los pax de movilidad reducida | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Criterios de identificación y confiscación de artículos prohibidos | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Inspección para infantes | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Inspección de artículos médicos, de salvamento/con valor de prueba o científico/las urnas cinerarias | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Cortesía en el trato a los pasajeros y personas | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |

Área: CONTROL DE ACCESO **Hora:** _____

| Actividad | Norma PNSAC / PSA / Libro XXXVI | C | NC | NA | Observaciones |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------|
| Equipo de comunicación en los puntos de control de acceso | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Cantidad adecuada del personal en el punto de control de acceso | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Listas actualizadas de restricción de acceso | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Verificación del carnet de ingreso aeroportuario | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Verificación del pase vehicular | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Procedimientos adecuados de inspección de personas | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Procedimientos adecuados de inspección de vehículos | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Poseen los SOP vigentes y propios de su puesto | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Iluminación suficiente del punto de control de acceso | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |
| Protección contra las inclemencias del tiempo (clima) | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | |

APPENDIX B

MODEL MEMORANDUM of UNDERSTANDING (MoU) FOR THE BILATERAL RECOGNITION OF AVIATION SECURITY MEASURES, between (STATE "X") AND (STATE "Y")

PREAMBLE

Considering the importance of the Standards provisions of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention 1944 of the International Civil Aviation Organization,

The Parties have agreed to the following:

OBJECTIVES

Establish an agreed basis of guarantees through accepted standard controls and security procedures by which a competent authority may select in one or more airports under its responsibility, exempt from further inspections of passengers and cabin baggage or checked baggage or cargo in transit from one or more selected airports under the responsibility of another competent authority

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Agreement and its attachments is well-defined by:

"Annex 17" ICAO International Standards and Recommended methods contained in Annex 17 - Security to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation opened for the signature in Chicago on the seventh day of December 1944 (Annex 17), as applicable;

"Competent authority" the body designated by each State under Standard 3.1.3 of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and any other national authority which are shared or delegated responsibilities set out in this Agreement;

"Carry - on Baggage" any item of personal property of a passenger to carry in the cabin of an aircraft;

"Checked Baggage" any item of personal property of a passenger to carry into the cargo compartment.

"Parties" or "Party" the signatories to this Agreement;

"Selected airport" any airport or terminal whereby the competent authority has responsibility and that has been identified by the authority, such as an airport or terminal that applies security controls to passengers and their cabin and checked baggage, in selected flight pursuant to this Agreement and listed in Attachment A;

"Selected flight" all direct flights that have been identified by the competent authority subject to security controls established in this Agreement and listed in Attachment A;

"Inspection" the application of technical procedures or other intended to identify or detect weapons, explosives or other devices, objects or hazardous materials which may be used to commit acts of unlawful interference.

SCOPE

This Agreement establishes the terms and conditions under which each party agrees to recognize the security controls of the other apply to:

Passengers, cabin and checked baggage.

The parties agree that the recognition of security controls will lead to the implementation of One Stop Security for passengers and cabin baggage and checked baggage, at selected airports of their territories, listed in Attachment A.

CONFIDENTIALITY AND NON-DISCLOSURE

The Parties on this agreement are undertaken to observe the confidentiality and secrecy of documents, information and other data received or provided by the other party during the application period of this Agreement and its attachments.

The Parties agree to sign the Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA), attached to this document as Attachment B, at the same time in that have signed the present Agreement and ruled separately by the exchange of confidential information of each one.

BASIS FOR BILATERAL RECOGNITION OF SECURITY PROCEDURES

General Regulations

In agreement with their rights and obligations under international law, the State "X" and the State "Y" reaffirm that their mutual obligation to protect the security of civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference constitutes an integral part of this Agreement

The State "X" and the State "Y" must act in accordance with the provisions on aviation security established by the International Civil Aviation Organization and annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation designated, in particular Annex 17, to the extent that these provisions are applicable to the Parties.

