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# EFFECT OF PPD TYPE JAMMERS ON AVIATION GPS RECEIVERS

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
# CONTENT OF THE PRESENTATION

- 1) Ground testing: effect of GPS jammers on some GPS receivers used by NAV CANADA
- 2) Flight testing: effect of a low power GPS jammer on airborne GPS receivers
- 3) Summary from the Ground and the Flight tests
- 4) Long term monitoring: presence and effect of PPD type jammers in the vicinity of a busy airport
- 5) Way forward: what should an ANS provider do about GPS jammers

# 1) GROUND TESTING

## GPS Jammers

- PPD jammers: miliwatts to hundreds of miliwatts to watts; illegal




- Not considered:
  - Military – high power jammers
  - Intentional jamming

## GPS Receivers Under Test

- 1) Ashtech SkyNav GG12W aircraft GPS receiver (TSO-C145/146 compliant);
- 2) Squid - Vehicle Location ADS-B transponder (GPS receiver built-in), manufactured by ERA (used by Nav Canada for ground vehicle tracking);
- 3) Hemisphere DGPS Receiver (used by Nav Canada to verify the exact location of the MLAT Sensors/Remote Units).




# GPS Jammer 1 (FF-15)





- Frequency: CDMA, GSM, DCS, 3G and GPS L1
- Jamming Range: up to 15 meters radius
- Output Power: Each band 300mW, total power is 1500mW

## GPS Jammer 2 (GJ6)




- Frequency: GPS L1, L2 and L5
- Jamming Range: average 10 m radius
- Output Power: Each band 300 mW, total power is 450 mW

## GPS Jammer 3 (L1/L2 Jammer)




- Frequency: 1217-1237MHz / 1565-1575 MHz
- Jamming Range: radius 5-10 meters in car (with antenna)
- › Output Power: not specified, but limited with attenuators to 10 mW during test

## GPS Jammer 4 (GP4000)




- Frequency: 1450-1600 MHz
- Jamming Range: average 5 m radius
- Output Power: “7 dB” (integrated antenna, hard to estimate actual power)

# GPS Jammer 5 (GP5000)



- Frequency: GPS L1
- Jamming Range: average 5 m radius
- Output Power: 200 mW

## Comparison of Jammers' Spectral Signatures




- Power was limited to 10 mW with attenuators (except for Jammer 4)
- Antennas for jammers 1, 2, 3 and 5 were on the roof of a vehicle
- Entire jammer 4 was on the roof of a vehicle

## Relative Position of Jammers vs. Receivers




- The vehicle with the jammers was moving towards the receivers while logging time and location – relative distance to receivers calculated
- The receivers were stationary, logging time, Number of Satellites Visible (NoSV) (Range 0 to 12) and Fix/No Fix (0 = No fix/Invalid, 1 = Standard GPS, 2 = Differential GPS)

Same receiver is affected moderately by one jammer ...




Effect of moving Jammer 2 on Squid/ERA receiver

... but quite strongly by another




Effect of moving Jammer 4 on Squid/ERA receiver

## Same jammer affects different receivers differently



Effect of moving Jammer 2 on Hemisphere DGPS receiver

## Strongest jamming effect combination




Effect of moving Jammer 4 on Hemisphere DGPS receiver

## Ashtech SkyNav – the only aircraft GPS receiver tested


- Compliance:
  - RTCA DO-178B Level ‘B’ ((Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification)
  - RTCA DO-208 (MOPS for Airborne Supplemental Navigation Equipment Using GPS)
  - RTCA DO-229D (MOPS for GPS/WAAS Airborne Equipment)
- “Features extensive anti-jam capabilities”:
  - RTCA DO-208 and DO-229D (WAAS MOPS) – meets CWI (continuous Wave Interference) specification
  - RE-ACQUISITION < 3 sec if blockage is less than 10 sec, <5 sec if blockage is 10–60 sec

