



DGP/22-IP/8  
9/10/09

## **DANGEROUS GOODS PANEL (DGP)**

### **TWENTY-SECOND MEETING**

**Montréal, 5 to 16 October 2009**

**Agenda Item 5: Resolution, where possible, of the non-recurrent work items identified by the Air Navigation Commission or the panel:**

**Agenda Item 5.3: Review of provisions for dangerous goods relating to batteries:**

- a) **lithium batteries**
- b) **battery-powered devices**
- c) **battery-powered mobility aids**

### **LITHIUM BATTERY PROPOSALS TO THE DANGEROUS GOODS PANEL (DGP)**

(Presented by M. Rogers)

## ICAO Safety Management System (SMS)

- Lithium Battery Shipments must be assessed using established SMS principles
- ICAO website provides guidance on applying SMS

## Definition of risk

- **Risk** – The assessment, expressed in terms of predicted **probability** and **severity**, of the consequence(s) of a hazard taking as reference the worst foreseeable situation
  - *A wind of 15 knots blowing directly across the runway is a **hazard***
  - *A pilot may not be able to control the aircraft during takeoff or landing is one of the **consequences** of the hazard*
  - *The assessment of the consequences of the potential loss of control of the aircraft by the pilot expressed in terms of probability and severity is the **risk***

## Second fundamental – Risk probability

Probability of occurrence		
Qualitative definition	Meaning	Value
<b>Frequent</b>	Likely to occur many times ( <i>has occurred frequently</i> )	<b>5</b>
<b>Occasional</b>	Likely to occur some times ( <i>has occurred infrequently</i> )	<b>4</b>
<b>Remote</b>	Unlikely, but possible to occur ( <i>has occurred rarely</i> )	<b>3</b>
<b>Improbable</b>	Very unlikely to occur ( <i>not known to have occurred</i> )	<b>2</b>
<b>Extremely improbable</b>	Almost inconceivable that the event will occur	<b>1</b>

## Third fundamental – Risk severity

- Definition
  - **Severity** – The possible effects of an unsafe event or condition, taking as reference the **worst foreseeable situation**


## Third fundamental – Risk severity

Severity of occurrences		
Aviation definition	Meaning	Value
<b>Catastrophic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Equipment destroyed.</li> <li>➤ Multiple deaths.</li> </ul>	<b>A</b>
<b>Hazardous</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ A large reduction in safety margins, physical distress or a workload such that the operators cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely.</li> <li>➤ Serious injury.</li> <li>➤ Major equipment damage.</li> </ul>	<b>B</b>
<b>Major</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ A significant reduction in safety margins, a reduction in the ability of the operators to cope with adverse operating conditions as a result of increase in workload, or as a result of conditions impairing their efficiency.</li> <li>➤ Serious incident.</li> <li>➤ Injury to persons.</li> </ul>	<b>C</b>
<b>Minor</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Nuisance.</li> <li>➤ Operating limitations.</li> <li>➤ Use of emergency procedures.</li> <li>➤ Minor incident.</li> </ul>	<b>D</b>
<b>Negligible</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ Little consequences</li> </ul>	<b>E</b>

## Fourth fundamental – Risk index/tolerability

Risk probability	Risk severity				
	Catastrophic A	Hazardous B	Major C	Minor D	Negligible E
Frequent 5	5A	5B	5C	5D	5E
Occasional 4	4A	4B	4C	4D	4E
Remote 3	3A	3B	3C	3D	3E
Improbable 2	2A	2B	2C	2D	2E
Extremely improbable 1	1A	1B	1C	1D	1E

## Fourth fundamental – Risk index/tolerability

Risk management	Assessment risk index	Suggested criteria
 <p>Intolerable region</p>	<p><b>5A, 5B, 5C, 4A, 4B, 3A</b></p>	<p>Unacceptable under the existing circumstances</p>
<p>Tolerable region</p>	<p><b>5D, 5E, 4C, 4D, 4E, 3B, 3C, 3D, 2A, 2B, 2C</b></p>	<p>Acceptable based on risk mitigation. It might require management decision</p>
<p>Acceptable region</p>	<p><b>3E, 2D, 2E, 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 1E</b></p>	<p>Acceptable</p>

## Lithium Batteries in Current Regulatory Scheme

- The risk presented by large shipments of lithium batteries represent an “unacceptable risk under the existing circumstances”
- Current regulatory scheme excepts “small” batteries, allowing thousands of these batteries together in one cargo compartment
- *SMS principles demand that ICAO act to mitigate this risk*

## How to Mitigate the Risk of a Lithium Battery Fire

- Fire is caused by:
  - External Short Circuit
  - Damage
  - Internal Short Circuit (Manufacturing Defect)
  - Improper Design (Counterfeit Batteries)
  - Heat from another suppressed fire
- Not every fire can be eliminated by following the Technical Instructions
- *We must manage the severity of the consequence to mitigate the risk*

## Managing the Severity of a Lithium Battery Fire

- The severity of a fire is dependent on the size and number of lithium batteries
- The Technical Instructions place limits on the size of a battery, but not on the number that may be loaded
- New restrictions per cargo compartment must be introduced to limit the severity of a fire
- Cargo compartment restrictions are not possible without batteries being fully regulated

## The issue of non-compliance

- Shippers are generally attempting to comply with current regulations
- Fires are often cited as the only indication of non-compliance
- Regulations are complicated and confusing
- Training is essential to ensuring compliance
- A Class 9 system reduces regulatory complexity, making compliance and enforcement easier



## August 14<sup>th</sup> Minneapolis Incident

- Shipment was in compliance with existing U.S. Requirements
  - Batteries were individually wrapped to prevent short circuit and inadvertent activation
  - Batteries had undergone UN Testing
  - Batteries were boxed and then placed in strong outer packagings



# August 14th Minneapolis Incident



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## August 14<sup>th</sup> Minneapolis Incident

- Complied with all ICAO requirements except Lithium Battery Handling Label and possibly the document requirement
- Regardless of the origin of the fire, ICAO regulations allow thousands of e-cigarettes to be legally loaded in a single cargo compartment
- The Aircraft Halon System could not have extinguished this fire
- Lithium Metal Battery Shipments such as this are permitted outside of Class 9 on passenger airliners

## Statements of Other Organizations

- U.S. National Transportation Safety Board:
  - Require aircraft operators to implement measures to reduce the risk of primary lithium batteries becoming involved in fires on cargo-only aircraft, such as transporting such batteries in fire resistant containers and/or in restricted quantities at any single location on the aircraft
  - Eliminate regulatory exemptions for the packaging, marking, and labeling of cargo shipments of small secondary lithium batteries

## Statements of Other Organizations

- U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Pipelines and Hazardous Materials:
  - Require packages containing lithium cells and batteries to be identified as hazardous material
  - Establish limits on the number of lithium cells and batteries that may be contained in a single package, and limits on the number of packages that may be transported in a unit load device, pallet, container or compartment on board aircraft

## The Position of the Panel

- If an accident occurs with hundreds of fatalities, it will be difficult to justify a regulatory scheme that allows thousands of batteries on a passenger aircraft considering:
  - Batteries are not fully regulated
  - No limit exists on the number of batteries transported
  - The incident history and clear fire risk
  - The positions of other organizations

## IFALPA Proposals

- Fully Regulate Lithium-ion and Lithium-metal batteries as Class 9 Dangerous Goods
- Impose quantity restrictions on batteries in cargo compartment to mitigate the risk of a fire
- Improve Communication to Shippers offering Lithium Batteries

— END —