The Parties shall require that each aircraft operators with their registration or operators who have their main office or permanent residence on their territory and the airports operators located in their territory, shall act in conformity with such aviation security provisions

Consequently, each Party shall notify to the other Party, by its request of any gap that exists between its regulations and practices on the aviation security that has relevance for the operators of the other Party.

Without limiting the general character of their rights and obligations under international law, all the Parties shall act, in particular of compliance with the provisions of the Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed that take place aboard the aircraft (Doc 8364), signed in Tokyo on September 14th, 1963; on the Convention for the Suppression of Illegal Seizure of Aircraft (Doc 8920), signed at The La Haya on 16th of December 1970; the Convention for the Suppression of Illegal Acts against the Security of Civil Aviation (Doc. 8966), signed in Montreal on September 23rd, 1971; the Protocol for the Suppression of Illegal Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Illegal Acts against the Security of Civil Aviation, held in Montreal on 23rd September 1971 (Doc 9518), signed in Montreal on February 24th, 1988; the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Doc 9571), held in Montreal on March 1st, 1991; the Convention for the Suppression of Illegal Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Doc 9960), held in Beijing on September 10th, 2010; the Supplementary Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Illegal Seizure of Aircraft (Doc 9959), held in Beijing on September 10th, 2010 and any other multilateral Agreement on aviation security that is binding on the parties.

VALIDATION PROCESS

The Parties recognize that have exchange all the NCASP and ASP, regulations and written procedures to ensure mutual understanding of existing security measures, particularly with regard to the inspection of passengers, cabin and checked baggage. These include the following:

- a) NCASP and ASP;
- b) regulations, practices and procedures that support airport security controls;
- c) Inspection equipment used on the selected airport, operational use of inspection equipment and procedures for the calibration and maintenance of equipment, when it is appropriated;
- d) Security personnel enrollment, verification of background, training and certification procedures;
- e) Monitoring and control measures of performance in the selected airport;

- f) mechanisms, measures and procedures to maintain the security of passengers after their inspection.

The parties recognize that have exchange the information on quality controls emanating from the NQCP, when they are available. This information may include:

- a) the number of studies, inspections and tests where quality control is based on;
- b) entities or personal involved in the studies, inspection and testing;
- c) details of how the studies, inspections and tests are carried out.

The Parties recognize that have verified the procedures applied by the State to validate, based on joint evaluations on-site of security controls applied to passengers, cabin and checked baggage.

In Attachment C of this Agreement, contains a summary of the security measures in force under the interchange information mentioned in Articles XX and XX.

ONGOING REVIEW

From the entry into force of this Agreement each Party agrees to notify the other, often agreed by mutual understanding, any significant change into the programs such as, regulations and written procedures referred to in Article XX.

From the entry into force of this Agreement each Party agrees to notify the other, often agreed by mutual understanding, any significant change in the quality control measures referred to in Article XX.

From the entry into force of this Agreement, The Parties agree on develop a mutual verification of the procedures applied, often agreed by mutual understanding , based on the joint evaluations on site, of the security controls applied to passengers, cabin and checked baggage. The Parties also agree to consider favorably requirements to participate, with observer status, in the security inspections undertaken by the other Party.

CONSULTING

If a Party has reasonable found to believe that the other Party has left from the provisions of this section. The Party may request consultations. These consultations must begin within () days after you have received that request.

If after the consultations begin, there are no satisfactory agreements within () days, this will organize from the Party that requested the consultations to take action to withhold, revoke, interrupt or impose appropriate conditions to the airlines authorizations of the other Party.

When an emergency justifies the issue or when it prevents additional violations of the provisions of this Article, the Party that considers the other Party has departed from the provisions of this Article may, at any time, take proper provisional measures.

SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION

Temporary suspension

Each Party has the right of temporarily suspend the implementation of this agreement, if there is any reasonable doubt of non-compliance or non-execution, in whole or in part of the same by the other Party; or in any such case which it adducts or raises any of these reasons: national security situation, national interest, public order or public health, or an ill-fated decision of consultations under Article XX.

