


Session 1

Global and regional threat landscape

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International Civil Aviation Organization

UN Specialized Agency, established by the Chicago convention (1944), now counts **193** Member States:

- **issuing** legal instruments: conventions, protocols, resolutions, standards and recommended practices (SARPs) addressed **to States** contained in 19 Annexes to the Chicago Convention (1944)
- **auditing** States, and
- **assisting** them in implementation of SARPs

Threat faced by aviation industry

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Persons

- illegal entry
- documents fraud
- human trafficking
- suspected terrorists
- criminals
- FTFs

Weapons


- arms
- ammunition
- explosives

Drugs

- Illicit drugs and precursors

Goods

- contraband
- cash
- hazardous materials
- stolen items



Traditional

- Artfully concealed complex IEDs and homemade explosives
- Use of small arms
- Attacks targeting the plane
- Plane used as a weapon

Recent

- Attacks at a distance
- IEDs, small arms, vehicle-borne attacks
- Landside attacks
- Chemical threats
- Insider/non-passenger threat
- RPAS (UAS)

Emerging

- Cyber attacks
- Biological and radiological threats
- Violent extremism and perimeter breaches
- Unruly behavior and airport disruptions
- Communication of false information

Historical global response to aviation threats

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1960s




1970s-1990s

- Preboarding screening WTMD/x-ray
- Pax/bag reconciliation
- Aircraft searches
- High-risk flights procedures



2000s

- Background checks
- Cockpit security
- Shoes, LAGs
- Hold baggage screening (HBS)
- Body scanners



2010s

- Cargo enhanced security/supply chain
- Staff screening
- Cyber security
- UAS measures
- Landside security
- Artfully concealed IEDs



2020s

Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement

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Risk picture is regularly published in the
Aviation Security Global Risk Context
Statement document

(Doc 10108, Restricted)



Approved by and published under the authority of the Secretary General

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION



A dedicated WG produces global risk advice, for States and ICAO governing bodies



Risk picture is updated yearly, based on a pre-established risk assessment methodology, which considers a number of threat scenarios



Threat, consequences and vulnerability information are inputs to the assessment



SARPs are created or amended based on risk advice by this WG

AVSEC Global Risk Context Statement - Doc 10108

Next steps:

- Development of new definitions (Likelihood, Consequence)
- 4th Edition of RCS

2025

2026

Current developments

- Addendum to the 3rd Edition to be published in Q2 2025
- Risk Management Manual – end of 2025



Addendum to the Aviation Security Risk Context Statement (Doc 10108)

This addendum contains a global aviation security risk assessment intended to help inform and support ICAO Member States' risk assessments.

References to threat, risk and incidents with security threats, aviation security risks and acts of unlawful interference (AUI).

This addendum is an update to Chapter 3 and 4 of the *Global Risk Context Statement* (Doc 10108) – responsible for conducting national and international decision makers, practitioners and other relevant stakeholders of this document must be applied in aviation security information.

This document supports Global Priority Area Aviation Security Plan (Doc 10118).

May 2025

VEHICLE-BORNE AIRSIDE ATTACKS

Vehicle-borne airside attacks could be an IED concealed by an insider with legitimate airside access and detonated inside a vehicle targeting an airport facility or a parked or moving aircraft; an attack by the ramming of a vehicle into an airport facility airside where passengers are present; or the use of a fake emergency or liveried vehicle to pass a vehicle checkpoint with the intent of attacking parked or moving aircraft on the airside.

Likelihood	Consequence	Residual Vulnerability	Residual Risk	Trend
MEDIUM-LOW	MEDIUM-HIGH	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	—

Mitigation: Integration of security considerations into the design and construction of airport facilities, or modification of existing ones, use designs and materials to mitigate the destructive impact of a bomb blast, effective detection and response measures in place, checkpoint screening of staff and vehicles and airside vehicle management and background checks.

CYBER AUIs

A cyber-attack refers to an attack on civil aviation critical systems, data or information; this assessment only applies to attacks on critical systems. The cyber domain may be seen as a target for attack or as a vector or facilitator for physical aviation security attacks. This assessment only applies to attacks on critical systems that may result in an AUI.

Likelihood	Consequence	Residual Vulnerability	Residual Risk	Trend
LOW	HIGH	MEDIUM-LOW	MEDIUM	—

Mitigation: For information on how to manage risks in civil aviation, please refer to Doc 10213, *Global Cyber Risk Considerations*, which will be issued in 2025.

CONVENTIONAL HIJACK

This type of threat covers the commandeering of an aircraft to perpetrate a conventional hijack where hostages are taken and demands made which may be resolved by negotiation or force.