## Tested aircraft GPS receiver also found vulnerable




Effect of moving Jammer 4 on Ashtech aircraft GPS receiver – the longest loss of the LPV

## Aircraft GPS receiver's S/N ratio during loss of fix



Effect of moving Jammer 4 on Ashtech aircraft GPS receiver's S/N ratio


## Other jammers barely affect Aircraft GPS receiver



Effect of moving Jammer 3 on Ashtech aircraft GPS receiver's S/N ratio



## 2) FLIGHT TESTING

### NAV CANADA Flight Inspection Fleet



- 10 mW L1 chirp signal jammer on the ground; two GPS receivers in each A/C: cockpit and test receiver
- Bombardier DHC8 flew at 3500 feet ASL outbound and 3000 feet inbound directly over the jammer
- Bombardier CRJ2 flew 1500 feet both directions with 900 m offset

## Minimum jamming effect on airborne GPS receivers



- In both cases test receivers logged minor drop in the S/N ratio
- No observable effects on the cockpit receivers

### 3) CONCLUSIONS FROM TESTING

- Exposure to GPS jamming by PPD type jammers is hard to predict:
  - Manufacturers' specifications re power and range cannot be trusted
  - Same receiver is affected by the different jammers differently
  - Same jammer affects different receivers differently
- Receivers on the ground are far more susceptible than airborne receivers:
  - Antenna radiation patterns, shielding by fuselage
  - Alternative ways of landing available where jammers are likely to be present
- Operations on the ground are at a higher risk:
  - Tracking systems for airport ground vehicles "drifting"
  - DGPS, GBAS
- Beware of stationary high-power jammers:



- \$849 at [www.jammer-store.com](http://www.jammer-store.com)
- GSM, CDMA, 3G, 4G Wimax, 4G LTE, WIFI, GPS etc.
- 60 W
- Range: 60 m


## 4) LONG TERM MONITORING

### Objectives


- Set up RF spectrum monitoring equipment capable of IDM of GPS jammers
- Learn about capabilities of the equipment
- Collect data and understand prevalence of jammers at the location (busy airport)
- Understand repercussions to aeronautical operation
- Propose operational workarounds, if any are deemed beneficial

## Equipment

- Intelligent Networkable Spectrum Monitoring Node 10MHz to 6GHz
- Embedded Linux System, Storage Limit: 512GB SSD



## Network of 4 Nodes, storing and partially processing data





- 1) 24L LOC (50 m)
- 2) 15L LOC (250 m)
- 3) 15R LOC (1200 m)
- 4) CASDE (1250 m)




## Processing software at remote location


- Real-time spectrum monitoring
- Monitors multiple nodes simultaneously
- TDOA/AOA Geo-Location




## Some detected jammers



## Some detected jammers




# Some geolocated jammers



## Some geolocated jammers




# Monthly Events Statistics



- No significant consequences to airport operation: one complaint from pilot


## Monthly Events Statistics (improved node antennas)



## NAV CANADA's shift to Performance Based Navigation

- NAV CANADA published 1578 PBN approach procedures using chart title 'RNAV (GNSS)' as of December 2017:
  - 1016 with LNAV lines of minima
  - 178 with LNAV/VNAV lines of minima
  - 355 with LPV lines of minima
  - 29 with RNP AR lines of minima
- GNSS approach often the only instrument assisted approach to remote airports; luckily, there are usually no GPS jammers there
- Many GPS jammers around major airports; luckily, there are usually alternate ground based facilities to assist landing

# RNAV/GNSS approach availability in Canada



## **5) WHAT TO DO ABOUT GPS JAMMERS**

- Should ANS providers invest in GPS jammers IDM equipment and training?
- Should procedures be introduced to address jamming, e.g. jamming events alarms, rapid reaction and location efforts, reporting to authorities?
- Should dealing with GPS jammers be entirely left to the regulators and/or law enforcement authorities?
- Should ANS providers lobby regulators and enforcers for preferential treatment in protection against GPS jammers?

# QUESTIONS ?

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