In such a case, the Party that wants to temporarily suspend the Agreement must give notice in writing to the other Party, through the competent authority.

Unilateral Termination

At any time each Party may give a further writing notice, through the Aeronautical competent authority, to other Party about its termination decision or revoke of this Agreement, without requiring attend on one or more of the claimed cases in the temporary suspension.

The Agreement will be over or end in a (1) year after the received date notice by the other Party, unless the termination notice will be withdrawn by mutual agreement before the expiration of this period.

AMENDMENTS

Each Party may request by writing that all or any part of this Agreement with their attachments must be amended. Such amendment should need a written mutual approval of the Parties and constitute an integral part of this Agreement. The amendments shall entry into force on an established date given in writing by the Parties.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

This Agreement shall entry into force when the last date of signature made by both parties (the "date of entry into force") and remain in force unless its finish under Article XX is appealed.

Given in the city of _____, the [] of the month of _____de 201 []

Competent Authority of State "X"

Competent Authority of State "Y"

APPENDIX 1

Attachments a of model Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)

Attachment A – List of airports (all airports recognized by The Parties, in addition to selected flights if applicable)

Attachment B - Non-Disclosure Agreement

The Parties agree not to disclose, not to disseminate and not to transmit any other form to third parties, any document or its contents or any related data arising from the exchange of information between them, without its prior written consent.

Attachment C - Security Measures (summary of security measures implemented by the Parties)

- a. USAP audit report by ICAO;
- b. National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) Airport Security Programme and other relevant operator security programs;
- c. The nature and scope of the supervision carried out by the competent authority;
- d. Exchange of information on hazard and risk;
- e. Exchange of information on acknowledgement agreement with other states;
- f. Regulations, practices and procedures that support the security controls systems of the airport;
- g. Security equipment used on the airport, with operational use of security equipment and procedures for the calibration and maintenance of equipment, if applicable;
- h. Security personnel enrollment, verification of background, training and certification procedures;
- i. Monitoring performance of selected airport;
- j. Tools, measures and procedures for the security maintenance;
- k. Information about the security controls collected by the national quality control activities (example: audits, studies, inspections and tests), if that available. The information collected should include the frequency, results and other relevant details of the quality control of the activities carried out by the X State and entities engaged in these activities.

APPENDIX C

MODEL MEMORANDUM of UNDERSTANDING (MoU) FOR THE UNILATERAL RECOGNITION OF AVIATION SECURITY MEASURES, between (STATE "X") AND (STATE "Y")

PREAMBLE

Considering the importance of the Standards provisions of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention 1944 of the International Civil Aviation Organization,

The Parties have agreed to the following:

OBJECTIVES

Establish an agreed basis of guarantees through accepted standard controls and security procedures by which a competent authority may select in one or more airports under its responsibility, exempt from further inspections of passengers and cabin baggage or checked baggage or cargo in transit from one or more selected airports under the responsibility of another competent authority

DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Agreement and its attachments is well-defined by:

"Annex 17" ICAO International Standards and Recommended methods contained in Annex 17 - Security to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation opened for the signature in Chicago on the seventh day of December 1944 (Annex 17), as applicable;

"Competent authority" the body designated by each State under Standard 3.1.3 of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and any other national authority which are shared or delegated responsibilities set out in this Agreement;

"Carry - on Baggage" any item of personal property of a passenger to carry in the cabin of an aircraft;

"Checked Baggage" any item of personal property of a passenger to carry into the cargo compartment.

"Parties" or "Party" the signatories to this Agreement;

"Selected airport" any airport or terminal whereby the competent authority has responsibility and that has been identified by the authority, such as an airport or terminal that applies security controls to passengers and their cabin and checked baggage, in selected flight pursuant to this Agreement and listed in Attachment A;

"Selected flight" all direct flights that have been identified by the competent authority subject to security controls established in this Agreement and listed in Attachment A;

"Inspection" the application of technical procedures or other intended to identify or detect weapons, explosives or other devices, objects or hazardous materials which may be used to commit acts of unlawful interference.