Likelihood	Consequence	Residual Vulnerability	Residual Risk	Trend
MEDIUM-LOW	MEDIUM-LOW	MEDIUM-LOW	MEDIUM-LOW	—

Mitigation: Lockable reinforced cockpit doors, security screening of passengers and staff and access control, consideration given to aircraft which may be exempt from certain measures, lockable flight crew compartment doors, installation of secondary cockpit doors, deployment of in-flight security officers, employment checks and enhanced background checks (initial and reoccurring), training of crew on appropriate response procedures, promote passenger awareness and reporting, train staff in behavioural detection and response planning and preparedness.

Risks identified:

- Attacks using cargo and mail consignments
- Attacks at a distance, especially in conflict zones
- Attacks using unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)
- Threat posed by insiders
- Violent extremism, which may include politically motivated acts
- Cyber-attacks
- Acts attributed to unrest and attacks in, or near, conflict zones
- Attacks at airport landside areas
- Communication of false information



Risks under in-depth assessment:

- Liquids, Aerosols and Gels (LAGs)
- Cargo
- Artificial Intelligence (AI)



Aviation Cyber Risk Management

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"WE COULDN'T HIRE THE CYBERSECURITY CANDIDATE YOU SENT US, HE WAS SAYING TOO MANY SCARY THINGS ABOUT OUR COMPUTERS,"



Doc 10213 — Restricted

Global Cyber Risk Considerations

(FIRST EDITION, 2025)


Approved by and published under
the authority of the Secretary General

First Edition — 2025

International Civil Aviation Organization

Annex 17

12th Edition – July 2022



Standards:

- Domestic operations
- Review the level of threat to civil aviation
- Procedures to share with airport and aircraft operators, air traffic service providers or other entities
- Priorities and frequency of monitoring activities
- Establishing security restricted areas
- Vehicles/items access to security restricted areas
- Aircraft security check or a search
- Mitigation measures against MANPADS
- Decision to deploy in-flight security officers (based on threat assessment)
- Security measures are established for landside areas
- Measures relating to cyber threats

Recommended Practices:

- Procedures to deal with unidentified baggage
- Measures for the protection of critical systems and/or data

Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP)

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Aspirational Goal:

To achieve and maintain a strong global aviation security system that is underpinned by full and effective implementation of ICAO aviation security Standards in all Member States

Milestones:

- By 2027, 65% of States reach or surpass 75% EI
- By 2030, 80% of States reach or surpass 75% EI
- By 2033, 100% of States reach or surpass 75% EI

2nd Edition – July 2024

NACC

Regional threat landscape

ICAO NACC Region Background

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- 22 States
- 19 Territories
- 26 Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs)
- 44 Flight Information Regions (FIRs) – 29 in NAM, 15 in CAR

✈ 22.9% RPKs share of the Air Passenger Market

✈ International traffic heavily concentrated in 3 States



Major events:

- G7 Summit in Canada, 2025
- FIFA World Cup, 2026
- Olympic Games in Los Angeles, 2028
- Major cultural events and concerts



AUID – 2022-2025

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NACC	
Attack on aircraft in flight (e.g. sabotage and use of weapon on board):	12
Attack on airport/other aviation facility (including a/c on the ground):	10
Attack using aircraft as a weapon (including UAS):	0
Cyber-attack which endangers aviation safety:	5
Other (e.g perimeter breach and false threat):	87
Unlawful seizure of aircraft (including flight deck breach):	5

NACC 119
(30 acts, 79 incidents)



Threats identified:


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- Terrorist threat
- Criminal activity and gun violence
- Civil unrest and protests
- Cybersecurity

Challenges in the region:


- Lack of financial resources
- High staff turnover
- Natural disasters
- Low political priority
- Oversight activities
- Security culture and training
- Implementation of new technologies

NACC USAP-CMA - risk related SARPs



SAM

Regional threat landscape





ICAO SAM Background

- The SAM Region includes 13 States, covering 16% of global airspace, handling 5% of world passengers and 2.5% of cargo. Its geography—dominated by the Andes and Amazon—makes air transport essential.
- Recent major events such as the G20 Summit in Brazil and APEC in Peru (2024), as well as the upcoming COP30 in Brazil (2025), highlight the region's growing global role and the critical need for robust aviation infrastructure and security preparedness.

AUID – 2022-2025


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SAM

Attack on aircraft in flight (e.g. sabotage and use of weapon on board): 2
 Attack on airport/other aviation facility (including a/c on the ground): 6
 Attack using aircraft as a weapon (including UAS): 0
 Cyber-attack which endangers aviation safety: 0
 Other (e.g perimeter breach and false threat): 8
 Unlawful seizure of aircraft (including flight deck breach): 0

SAM 16
(13 acts, 3 incidents)



Threats identified:

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
- Organized crime and drug trafficking
- Terrorist threat
- Civil unrest and protests
- Cybersecurity risks

Challenges in the region:

- Limited financial resources
- High staff turnover
- Natural disasters
- Low prioritization of aviation security
- Weak regulatory oversight
- Security culture and training
- Need for strengthened security culture and continuous training
- Implementation of new technologies

SAM USAP-CMA - risk related SARPs

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Discussion

What is your national threat picture?