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ICAO/LACAC NAM/CAR/SAM Aviation Security and Facilitation Regional Group (AVSEC/FAL/RG)

WORKING PAPER

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Agenda Item 7: Training, Cooperation and Assistance

RESULTS OF THE CIVIL AVIATION CYBERSECURITY WORKSHOP BUENO AIRES, ARGENTINA, 19 TO 22 FEBRUARY 2019

(Presented by Secretariat)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	
This working paper presents the results of the Cybersecurity Workshop delivered by Jamaica in Buenos Aires, Argentina, from 19 to 22 February 2019, sponsored by the OAS with the presence of ICAO. The purpose of content of this WP is to review and identification of issues related to the ICAO cybersecurity work programme with this Workshop developed by Jamaica through the AVSEC/FAL/RG Regional Group.	
Action:	This working paper is intended to provide observations on the workshop content and delivery of the Cybersecurity in Aviation Workshop developed by Jamaica. It includes conclusions and recommendations with an emphasis highlighting possible discrepancies or issues with ICAO's ongoing work in aviation security and cybersecurity.
Strategic Objectives:	• Aviation Security and Facilitation
References:	• Annex 17 • Doc. 8973 Aviation Security Manual • ICAO/LACAC NAM/CAR and SAM AVSEC/FAL Regional Group

1. Introduction

1.1 A Cybersecurity Workshop sponsored by the Organization of American States (OAS) was delivered by Jamaica in Buenos Aires, Argentina, from 19 to 22 February 2019. An ICAO cybersecurity officer participated in the workshop to assess if the content of the workshop is aligned with the ICAO cybersecurity framework. After the four days of the workshop and despite the merit of Jamaica in having developed such material concluded that, the workshop content and explanations pertaining to the cyber risk assessment methodology are not aligned with ICAO's approach and with the deliberation in the Secretariat Study Group on Cybersecurity (SSGC).

1.2 Furthermore, the approach taken by the workshop facilitators when identifying the critical aviation systems, does not align with the mandate of ICAO to limit the scope to the safety and security of civil aviation and extends into passenger convenience and business sector of service providers (e.g. reservations systems).

1.3 One example is the description of methodologies and processes which omit the reference to the Risk Context Statement of ICAO and the cyber risk matrices contained therein.

However, the workshop uses info-graphics from other organizations without appropriate reference and distinction that they are not ICAO material (e.g. Info Graphic on Cyber Threats and Preparedness by CANSO, published in 2014). The development of threat scenario exercise involves elements that are outside the scope of safety and security of aviation. It focuses on business continuity and involves State sponsored attacks.

1.4 The extent to which ICAO Annexes are applicable in a State is not correctly reflected and could lead to misunderstandings of responsibilities of the appropriate authorities. The workshop includes an exercise with a strong emphasis on audit methods applied in the ICAO audit programs. However, it does not address the operational audit requirement in cybersecurity. The interrelation between safety and security is not highlighted and the explanations on the development of audit programs solely aim at the security component of IT Conversations with the workshop facilitator, point to the fact that Jamaica intends to promote the workshop in its current version to other States and Regions.

2. Conclusion

2.1 Jamaica should be congratulated for this intent to develop and have a guidance material of this important cybersecurity issue; however, the workshop was presented and delivered in a fashion that implies to be ICAO approved since the ICAO logo is present on the workshop handout, and information from restricted and sellable documents are included. Furthermore, the scope of aviation cybersecurity does not adequately reflect the ICAO mandate and the ongoing discussions of the SSGC and Council.

2.2 Although the good intention of Jamaica to continue with the promotion of the workshop in other regions, this intention would raise additional concerns to the ICAO Secretariat on a premature delivery of cybersecurity principles that could be difficult to correct by possible guidance and workshop development driven by the outcomes of the SSGC deliberation. Therefore, meanwhile an official ICAO material is completed and published, request the AVSEC/FAL/RG and Jamaica to avoid promoting this workshop, unless the solely decision of any interested State to use it. Additionally, request Jamaica to remove all ICAO Logos and reference to be an ICAO workshop from the workshop presentations and handouts.

3. Suggested actions

3.1 The AVSEC/FAL/RG/9, based on the observations made during the workshop held in Argentina, recommends that:

a) ICAO and the AVSEC/FAL Regional Group take measures to be dissociated from the workshop and to ensure that the workshop does not make implicit reference to be an ICAO workshop. This should include:

- ICAO to request from Jamaica to remove all ICAO Logos and reference to be an ICAO workshop from the workshop training material;

- ICAO to no longer promote the workshop through involvement in the logistic arrangements and to discontinue dissemination of invitations through State Letter; and

b) Due to cybersecurity is one of the emerging threats, request ICAO continue and expedite the development of a standardized cybersecurity workshop and training that can be delivered at the regional level.

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