SCOPE

This Agreement establishes the terms and conditions under which each party agrees to recognize the security controls of the other apply to:

Passengers, cabin and checked baggage.

The parties agree that the recognition of security controls will lead to the implementation of One Stop Security for passengers and cabin baggage and checked baggage, at selected airports of their territories, listed in Attachment A.

CONFIDENTIALITY AND NON-DISCLOSURE

The Parties on this agreement are undertaken to observe the confidentiality and secrecy of documents, information and other data received or provided by the other party during the application period of this Agreement and its attachments.

The Parties agree to sign the Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA), attached to this document as Attachment B, at the same time in that have signed the present Agreement and ruled separately by the exchange of confidential information of each one.

BASIS FOR UNILATERAL RECOGNITION OF SECURITY PROCEDURES

General Regulations

In agreement with their rights and obligations under international law, the State "X" and the State "Y" reaffirm that their mutual obligation to protect the security of civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference constitutes an integral part of this Agreement

The State "X" and the State "Y" must act in accordance with the provisions on aviation security established by the International Civil Aviation Organization and annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation designated, in particular Annex 17, to the extent that these provisions are applicable to the Parties.

The Parties shall require that each aircraft operators with their registration or operators who have their main office or permanent residence on their territory and the airports operators located in their territory, shall act in conformity with such aviation security provisions

Consequently, each Party shall notify to the other Party, by its request of any gap that exists between its regulations and practices on the aviation security that has relevance for the operators of the other Party.

Without limiting the general character of their rights and obligations under international law, all the Parties shall act, in particular of compliance with the provisions of the Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed that take place aboard the aircraft (Doc 8364), signed in Tokyo on September 14th, 1963; on the Convention for the Suppression of Illegal Seizure of Aircraft (Doc 8920), signed at The La Haya on 16th of December 1970; the Convention for the Suppression of Illegal Acts against the Security of Civil Aviation (Doc. 8966), signed in Montreal on September 23rd, 1971; the Protocol for the Suppression of Illegal Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Illegal Acts against the Security of Civil Aviation, held in Montreal on 23rd September 1971 (Doc 9518), signed in Montreal on February 24th, 1988; the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Doc 9571), held in Montreal on March 1st, 1991; the Convention for the Suppression of Illegal Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Doc 9960), held in Beijing on September 10th, 2010; the Supplementary Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Illegal Seizure of Aircraft (Doc 9959), held in Beijing on September 10th, 2010 and any other multilateral Agreement on aviation security that is binding on the parties.

VALIDATION PROCESS

The Party interested into apply the acknowledgement of the security controls recognizes that has received all the NCASP and ASP, regulations and written procedures to ensure mutual understanding of existing security measures, particularly with regard to the inspection of passengers, cabin and checked baggage. These include the following:

- a) NCASP and ASP;
- b) regulations, practices and procedures that support airport security controls;
- c) Inspection equipment used on the selected airport, operational use of inspection equipment and procedures for the calibration and maintenance of equipment, when it is appropriated;
- d) Security personnel enrollment, verification of background, training and certification procedures;
- e) Monitoring and control measures of performance in the selected airport;

- f) mechanisms, measures and procedures to maintain the security of passengers after their inspection.

The Party interested into apply the acknowledgement of the security controls recognizes that has received information on quality controls emanating from the NQCP, when they are available. This information may include:

- a) the number of studies, inspections and tests where quality control is based on;
- b) entities or personal involved in the studies, inspection and testing;
- c) details of how the studies, inspections and tests are carried out.

The Party interested into apply the acknowledgement of the security controls recognizes that has verified the procedures applied by the State to validate, based on joint evaluations on-site of security controls applied to passengers, cabin and checked baggage.

In Attachment C of this Agreement, contains a summary of the security measures in force under the interchange information mentioned in Articles XX and XX.

ONGOING REVIEW

From the entry into force of this Agreement each Party agrees to notify the other, often agreed by mutual understanding, any significant change into the programs such as, regulations and written procedures referred to in Article XX.

From the entry into force of this Agreement each Party agrees to notify the other, often agreed by mutual understanding, any significant change in the quality control measures referred to in Article XX.

From the entry into force of this Agreement, The Parties agree on that The Party interested into apply the acknowledgement of the security controls develop a mutual verification of the procedures applied, often agreed by mutual understanding , based on the joint evaluations on site, of the security controls applied to passengers, cabin and checked baggage. The Parties also agree to consider favorably requirements to participate, with observer status, in the security inspections undertaken by the other Party.

CONSULTING

If a Party has reasonable found to believe that the other Party has left from the provisions of this section. The Party may request consultations. These consultations must begin within () days after you have received that request.

If after the consultations begin, there are no satisfactory agreements within () days, this will organize from the Party that requested the consultations to take action to withhold, revoke, interrupt or impose appropriate conditions to the airlines authorizations of the other Party.

When an emergency justifies the issue or when it prevents additional violations of the provisions of this Article, the Party that considers the other Party has departed from the provisions of this Article may, at any time, take proper provisional measures.

SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION**Temporary suspension**

The Party interested into apply the acknowledgement of the security controls, has the right of temporarily suspend the implementation of this agreement, if there is any reasonable doubt of non-compliance or non-execution, in whole or in part of the same by the other Party; or in any such case which it adducts or raises any of these reasons: national security situation, national interest, public order or public health, or an ill-fated decision of consultations under Article XX.

In such a case, the Party that wants to temporarily suspend the Agreement must give notice in writing to the other Party, through the competent authority.

Unilateral Termination

At any time each Party may give a further writing notice, through the Aeronautical competent authority, to other Party about its termination decision or revoke of this Agreement, without requiring attend on one or more of the claimed cases in the temporary suspension.

The Agreement will be over or end in a (1) year after the received date notice by the other Party, unless the termination notice will be withdrawn by mutual agreement before the expiration of this period.

AMENDMENTS

Each Party may request by writing that all or any part of this Agreement with theirs attachments must be amended. Such amendment should need a written mutual approval of the Parties and constitute an integral part of this Agreement. The amendments shall entry into force on an established date given in writing by the Parties.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

This Agreement shall entry into force when the last date of signature made by both parties (the "date of entry into force") and remain in force unless its finish under Article XX is appealed.

Given in the city of _____, the [] of the month of _____de 201 []

Competent Authority of State "X"

Competent Authority of State "Y"

APPENDIX 1

Attachments a of model Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)

Attachment A – List of airports (all airports recognized by The Party interested into apply the acknowledgement of the security controls, in addition to selected flights if applicable)

Attachment B - Non-Disclosure Agreement

The Parties agree not to disclose, not to disseminate and not to transmit any other form to third parties, any document or its contents or any related data arising from the exchange of information between them, without its prior written consent.

Attachment C - Security Measures (summary of security measures implemented by the Parties)

- a. USAP audit report by ICAO;
- b. National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) Airport Security Programme and other relevant operator security programs;
- c. The nature and scope of the supervision carried out by the competent authority;
- d. Exchange of information on hazard and risk;
- e. Exchange of information on acknowledgement agreement with other states;
- f. Regulations, practices and procedures that support the security controls systems of the airport;
- g. Security equipment used on the airport, with operational use of security equipment and procedures for the calibration and maintenance of equipment, if applicable;
- h. Security personnel enrollment, verification of background, training and certification procedures;
- i. Monitoring performance of selected airport;
- j. Tools, measures and procedures for the security maintenance;
- k. Information about the security controls collected by the national quality control activities (example: audits, studies, inspections and tests), if that available. The information collected should include the frequency, results and other relevant details of the quality control of the activities carried out by the X State and entities engaged in these activities.